

TRANSITION FROM URBAN MANAGERIALISM TO URBAN
ENTREPRENEURIALISM IN TURKEY; THE EXAMPLE OF DALOKAY
(SOCIETY-ORIENTED MUNICIPALISM) AND GÖKÇEK (SOCIAL
MUNICIPALISM)

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis examines the transition from urban managerialism to urban entrepreneurialism in Turkey in the case of Ankara. The transformation of urban governance put forward by Harvey has widely discussed in the urban literature. However, how Harvey's theoretical framework has realized in Turkey was rarely discussed. In this study, the change in Turkey has been examined by considering the society-oriented municipalism emerged in the 1970s and the social municipalism approaches applied in the 2000s. Jessop's strategic-relational approach is also used. In this way, the change in local government practices in Turkey could be evaluated in the unique spatial and temporal context of the country and the urban area. Ankara mayors, Dalokay and Gökçek, who could be defined as the architects of both municipal approaches, are considered as strategic actors in the study. In the thesis, the decisions of the mayors, their projects and their relations with different political and economic groups were examined. In addition, important political, economic and social changes in Turkey and the world before the period in which the mayors took office were

also included. In this way, a broader perspective is presented in terms of the structure, relationships and context in which mayors take office as strategic actors and how they are affected while formulating their decisions and projects.

Keywords: Urban Managerialism, Urban Entrepreneurialism, Society-Oriented Municipalism, Social Municipalism, Strategic Relational Approach

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE'DE KENT YÖNETİCİLİĞİNDEN KENTSEL GİRİŞİMCİLİĞE GEÇİŞ; DALOKAY (TOPLUMCU BELEDİYESİ) VE GÖKÇEK (SOSYAL BELEDİYESİ) ÖRNEĞİ

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Bu tez Türkiye'deki kent yöneticiliğinden kentsel girişimciliğe geçişi Ankara örneğinde incelemektedir. Harvey'in ortaya attığı kentsel yönetişimin dönüşümü kent literatüründe oldukça tartışılmaktadır. Bununla birlikte Harvey'in teorik çerçevesinin Türkiye'de nasıl gerçekleştiği ise nadiren tartışılmaktadır. Bu çalışmada Türkiye'de yaşanan değişim 1970'lerde ortaya çıkan toplumcu belediyeçilik ve 2000'lerde ise sosyal belediyeçilik yaklaşımları ele alınarak incelenmiştir. Ayrıca Jessop'ın stratejik-ilişkisel yaklaşımı da kullanılmıştır. Bu sayede Türkiye'de yerel yönetim pratiklerinin değişimi ülkenin ve kentin kendi özgün mekânsal ve zamansal bağlamında değerlendirilebilmiştir. Her iki belediyeçilik yaklaşımının mimarları olarak tanımlanabilecek Ankara belediye başkanları olan Dalokay ve Gökçek çalışmada stratejik aktörler olarak ele alınmıştır. Tezde belediye başkanlarının kararları, projeleri, farklı siyasi ve ekonomik gruplarla olan ilişkileri incelenmiştir. Ayrıca belediye başkanlarının görev aldıkları dönemin öncesinde Türkiye ve Dünya'da yaşanan önemli siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal değişimlere de yer verilmiştir. Böylelikle belediye başkanlarının stratejik aktörler olarak göreve geldikleri yapı, ilişkiler ve bağlam

ile karar ve projelerini oluřtururken nasıl etkilendikleri konusunda daha geniř bir perspektif sunulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kent Yöneticilięi, Kentsel Giriřimcilik, Toplumcu Belediyecilik, Sosyal Belediyecilik, Stratejik İliřkisel Yaklařım

To My Family

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party
ANAP	Motherland Party
CHP	Republican People's Party
DP	Democrat Party
FP	Virtue Party
RP	Welfare Party
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
SHP	Social-Democratic Populist Party
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
SRA	Strategic-Relational Approach

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the last 50 years, Turkey has witnessed two different and effective municipal experiences. The subject of the thesis is the examination of transition from urban managerialism to urban entrepreneurialism in Turkish local governments through two unique municipal approaches which are the society-oriented municipalism in the 1970s and the social municipalism that started to be effective from the beginning of the 2000s. Harvey's framework of urban managerialism and urban entrepreneurialism emerged from his examination of the transition in urban areas in USA having its own unique structures and actors. However, these two municipalism approaches (society-oriented and social municipalism) are the local government experiences belonging to Turkish literature and experience. Therefore, examination of these municipal approaches would be useful to provide better understanding for the transition experience in Turkey. Moreover, Jessop's theoretical framework for the state would also be deployed while examining the Turkish experience by presenting the unique structures and crises for understanding relationships which actors have to act and respond. Thereby, Turkish experience in the transition from urban managerialism to entrepreneurialism could be approached from different dimensions and aspects which provides better understanding of Turkish responses (society-oriented municipalism and social municipalism) to this transition.

Local governments in Turkey have developed differently than in Western countries. During the Ottoman period, local governments were generally under the administration of the centre, and they were not autonomous administrative units like those in Europe. However, it should not be understood that these local governments were units completely under the control of the central government and extensions of the centre. Local governments, whose organizational structure

was formed during the Ottoman period, were able to develop power against the central government from time to time and create more autonomous structures. In addition, different groups in the urban areas played an active role in the economic and social life of the city. In this sense, it is possible to talk about a unique local government structure in the Ottoman Empire. With the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the system in the Ottoman Empire was centralized even more and largely preserved. However, the demands for a more autonomous local government structure against this centralization tendency started with the gradual growth of the urban areas and their increasing importance, but the state structure generally preserved its centralized nature. Along with this situation, some strategic actors elected for the city administration as mayors have been very effective both in the change of structures and in terms of redefining relations in urban politics. Society-oriented municipalism and social municipalism emerge as two municipal movements that are formed organically by the decisions and practices of strategic actors within the limitations and opportunities of existing structures.

These strategic actors, who created two different municipalism movements by pushing and using the limitations and opportunities of the existing structures, changed not only their own local governments but also became an example for the functioning of other municipalities. In this sense, the decisions and practices of these actors, who use the opportunities, constraints, and crises of their own time, are important. In this thesis, the mayors of Ankara, Vedat Dalokay and İbrahim Melih Gökçek, will be examined as the important architects of two different municipal movements. Jessop's strategic-relational approach was used as a theoretical framework. The strategic relational approach grasps the state as a social relation. According to the approach, formation and change continue within the structures through restructuring by the decisions and practices of the actors in strategic positions. Another important part here is the spatio-temporal context in which the actors are operating. Because the decisions, practices, and thoughts of the actors can only be interpreted in their own time and place. Therefore, the political, economic, and social situation of the actors both draws the boundaries

of the decisions and practices of the actors and offers different opportunities for them to create their own strategic selectivities. Therefore, in the thesis, important political, economic, and social movements from the World that affect both the actors and Turkey will be included.

Rapid urbanization from the 1950s to the 1970s and starting again from the second half of the 1980s has been quite influential in Turkish politics. With these urbanization movements targeting big cities, the urban problems have grown considerably in both periods due to the indifference or inability of the central governments to address the issue. Especially people who had migrated to urban areas and lived in squatter's houses were very important for both municipality movements. These municipalism movements developed within the framework of the problems and demands of the urban poor. However, there are many differences in their approach to this urban problem. Visions for urban governance both in Turkey and in the World are also important factors since they affect the role of urban areas in broader political and economic structures. To lay down periods, urban governance understandings Harvey's concepts of urban management and urban entrepreneurship will be used. As mentioned before, the difference in the periods in which the actors lived is also reflected in the urban policies. While it is more appropriate to interpret Dalokay, the actor of the society-oriented municipalism movement, in the context of urban management, which is the dominant urban role of the welfare state period, Gökçek should be interpreted in the context of urban entrepreneurship. The approaches of the actors to urban governance gain more meaning from Harvey's point of view while examining their periods.

The two municipalism approaches are similar in terms of their starting points and the problems they faced. However, they differentiated considerably from each other with the different perspectives of the mayors as strategic actors in terms of formulating different policies for the solutions to the urban problems. In this thesis, two different municipalism movements will be examined through the strategic actions of the strategic actors: Dalokay and Gökçek. Moreover, spatio-

temporal context will also be deployed to interpret their actions. Lastly, two municipal approaches will be examined in several aspects to present similarities and differences.

1.1. The Aim and Scope of the Thesis

This study aims to evaluate the experiences of society-oriented municipalism and social municipalism through two mayors in Ankara with a strategic relational approach. There are three reasons for choosing Ankara in the research. Firstly, it is one of the cities most affected by the urbanization experiences of Turkey. This reason played an important role in the selection of Ankara, as the two municipalism movements to be compared were very affected by the problems and demands of squatter's houses caused by rapid urbanization. Secondly, the main actors of the two municipal movements were the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara. However, the actors who had a significant impact on the rise of social municipalism in Istanbul, later took part in the central government and left the local government. This created a disconnection for Istanbul between the emergence of the social municipality and the period when it reached a legal framework in the 2000s. Therefore, Ankara offers a better perspective in terms of the continuity of the actors in the analysis of the social municipality movement. Thirdly, the actors in Ankara were more active and different from the actors in other cities. The two mayors to be examined were more prominent in their mayoral practices than their colleagues in Istanbul during their time. This situation has also increased the research sources and literature on the two mayors of Ankara, which facilitated the research process of this thesis.

The scope of the thesis is the examination of the decisions and practices of Dalokay and Gökçek, who are taken as strategic actors representing two different municipalism movements. In this context, some strategic decisions of the mayors that are effective in using the opportunities of the existing structures and pushing the boundaries of it for the transformation of the structures will be examined. Therefore, this thesis does not aim to present all the decisions and practices of

Dalokay and Gökçek during their term as mayors. It is aimed to examine the decisions and practices of mayors within the framework of the characteristic features identified for their municipal approaches. In other words, the thesis examines the mayors' decisions and actions which are considered to be effective in the formation of their municipal approaches and their relations with the existing structures. Accordingly, transforming urban rent to the society and relationships with different state and social actors will be important for the society-oriented municipalism. On the other hand, social aids will be emphasized in social municipalism.

In addition, the relations that mayors establish with society and structures are also important. Because both movements emerged through the policy solutions, they offered to the problems arising from the urban poor and the existing structure. In this context, actors' relationships with the urban poor will also be examined with the perspective of the mode of representation as one of the state dimensions Jessop provided. Moreover, since dominant political and economic movements and structures are influential on the decisions of strategic actors, a brief summary of dominant political and economic movements as well as political and social disturbances in Turkey will be given before each case.

The period 1973-1980 will be examined for society-oriented municipalism. However, the focus will be on the 1973-1977 period when Dalokay served. However, the 1977-1980 period will also be included because it is seen as a continuation of Dalokay's influence on the urban politics of Ankara. However, period between the 1980 to 1994 was not examined for several reasons. 1980-1984 period was just after the military coup and the mayor, who was a general, was appointed from the military government directly. Therefore, it is quite difficult to examine any municipal approach in that period. There were two mayors served in the periods between 1984 to 1989 and 1989 to 1994. The first one was under Mehmet Altınoy and the second one was under Murat Karayağın. The most critical part for this thesis is to examine strategic actors being able to formulate unique policies in terms of approach to municipalism.

Even though those mayors were also influential in their terms, it is hard to determine the characteristics in their approaches. In other words, there were not able to present unique and structurally significant approaches to municipalism. Therefore, their periods were not examined in this thesis. The period between 2004-2014 will be used to examine the Gökçek period. Although he became the mayor in 1994, the thesis focuses on the period after 2004, when the social municipality gained its structural framework. Even though there could be seen the first implementations of social municipalism in the period between 1994-2004, social municipalism have gained its characteristics after the 2004. Therefore, examining social municipalism after 2004 will provide better context to discover characteristics of this approach. The period after 2014 will not be included because of the extraordinary events experienced in Turkey (attempted coup in 2016, significant structural changes in constitution in 2018) and in Ankara as Gökçek's resignation in 2017. Therefore, the 2004-2014 period will be chosen for social municipalism. As result, the scope of the thesis is limited to those periods (1970s and 2000s) since those municipal approaches are the two landmarks of Turkish transition from urban managerialism to entrepreneurialism.

1.2. Methodology

This thesis uses a systematic review method for examining the transition from urban managerialism to entrepreneurialism and two different municipalism experiences in Ankara. A systematic review entails an exhaustive, explicit, reproducible, and synthesized analysis of all relevant literature with respect to a certain area of interest (Tranfield et al., 2003). For this purpose, systematic review strategy was used to locate, evaluate, and compile relevant sources of information regarding the society-oriented and social municipalism. A comparison is also another fundamental tool of analysis. The comparative method is also applied for looking for patterns of similarities and differences, explaining continuity and change. It strengthens the power of description and plays a central role in concept-formation by bringing into focus suggestive

similarities and contrasts among cases. On the most basic level, comparison involves the description of similarities and differences. Providing contextual descriptions of a set of structure, culture, political, and economic situation enhances the understanding and ability to interpret different cases. This study aims to present a Turkish experience of transition from urban managerialism to entrepreneurialism through examining two municipalism approaches naming society-oriented municipalism and social municipalism on the basis of strategic actors rather than proposing hypothesized predictions. In this sense, this research will be “theory-guided case study” which seeks to “explain, interpret, and/or understand a single case as an end in itself” empowered by a “well-developed conceptual framework” instead of drawing generalizations (Levy 2008, 4). Case studies are widely used for this aim. Even though studies using a small number of cases (small-N) have usually been criticised, this thesis aims to know more about less rather than less about more (Gerring 2007). Collier says:

“The decision to analyse only a few cases is strongly influenced by the types of political phenomena under study and how they are conceptualized. Topics for which it is productive to examine relatively few cases include revolutions, particular types of national political regimes, or particular forms of urban political systems.” (Collier, 1993)

It is also essential that the objects of analysis are compared on the basis of a common theoretical framework and that this is performed by drawing on equivalent conceptualizations and methods (Esser & Vliegenthart, 2017). Moreover, the context and boundaries of the cases should be supplemented before analysing, since “systems and cultures are not frozen in time; rather, they are constantly changing under the influence of transformation processes” (Esser & Vliegenthart, 2017). Therefore, this thesis tries to provide the historical background and political, economic, and social conditions of each case before examining them. Additionally, comprehensive and in-depth descriptions offer knowledge and preliminary theories about intriguing subjects as well as possible contributing elements to the explanation of similarities and differences.

Literature review and secondary data analysis will be deployed in data collection. While a literature review will be conducted both for theoretical framework and cases, secondary data analysis will be used for the cases. Scientific journals, dissertations, newspapers, governmental documents and reports, NGO reports, and political party brochures will be used as secondary data sources. The keywords which are used for scanning are: ‘social municipality’, ‘society-oriented municipality’, ‘social aid’, ‘Vedat Dalokay’, ‘Melih Gökçek’, ‘Ankara Municipality’, ‘Ankara Metropolitan Municipality’ with their Turkish translations as well. The references given in dissertations and scientific journals are also used to trace for exploration of the knowledge. Both qualitative and quantitative research are used as secondary data sources.

While determining the strategic actions of strategic actors, some categorizations or critical points proposed by Jessop’s conceptualization for the state have been deployed. The dominant political views of the period, the structures actors are operating within, and the important problems of the period are important in the strategic effect of the mayor on the structure of local governments. Accordingly, the political movements that the actors were affected by, the dominant urban problems in their periods, the dominant political trends in urban politics, the strategies chosen by the mayors for the welfare of the people living in the city, and the relationship of the mayors with the society in the context of their representation, the structural and social crises, the way they use structural and social crises, the role of local governments in the state structures will be the main points to be used in comparing and examining transition in the two municipal approaches. The political movements and urban problems that were dominant in their period present the framework of the problems that the actors were affected and faced. The solutions produced to urban problems are important in terms of strategies how to distribute resources. In addition, the roles of local governments in the state structure are important in terms of constraining the interaction of strategic actors with the structure and what kind of structuring they want. The forms of representation established by the mayors with the public are also important in terms of influencing the decisions and actions of the actors. Finally,

how strategic actors approach structural and social crises and how they use them are also important in terms of creating strategic selectivities for the future of structures. Therefore, the strategic thoughts and actions of mayors have been determined in terms of the categories listed above, and in the conclusion part of the thesis, two municipalities will be evaluated through Jessop's theoretical approach for understanding Turkish experience for the transition from urban managerialism to entrepreneurialism.

1.3. Limitations

Since this thesis is based only on the mayors of the city of Ankara and their practices within the framework of two different municipalism movements, it is difficult to generalize the practices of the approaches mentioned in this thesis to other cities and mayors. Since these two municipalism approaches are highly dependent on the actors, the practices in other cities will also be different. There are differences even between mayors belonging to the same movement in their own periods. Even though many cities in Turkey experience similar problems to the city of Ankara, it should not be forgotten that each city has its own problems, types of relations, and mayors for formulating their own solutions. In addition, the strategic relational approach has been used in the thesis for examining only the strategic activities of the actors during their mayoralty periods in terms of their relations with the structure. In this context, this thesis does not aim to approach the municipal activities of mayors holistically and to present all their activities.

In the analysis of the Gökçek period, the social municipalism period of the thesis will be more understandable and clearer with the data that may emerge in the following years due to the lack of data and the possibility of being misleading. The emergence of new data may provide a better understanding of the issues mentioned in this thesis for future studies on the Gökçek period.

1.4. Structure of the Thesis

The thesis consists of 7 chapters together with this chapter. While the first chapter introduces the thesis, it also presents the purpose of the thesis, its context, the methodology used, the limitations of the thesis, and an overview of the next chapters. The second chapter will present the theoretical framework of the thesis. In this section, the state discussions that started with Poulantzas will be continued with Jessop. The point of view of Jessop, who sees the state as a social relationship, on state-society relations will be emphasized. Afterward, the strategic relational approach as the most important theoretical framework for the thesis will be provided. Strategic actors that are important for the strategic-relational approach, the relations of actors with structures, path-dependency, spatio-temporal context concepts will be explained. In addition, six dimensions of the state that emerged as a result of Jessop's state approach will be presented. Afterward, Harvey's concepts of urban management and urban entrepreneurship will also be examined in order to better understand the practices of mayors since they are affected by the dominant urban governance approaches.

The third chapter will examine the change process of local governments in Turkey, starting from the Ottoman period until 1973, by dividing it into two subsections as the Ottoman period and the Republican period. The forms of government, legal frameworks, and effective political ideas will be given. This section will also touch on the social and political changes that took place in the World and in Turkey until the 1970s, which are thought to have affected the formation of society-oriented municipalism.

The fourth chapter examines the first municipal approach and actor that will be examined in the thesis: social municipalism and Dalokay. In this section, the content of society-oriented municipalism and the principles that are important for this approach will be mentioned. Afterward, the Dalokay period will be discussed. In this period, Dalokay's relations with the central government, urban groups, and his own party will be examined. Dalokay's realized and unrealized

projects having strategic importance will be included, and the importance of these projects in the formation of society-oriented municipalism will be discussed. This section will also touch on the period of Dinçer, who became the mayor right after the Dalokay period and continued the society-oriented municipalism approach. However, while examining the Dinçer period, the Dalokay period and his influence will still be in focus. The chapter will end with an analysis and discussion of the period.

The fifth chapter will examine political changes which were effective in the World and in Turkey, leading to the emergence of social municipalism. An evaluation will be made on the new right, which was effective with the decline of the welfare state in the 1980s. The coexistence and contradictions of neoliberalism and neoconservatism movements, which were embodied in the new right, will be examined. Afterward, the political, economic, and social changes that have been affected by the new right-wing practices in Turkey and have an impact on the emergence of social municipalism will be examined.

The sixth chapter will be focused on social municipalism and Gökçek's period as the second case. In this chapter, the general features of social municipalism and the legal restructuring of local governments within the framework of social aids and services, which are thought to be the characteristic features of social municipalism, will be given. Afterward, the Gökçek period will be examined under three subsections. These subsections will examine the projects and activities carried out during the Gökçek period as urban entrepreneurship, social assistance and services, and conservative motifs as part of his hegemonic vision. Finally, this section will end with an analysis and discussion of the period.

In the seventh chapter, the similarities and differences of these two municipalism approaches will be compared and discussed in the context of the strategic actors and their relations with the structures. Comparison will present similarities and differences between the two municipal approaches as well as understanding of the Turkish transition from urban managerialism to entrepreneurialism

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK- STRATEGIC-RELATIONAL APPROACH TO HARVEY'S URBAN THEORY

The main objective of this thesis is to examine the two periods of time as municipal experiences in Ankara through the mayors and their projects for revealing the Turkish transition experience from urban managerialism to urban entrepreneurialism. The thesis mainly focuses on the mayors as key political actors for having the power to shape urban relations and urban development. While focusing on the mayor, their reality plays an important role in understanding their actions and decisions. Therefore, Jessop's strategic-relational approach (SRA) has been deployed to analyse mayors as strategic actors and their actions as strategic actions in their own spatio-temporal context alongside their relations with particular political, social, and economic structures. Harvey's discussion on the transition of urban governance from managerialism to entrepreneurialism is also used as an urban approach to provide paradigm change for the mayor in urban development and management.

In that regard, this chapter will start by introducing the state theory of Poulantzas briefly as a source of inspiration for Jessop's SRA. The following sections will introduce and analyse the SRA in detail in terms of approach to the state, actor-structure dialect, and dimensions of the state. Lastly, the chapter will be closed by examining Harvey's framework on urban governance.

2.1. Poulantzas' State Theory

Poulantzas's theory of the state is a product of the effort to solve the problem of the state, which orthodox Marxism systematically neglects (Jessop, 1997). Poulantzas' distinction between state power and class power aims to show the

relative autonomy of the state, which involves a relational approach at the same time. Relative autonomy suggests that the source of power in social formations lies in class relations rather than the state. The state, as the institutional structure used to create and maintain class power, also has autonomy over classes and class segments. According to Poulantzas (1973), various social institutions, and especially state institutions, do not have or possess any power.

From the perspective of power, institutions could only be associated with the social classes that hold power. Social classes are organized in or around the centers of power. In this context, the state is the center of the application of political power. However, those power centers are not simple organs or extensions of class power. Those institutions having economic, political, cultural, or military aspects also have autonomy and structural specificities that cannot be reduced to power (Poulantzas, 1973).

In this context, Poulantzas distinguishes between state power and state apparatuses. State power is used to describe the power of a certain class that is in line with the interests of the state (Poulantzas, 1976a). Poulantzas does not embody the concept of power in the state apparatus and institutions. He positions power relations within class relations (Poulantzas, 1976a). In this sense, the state is neither an instrument of ruling class power nor does it have its own power outside of class struggle (Carnoy, 1984).

Poulantzas emphasizes the priority of class struggle compared to the state apparatus. He does this by arguing that the capitalist state should be understood as a relationship, more precisely as an intensification of the power relationship between the struggling classes. So that dilemma about the current debate on the state as an object and the state as a subject could be overcome. The understanding of the state as an object is an instrumentalist understanding. It asserts that the state does not have any autonomy and it is a passive instrument in the hands of a class or group. The understanding of the state as a subject, on the other hand, absolutizes the state by reducing the autonomy to 'its own will' and,

at the same time, claims that the state embodies the dominance of the group who could be bureaucrats or political elites that represents the power concretely. Both approach to the state understood the relationship between the state and social classes as an external relationship. Either social classes compel the state to submit, or the state (subject) subjugates or controls the classes. In this externality relationship, the state and the ruling classes are seen as two entities facing each other (Poulantzas, 1976a). However, grasping the capitalist state as a relation means accepting that it arises from class contradictions and is established by and with them. Therefore, the state which will reproduce class distinctions cannot be a monolithic block but is divided by its very nature (Poulantzas, 1976a). The fact that Poulantzas does not attribute a unique power to the state is related to the fact that he presents a different perspective from the approaches that consider the state as a subject or object. When the state is considered as a subject, the state is understood as the embodied general will in the face of atomized individuals, who are separate from civil society and the carriers of rationality. On the other hand, the instrumentalist approach considers that the state is inherently conceptualized as a simple tool that the ruling classes use as they wish. For Poulantzas, who criticizes both approaches, the state cannot be reduced to the position of either a subject or an object; the state is, by its very nature, a relation. In other words, the state is the concentrated form of the balance of power between classes, which is specifically expressed within itself (Poulantzas, 1976b).

Thus, Poulantzas argues that political class domination is inscribed in the material organization and institutions of the state system and that institutional materiality finds its foundations in the relations of production and social division of labor (Jessop, 2008). The general nature of the capitalist state includes representation as representing the general interest, more than coercion and/or deception. The state does more than limiting and protecting the rules of the economic game and creating false consciousness among subordinate classes. The state involves actively in organizing hegemonic class unity for the power bloc in addition to the establishment and maintenance of relations of production and the social division of labour. In other words, the role of the state in the reproduction

of class domination could not be only reduced to oppression and ideology (Jessop, 2008). Poulantzas sees the state as a factor that brings together, intensifies, materializes, and revitalizes the political-ideological relations specific to the given mode of production (Poulantzas, 2000).

State apparatuses' main role is to maintain the unity of the social formations by reproducing social relations and intensifying class domination. Even though state apparatuses do not have power within themselves, they materialize and intensify class relations. The state is not an entity with an intrinsically instrumental essence. It is a relationship, more accurately, an intensification of a relationship (Poulantzas, 1976a).

As a result of abandoning the structuralist thought and considering the state as an institutional whole that is not monolithic, Poulantzas emphasizes that the state is not a monolithic bloc or a simple sovereign legal subject. He conceptualizes the state as a strategic space established through the intersection of networks of power that provides a suitable space for the political maneuvers of the hegemonic parts of the society. In other words, the state as an institutional whole envisions it as a social relation that cuts through class contradictions and conflicts. Thus, in his approach to the state, Poulantzas emphasizes the importance of the changing balance of class forces. In this framework, the state is seen as the material concentration of the balance between class forces, as it establishes the balance rather than reflecting it in the political struggle (Jessop, 2008). Thus, while theorizing the state, Poulantzas abandons cohesion as the primary analytical category and replaces it with class struggle (Van den Berg, 1988). The state is no longer considered as a device managing class contradictions from the outside, organizing the contradictory unity of the power bloc, and externally ensuring the cohesion of the social formation. By emphasizing the priority of class struggle over state apparatuses, Poulantzas claims that power is relational, and the state is a social relation (Poulantzas, 2000) Within this framework, the state comprehends power relations such as

capital, more accurately, as the material intensification of these power relations between classes and class segments within the state (Poulantzas, 2000).

Interpretation of the state as an intensification of the class struggle or as a relation, Poulantzas framework constitutes a great intellectual step in overcoming the theories reducing the state to an object or a subject and revealing the nature of the immanent relationship between class struggle and the state. Therefore, his understanding offers a more satisfying framework for understanding different kinds of capitalist formations and transformations from the supranational structures to urban politics.

2.2. Jessop's Approach to the State

Jessop, who is quite affected by Poulantzas' state theory, was not satisfied with Poulantzas' final equation between class power and state power. Jessop agrees with Poulantzas' approach to the state as a social relation. However, according to Jessop, Poulantzas was unable to overcome a key dilemma for state power. State power benefits the dominant power bloc at the macro level. However, at the micro level, in addition to class interests, a wide range of conflicts and tactics have an impact on state policies.

As a result, Jessop contends that we cannot generalize or make a macro-level assertion about the nature of state power, while he concurs that the state is a social relationship. He makes the more flexible proclamation that the state will be more sensitive to certain political strategies over others, acknowledging that many other political strategies besides economic or class concerns impact state policy. This somewhat obvious conclusion ultimately indicates that any explanation that prioritizes class or capital on a theoretical or political level is disregarded (Jessop, 1990). However, the state continues to be both strategically and structurally selective; it has a "structurally mediated bias," which means that some forms of the state favor some strategies over others (Hay, 1994).

Jessop also criticizes the (relative) autonomy of the state of Poulantzas. He contends that no component of what we can simply refer to as the social world can be regarded as entirely or even largely deciding in an a priori or predetermined sense. As a result of Jessop's critical engagement with Marxist state theory, any theoretical "prime-mover" is deemed invalid, so to speak. Jessop says

"state power is capitalist to the extent that it creates, maintains, or restores the conditions necessary for capital accumulation in a given situation. It is non-capitalist to the extent that these conditions are not realised. This view radically displaces our theoretical focus from the search for guarantees that the state apparatus and its functions are necessarily capitalist in all aspects to a concern with the many and varied contingent effects of state power on accumulation in specific conjunctures." (Jessop, 1990, p. 354)

Jessop proposed the strategic-relational approach in order to overcome the "capital or class" dilemma in the discussions carried out in the context of the capitalist state within the Marxist theory and stated that the concept of "strategy" should be used to overcome the existing dilemma between capital-theoretical and class-theoretical approaches (Güney, 2003) has been involved in the capitalist state discussions. According to Jessop, state studies carried out within the framework of capital-logic often see the state as essentially capitalist by accepting the functionality of the state in terms of capital accumulation and bourgeois political domination. Also, within this understanding, a single logic of capital is assumed to be valid in every current phase of capitalist development, implying that there is a single set of imperatives. According to Jessop (2014), "such assumptions are highly restrictive and ignore the possibility of pursuing different accumulation strategies and the existence of a room for maneuver conducive to different class forces."

Class-theoretic analysts, on the other hand, argue that the form and functions of the state simply reflect the changes in the balance of forces within the class struggle, and in this sense, they see the state as only contingently capitalist, that is, the state in capitalist society (Jessop, 2018). According to Jessop, the concept

of strategy mediates between these two and is used in the sense of creating alternatives that can be valid in an existing structure (Güney, 2003). Jessop constructs the strategic-relational approach within the framework of the concepts of hegemony projects (strategies) and accumulation strategies based on the regulation approach, starting from Poulantzas and Gramsci. In this context, Jessop, by introducing the concepts of accumulation strategies and hegemony projects, defines the capitalist state as a strategic area where accumulation strategies and hegemony projects are tried to be created. “Jessop argues that these concepts complement each other, since the former – the strategies of accumulation – are the alternative logics of capital, and the second – the hegemony strategies – are useful in analyzing the field of class struggles” (Güney, 2003).

To analyse the relationship between accumulation strategies and hegemony projects, Jessop makes an analytical distinction between the two and defines the state as a social relationship in the context of the relationship between accumulation regimes and hegemony projects. Moreover, according to Jessop, the relationship between hegemony projects and accumulation strategies makes it possible to define not only the state but also capital as a social relationship. Therefore, the form of capital should be analysed on the basis of accumulation strategies and the form of the state on the basis of hegemony projects, and revealing the relational process between these two fields is possible with the concept of “strategy”.

2.3. Strategic-Relational Approach

The strategic-relational approach (SRA) is a relational and dialectical method that establishes the interdependence and recursive relationships among agential, structural, and ideational factors as the foundation for the existence of political and economic policy-making. The SRA focuses on the dynamic relationship between structure and agency. According to Hay (Hay 2002), the interaction between structure and agency is “not reducible to the sum of structural and

agential factors treated separately.” On the other hand, there is a constant relationship between structure and agency affecting and being affected by each other. Therefore, those two concepts must be examined together. Moreover, examining this relationship within the framework of spatio-temporal context is also important. Hay asserts that the nature of structural contexts comes from history. Path-dependency in this approach does not provide linear and undisturbed historical change. Even though yesterday’s decisions and actions shape, constraint, and enable the context of today (Bathelt and Gluckler, 2003), path-dependency is still bound to contingency to shape the future; since it “*does not condemn actors to endless repetition.*” (Jessop, 2005). Path-dependency is important to provide a better understanding of actors acting in their context and also meaningful insight for path-shaping strategies of actors.

Structure and agency are distinguished analytically, yet they are thought to be mutually constitutive and exist through their relational and dialectical connections (Jessop, 2008). According to Hay (2002), the interaction between structure and agency is defined as relational because it is mutually constitutive and “dialectical” since it produces an outcome other than a zero-sum game. The SRA eliminates the dualism seen in the relationship between the original structure and agency of other critical realist models as a result of this interplay (Jessop 2005). A new integrated version of the structure and actors is produced as a result of the interaction between the two aspects. Agents and structures can only exist in connection to one another, thanks to this kind of interaction. While the agent is regarded as connected to the structure and is therefore conceived as structurally limited, the structure is designed in relation to action and is treated as strategically-selective. Hay (2001) explains as “structures can only be said to exist “by virtue of their mediation of human conduct- structures constitute both the medium and condition of human agency”. Therefore, Jessop (1990) denies the dichotomy of free agents, acting in accordance with their free will, and structure which is defined as a set of immutable and automatically generated limitations. This kind of interaction or relation depends on the existence of structurally distinct sets of limitations and opportunities which provide privileges

for some actions and strategies over others in a particular spatio-temporal framework (Jessop 2001; Jessop, 2005). The formation of a dialectical interplay between the structure (or state) and those actors acting inside or through it, according to Jessop, makes it even more important to analyse power relations and state power through the SRA. This justification also makes it possible to connect policy-making analysis to the SR conception of power relations and production.

It is crucial to emphasize that no factors can be taken into account a priori as reasons for the exercise of power when conceiving dynamics through the SRA. This theoretical endeavor is required to provide a more comprehensive explanation of the complexity of reality and its political processes. Structure and agency in the SRA become inextricably linked through a dialectical and recursively reproducing relationship. In terms of “strategic-relational” analysis, both structure and agency can be examined. The structure is changed in a strategically-selective context through the creation of “strategic selectivities,” whereas agency is established when actors decide to become “strategic actors” by strategically calculating their structural orientation. What Jessop (2009) means by strategic selectivities is that

“structural constraints always operate selectively; they are not absolute and unconditional but are always temporally, spatially, agency- and strategy specific. While the concept of strategic actor implies that agents are reflexive, capable of reformulating within limits their own identities and interests, and able to engage in strategic calculation about their current situation.” (p.41)

Therefore “... structures have no meaning outside the context of specific agents pursuing specific strategies” (Jessop, 1996, 126), which is also valid for agents. The political, economic, and institutional contexts are closely related to opportunities to exercise power for agents or strategic actors in a certain period of time and setting. Agents’ capacities to act and have an impact on strategic selectivities are determined by the precise positions they occupy within the system. Many settings offer various combinations of opportunities and restrictions, leading to various kinds of strategic selectivities. As a result of the

distinctiveness of strategic selectivities, some actions are favored over others, and actors pursue in accordance with their preferred strategies.

The structure, which is formed by the actions and decisions of previous strategic actors, limits, constraints, and provides opportunities for new strategic actors. Therefore, the state is theorized as a (strategic) social relation produced continually as a result of past strategies implemented by strategic actors and favored specific strategies over others (Jessop, 1990). This understanding provides the rejection of unitary or monolithic perception of the state since different strategic actors occupying various strategic positions within the state have the ability to implement diverse strategic selectivities in accordance with their capacities. However, it should also be noted that formal unity and coherence of the state system is also established around some formal and informal norms. Jessop (1990) says, “any substantive unity which a state system might possess derives from specific political projects and struggles to impose unity or coherence on that system”. However, this coherence is also provided by implementing a series of decisions and actions (strategic selectivities) in a similar direction. According to Jessop (2001), “structured coherence” is provided when there is recurrence or stabilization of a configuration of structures and selectivities in which the development of activities that ensure the lifespan of the specific configuration is fostered. When systematic inconsistencies characterize the interaction of structure and agency and prevent the creation of a “relatively stable order,” the opposing situation of “patterned incoherence” occurs (Jessop, 2001). Therefore, coherence or unity of the state is provided through relations of different actors. Jessop says, “since structures cannot guarantee their self-reproduction but only privilege some strategies and actors over others, there is always scope for actions to overflow or circumvent structural constraints” (Jessop, 2005, p. 51). Therefore, state-building or state is based on a dynamic process designed by different strategic actors exercising power to carry out their desired strategic actions in accordance with the dominant political paradigm.

The state cannot be considered as an actor having the power to implement its own strategy; instead, it provides authority or opportunity to actors to implement their own strategies. As Jessop says, “the power of the state is the power of the social forces acting in and through the state” (Jessop, 1990). As a result, the state is inextricably linked to an actor’s capacity to design strategic actions, which implies that strategic selectivities depend on an actor’s views, their significance to other people, and how they use their authority. Accordingly, the state and the power it confers are the results of political maneuvers made by state actors, and the state is constantly acting in the interests of some actors who are most closely aligned with the general balance of interests. According to Jessop (Jessop, 2016):

“As an ensemble of power centres and capacities that offer unequal chances to different forces within and outside the state, the state cannot exercise power. In other words, it is not the state as such that exercises power. Instead its powers (plural) are activated by changing sets of politicians and state officials located in specific parts of the state, in specific conjunctures.”

At this point, the spatio-temporal context and path-dependency (structures realized by the decisions and actions of past actors) become critical for analyzing the strategic actors and their strategic actions. Actors must be examined and treated within the framework of their time and dominant political paradigm, including the state structure in order to understand the constraints and opportunities which actors have and have not.

To better understand SRA, Jessop proposes six dimensions of the state, and “each dimension has its own strategic selectivities and, while each one is analytically distinct, they all overlap empirically” (Jessop, 2016). While three of the dimensions are related to formal and institutional aspects of the state, the other three dimensions, which are called substantive dimensions, explore discursive and action-oriented aspects (Table 1). Formal dimensions of the state are modes of representation, modes of articulation, and modes of intervention. Formal dimensions emphasize constitutional, structural, and more concrete aspects of the state. Jessop says

“They are modes of political representation and their articulation; the vertical, horizontal, and transversal articulation of the state as an institutional ensemble and its demarcation from, and relation to, other states; and mechanisms and modes of state intervention and their overall articulation. These dimensions can be studied from the most basic state forms through to specific regimes in particular conjunctures.” (Jessop, 2014)

The formal dimension is important for grasping capacities and constraints of structure or state. It shapes the capabilities of the actors and their relationship with society. While modes of representation and modes of articulation are presenting forms of representation mechanisms and power distribution between different branches of the state, modes of intervention provide various means (organizational mechanisms and available resources) to exercise power in society (Haslam, 1999). No matter how much the representation mechanisms seem to consist of only formal channels at first, “*political representation also occurs away from the state insofar as official decisions take account of (potential) support or resistance*” (Jessop, 2016). Therefore, identification of actual modes of representation at various scales and places in terms of how the representation operates both formally and informally becomes vital to understanding how different political forces and classes promote their own interest and ideas for affecting decision-making and implementation (Jessop, 2016).

Jessop identifies five typical modes of representation: clientelism, corporatism, parliamentarism, pluralism, and *raison d'état*. To explain briefly each type of representation, clientelism involves a relationship between the dominant patron and his subordinates based on an exchange of political support (mainly votes) for a favorable distribution of political and economic resources, which creates a hierarchical relationship.

Table 1. Six dimensions of the state and their crisis tendencies

Dimension	Definition	Significance for SRA	Crisis Aspect
Three Formal Dimensions			
Modes of representation	These give social forces access to the state apparatus and to its capacities	Unequal access to state Unequal ability to resist at distance from state	Crisis of representation
Modes of articulation	Institutional architecture of the levels and branches of the state	Unequal capacity to shape, make, and implement decisions	Crisis of institutional integration
Modes of intervention	Modes of intervention inside the state and beyond it	Different sites and mechanisms of intervention	Rationality crisis
Three Substantive Dimensions			
Social basis of state	Institutionalized social compromise	Uneven distribution of material and symbolic concessions to the ‘population’ in order to secure support for the state, state projects, specific policy sets, and hegemonic visions	Crisis of the power bloc Disaffection with parties and the state Civil unrest, civil war, revolution
State project	Secures operational unity of the state and its capacity to act	Overcomes improbability of unified state system by orienting state agencies and agents	Legitimacy crisis
Hegemonic vision	Defines nature and purposes of the state for the wider social formation	Provides legitimacy for the state, defined in terms of promoting common good, etc.	Crisis of hegemony

Source: Jessop, 2016

Corporatism entails a mode of representation based on a socially determined function or task within the division of labour in a particular economic space. It is distinguished by the formal equivalence of “corporations” whose members carry

out functionally distinct tasks. Parliamentarism involves citizens to the policy-making process indirectly and individually on an equal basis through the voting and election system. Pluralism could be grasped as access to state apparatus through formal channels by recognized (by relevant the state or branches of the state) groups representing different political interests. *Raison d'état* occurs mainly when there is a threat to society, state, or national interests, which tries to make this kind of intervention legitimate since it suspends formal channels of representation to a degree. Jessop claims that *raison d'état* might be linked to informal representation channels since it extends, changes, and goes beyond the formal structure of the state and usage of state power in order to shape key political and social issues. Those five modes of representation might operate at the same time, and there might be mixed forms. Moreover, the dominant mode of representation could change in time since it is also based on social forces acting in the state. Jessop says (2016):

“While formal channels of representation are important, they must be related to the roles played by political parties, various types of corporatist body, lobbies and pressure groups, old and new social movements, and state managers. These agents all provide links to the social bases of the state and help to organize them.”

The other three dimensions concern the social base of the state. The discursive and action-oriented aspects give strategic meaning to formal features. It “correspond(s) to the underlying, the inner-dwelling and the overarching forces in the state and political systems.” (Jessop, 2016). The state’s broader social interactions are crucial for ensuring integration and cohesiveness because any substantive unity the state possesses only emerges from specific political projects. Jessop proposes the social basis of the state in order to highlight the strengthening of the representational regime through civil society, such as those forces operating outside of the political system. He continues by saying that as accumulation strategies are necessary to give the capital circuit coherence and direction, state projects are necessary to give the various operations or activities of the state some direction and coherence (Jessop, 2016).

Discursive domain is also crucial for revealing internal cohesion, decision processes, and the role of government in society at large. In other words, social basis of state explores the characteristics of power bloc and the social forces operation in. State project dimension provides how the state, and its apparatus are defined and unified as a working system coherently. Lastly, hegemonic vision is used to analyse how discourses produced and mobilized by the power bloc and their strategies in order to contribute social cohesion (Haslam, 1999). Emphasis on the social cohesion, unity of the state, and directives of the dominant power bloc do not necessarily provide such a vision.

Examining the crisis aspects of the state contributes to observe those competing actors for national, regional or local power. Since competition between actors having different strategic agendas reveals themselves in the crises. Jessop says that the cause of crises is that certain social relations cannot not be produced as before. As there might be many reasons that can trigger the crisis, the most important point is how the crisis is evaluated by strategic actors rather than 'real' causes. Because the way actors define the causes of the crisis also affects the political solutions, they would develop to overcome the crisis. In other words, they develop policies on how to manage the crisis and how to get out of the crisis. Jessop separates the crisis in two ways (Sum & Jessop, 2015); crisis 'in' and crisis 'of'. Crisis 'in' could be defined as regulations or failures in the ongoing system. In order to overcome the crisis, changing some features or regulations in the existing structure could be enough. On the other hand, crisis 'of' is defined as the crisis of the crisis management. Such a crisis is more complex than crisis 'in' and is beyond the ability of old management methods to solve. In other words, crisis 'of' is a situation that questions the existing structure more and has a high potential to bring more serious changes on the structure. For example, limiting the crisis by finding the right policies and making appropriate adjustments involves improvements in the existing structure rather than economic, political and social problems arising from structural reasons (towards Wolff, 2008). Jessop says that such a definition is particularly advantageous for newly elected governments. Because while the new government can stick to

capitalist structures, it blames the wrong policy practices of the previous government for problems. Thus, new government escapes by accusing the previous administration of failing to produce right policies rather than solving the structural problems. However, even if the crisis is defined as crisis ‘in’ or ‘of’, conflicts arise about how the crisis will be resolved. Therefore, while crises provide entrepreneurship opportunities to strategic actors, they also create important path-shaping moments (Sum & Jessop, 2015). In such a situation, it is important to get as much support from the social base as possible for strategic actors to implement their own strategic selectivities. In this point, populism, identified with times of crisis, becomes a useful political strategy for actors (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017).

Although this thesis does not discuss populism, it contains an important complement to Jessop's state dimensions which are mode of representation and hegemonic vision. Populism does not provide an ideology, structure or hegemony by own. Therefore, it can be used as a political strategy to gather power and votes in many ideologies and structures. There are reasons why populism is particularly identified with times of crisis. The inability of the current administration to solve the problems and the difficulties of people in times of crisis weaken their relations with the existing parties, administration, structures and dominant hegemony. At such a time, while showing the problems and those responsible, the strategy of seizing power with the claim of reflecting the general will of the people gains importance with a new hegemonic discourse. In other words, the mode of representation and hegemonic vision targeted by strategic actors in times of crisis put forward the pursuit of a populist strategy. Populism mainly consists of three elements; a leader which could be also party, organization or movement that claims to best represent the will of the people, the enemy, and the people. All three elements can be defined in different ways for different strategic actors to implement their own strategies. The people can be defined as a nation or as a class, ethnicity, or excluded parts of the society. The enemy can be defined as the current administration, bureaucracy, elites or external forces. According to Laclau, both the people and the enemy are ‘empty

signifiers' (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). But populism is used not only to gain power, but also to maintain the power. Populism, which consists of redefinable concepts, can transform into structural relations over time as in clientelist relations. Therefore, even if populism is not a mode of representation, it can turn into a way of representation as a political strategy, especially in times of crisis, by targeting dimension of representation. Especially after gaining power, populism can transform itself into forms of representation through cooperative and clientelist relations. Therefore, even if the populism is not mode of representation since it does not provide any structure for representation itself, populism could become crucial political strategy to target mode of representation and could be integrated to structures.

Jessop's approach to the state and his analytical characterization of the dimensions of the state provide solid ground for examining not just the state's relationship with society but also the exploration of relationships between various strategic actors within the state, including their relations with the state, political parties, and civil society in a given time and space. Jessop says (2016):

“Competition over state projects leads to struggles to impose contradictory ‘apparatus unities’ on (actual or potential) state organs. Thus, the always tendential institutional logic and distinctive interests of the state must be related to the state projects, if any, that happen to be politically hegemonic or dominant at a given moment. There is never a point when the state is finally built-in a given territory and after which it operates, so to speak, on automatic pilot, according to its own, definite, fixed, and inevitable laws. Nor, to be less demanding, does a moment arrive when a single state project becomes so hegemonic that all state managers simply apply an algorithmic model of their duties and interests as members of a distinct governing class... For, whatever constitutions might decree or declare about the unity and sovereignty of the modern state as a juridical subject, there are often several rival ‘states’ competing for a temporary and local hegemony within a given national territory.”

Urban areas where many central state branches and local government work together to exercise power and also gather power over and from the society provide a quite productive spatiality to implement SRA and analyse dimensions of the state, “since these dimensions should not be studied only at the national

level” (Jessop, 2014). Therefore, examining the many strategic actors trying to implement their own strategic selectivities in the urban area, which provides a strong sense of spatio-temporal context, would be one of the best political scales for implementing the SRA. However, before ending this section, examining the framework of Harvey, who shares important points with strategic-relational theory, would be necessary to understand strategic actors operating in urban politics.

2.4. Change in Urban Governance: From Urban Managerialism to Urban Entrepreneurialism

Harvey’s conceptualization of urban areas and its relation to capitalist accumulation strategies. Especially, Harvey’s article “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism” has contributed immensely to Marxist urban studies and urban governance discussions. However, before examining the article of Harvey, discussing Harvey’s position in the state discussions, including structure-actor dialectics briefly, would be useful to better understand the SRA and Harvey’s approach.

Even though Harvey does not provide a complete state theory, he conceives of the state as a more instrumental thought as serving the capitalist accumulation process in accordance with the interests of the capitalist class. The position of the state, especially in urban areas, is mainly about regulating the flow of capital between circuits of capital and providing services that could not be provided by the market for the reproduction of labour. Unlike Jessop’s approach, Harvey does not emphasize other social and political forces within the state. Even though Harvey’s perception of the state, he also accepts the possibility of strategic actors acting for their own interests instead of purely serving in favor of the interests of the capitalist class (Şengül, 2009). According to Şengül (2009), Harvey recognizes the historical importance of actors in both production and reproduction of urban space; however, he also defines different actors and their

strategic actions within the framework of class relations as competition between capitalists or conflicts between capitalist and working classes (Şengül, 2009). In short, the main distinction between two significant Marxist thinkers lies in the ontological essence of the state. However, the two writers could be thought of as subsidiary sense while examining urban politics instead as contradictory in the examination of urban politics and governance.

Harvey's article is important for providing the change or transformation of urban politics from managerialism to entrepreneurialism as dominant political and economic paradigm changes from Keynesian to neo-liberalism. While urban managerialism, which could be linked to the Keynesian welfare state paradigm, focuses on providing essential urban services and urban growth based on bureaucratic forms alongside management and planning, urban entrepreneurialism promotes public-private partnerships with the logic of profit (Laurmann, 2017). As the Keynesian paradigm was being criticized from the 1960s, the new paradigm's (neo-liberalism) urban approach has evolved into urban entrepreneurialism appropriately. Laurmann (2017) describes this transition as:

“...the strategies which city managers adopted in the fiscal and regulatory vacuum left in the wake of post-Fordist deindustrialization, neoliberalization, and national decentralization... analysts of the entrepreneurial framework emphasized the changing role of urban managers in post-Fordist cities: managers responded to a climate of austerity by creating their own funding sources.”

Harvey describes three aspects distinguishing urban managerialism and entrepreneurialism. Firstly, entrepreneurialism promotes public-private partnerships and participates in speculative investment practices as a means of generating income by attracting funding and investments using governmental powers. Instead of distributing the wealth across various parts of the society and sectors as in managerialism, it focuses on accumulating the wealth. Secondly, the nature of public-private partnership defines in the context of entrepreneurialism due to the design and exercise of policies based on a speculation mentality

instead of well-planned and coordinated ones. This is a transition in urban governance from state-led policies managed by bureaucrats through using state institutions to policies developed by public-private coalitions and stakeholders (Hall and Hubbard 1998). Since there is a higher risk factor in entrepreneurial activity, Harvey (1989) claims that while private sectors benefit from the rewards, the public sector absorbs the risks. Thirdly, managerialism focuses on the political economy of a territory primarily designed to enhance living or working conditions inside a certain region. On the other hand, entrepreneurialism rests more on the construction of or enhancement within the place greater or smaller than the particular territory. Even though this kind of activity usually provides benefits for a limited population in a specific place, entrepreneurialism assumes that “resulting economic development will trickle out into surrounding neighbourhoods” (Brenner, 2004). However, Harvey (1989) also says, “place-specific projects of this sort also have the habit of becoming such a focus of public and political attention that they divert concern and even resources from the broader problems that may beset the region or territory as a whole.”

Harvey proposes four broad options for urban areas adopting entrepreneurialism. The first option is about the competition within the global division of labour using specific advantages for the production of goods and services. However, these advantages do not drive solely from resource base or location; but it is also created by means of investment funded publicly or privately in order to strengthen or create an economic and social base of the urban area. The second option involves strengthening the city’s position within the spatial division of consumption through various means such as the gentrification of built environments, shopping centers, sports complexes, and other touristic and recreational activities to increase the capacity of the urban area to attract consumers. The third preference is about acquiring key control and command functions regarding high finance, government, and information gathering. Heavy and expensive infrastructure investment is a requirement for this option due to the dependency of those functions on complex and developed transportation, communication, and office systems as well as experts and educated labour force

alongside the satisfaction of their needs. Lastly, the fourth option promotes competing for the redistribution of the central government's surpluses as being a favourable area for benefiting from the state investments.

It should be noted that four strategies for entrepreneurialism are not mutually exclusive and a combination of any of those strategies could be deployed together in accordance with the spatial, economic, and political positions of the urban area. However, inter-urban competition also plays a key role in limiting and directing the usage of those strategies for urban development. Even though various combinations, Harvey (1989) also stresses "repetitive and serial reproduction of certain patterns of development" seen in many urban areas, which makes inter-urban competition operating "as an "external coercive power" over individual cities to bring them closer into line with the discipline and logic of capitalist development." Even though repetitiveness, Harvey (1989) also recognizes distinctive strategies since he grasps urbanization "as a spatially grounded social process in which a wide range of different actors with quite different objectives and agendas interact through a particular configuration of interlocking spatial practices." Therefore, each power coalition would try to implement their own "distinctive version of what Jessop (1983) calls 'accumulation strategies and hegemonic project'" (Harvey, 1989). However, Harvey also emphasizes that inter-urban competition inevitably constraints even the benevolent coalitions of class forces to act accordingly to capitalist accumulation strategies rather than meeting local needs and increasing social welfare (Harvey, 1989). As a result of entrepreneurialism, unequal distribution of wealth and urban impoverishment also widen among the society (Wood, 1998).

As a result of this chapter, the thesis aims to examine the mayors of Ankara as strategic actors and their strategic actions through the lenses of two different urban governance practices. Society-oriented municipal experience as urban managerialism and social municipal period as the rise of urban entrepreneurialism with their mayors will be examined. The mayors' relations with different urban actors operating in the urban area will also be scrutinized by

using SRA. To understand the historical background of the structures and path dependencies, the upcoming chapter will introduce the historical background of Turkish local governments and urban coalitions, including social and political changes affecting urban areas until the 1970s.

CHAPTER 3

ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN TURKISH POLITICS

Throughout history, local government structures have emerged that vary according to the economic, social, political, cultural, and historical structures of the countries. Local governments have emerged in the historical process to meet certain needs and to carry out some local services (Ulusoy ve Akdemir, 2007:199). Even though the modern sense of local government structures in Turkey was constructed by taking the example from the West at the end of the 19th century, it is possible to talk about a local government tradition that has been going on since the Seljuks and Ottomans. Although it is controversial that these structures have local government features, these structures, to a certain extent, contain traces of modern local government structures in Turkey. Centralism, the positions of local economic groups in urban politics, and the traces they left in foundations and municipal services also have an important place in two different examples of municipalism that will be examined in the next parts of the thesis.

Compared to local governments in Western states, it is difficult to say that Turkish local government history has a deep and rich history (Ortaylı, 1998: 144). However, local Turkish governments have also created their own unique local governments with certain features from their history. Therefore, in order to understand the two periods of municipalism, which is the subject of the thesis, it will be useful to look at the roles and functioning of local governments in the Ottoman and Republican periods.

3.1. Ottoman Period

Local governments in the Ottoman Empire were divided into different levels. These are province, *sanjak*, *kaza*, and village. This grading was made for military and public works services. The provinces are a top administrative unit consisting of many *sanjaks*, covering large areas and having their own laws. *Sanjaks*, on the other hand, are the closest units to municipalities in the modern sense. *Sanjaks* can be compared to provinces and *kaza* to districts. Bureaucrats, called qadi (*Kadi*), are appointed from the center to each *sanjak* and *kaza*. Qadis are a central bureaucrats with almost all judicial, administrative and municipal powers. In this sense, the qadi is the most important local representative, supervisor, and manager of the center. Municipal services were inspected by the auxiliary units affiliated with the qadi. In general, the municipal services were not provided by the qadi's authority. The duty of the Kadi was mostly to allow the establishment of institutions providing these services, and to supervise them. Municipal services are generally provided by local foundations (*vakıf*) and guilds (*lonca*).

Foundations are institutions where individuals offer their own movable and immovable properties of their own will for the needs of the society in which they live. They were established with the idea of serving the society for religious, social, and economic purposes (Kazıcı, 2003:54). Foundations have become one of the most important institutions in the social and economic life of the city. Foundations had an important role in the execution of city services in the Ottoman Empire. In Ottoman society, services such as schools, libraries, hospitals, soup kitchens, guesthouses, dormitories, and social aid were traditionally carried out by foundations, and municipal services were largely based on foundations (Eryılmaz, 1997:37). In addition, the city's lighting and clean water needs were met by foundations (Ulusoy and Akdemir, 2007:200, Türe, 2000:36). In this sense, foundations did not only serve the needs of individuals but also played a role in the realization, provision, and execution of public services (Güran, 2006). It is also stated that a person living in the Ottoman

city benefited from many foundation services from birth to death (Yediyıldız, 1988: 405). The foundations, which provided many services in the cities during the Ottoman period, still play an auxiliary role in the fulfilment of these services today.

Another important institution in the execution of city services in the Ottoman Empire was the guild organizations. Guild organizations are hierarchically organized trade unions established on a professional basis. Guilds are also referred to as non-governmental organizations in the literature because they protect the interests of the people (Özbilgen, 2003). However, the guilds were generally concerned with the regulation of the economic life in the city. In general, they performed duties such as ensuring the quality and standardization of the goods produced, training the personnel, and supervising the sales of the goods (Özbilgen, 2003). According to Dursun (1998), the guilds also played a role in the relations between the central government and the public and helped in carrying out the center's decisions to the public and in control of those decisions.

There is a triple system in the units (Sancak and Kaza), most similar to the municipality structure in the Ottoman Empire. The center appoints qadi as the head of judicial, administrative, and municipal services, the foundations provide many public services, and finally, the guilds regulate the city's economy. Qadi has definite control over the foundations and the guilds with a centralist understanding. It is the duty of the Kadi to establish foundations and guilds, approve their managers, and supervise the activities. According to Şengül (2009), the existence of such centralized structures does not make local governments fully dependent units in the Ottoman Empire. Local governments were able to get some privileges by opposing the central government to a certain extent and bargaining. Therefore, although they are not as autonomous as in the West, they are not fully dependent structures. In the modern sense, the first municipal structures began to be established only after the *Tanzimat* period.

As a result, local governments in the Ottoman Empire operated as an institutionalized structure in the execution of urban services rather than applying a local government system in general. Even though centralism was quite strong, groups organized through foundations, religious groups, and guilds in urban policy played an important role in the social, political, and economic life of the city. Providing urban services through these groups for long periods of time has enabled foundations and artisan groups to take place as strategic actors in urban policy even today. In addition, it can be claimed that the understanding of serving through foundations and guilds prevented local governments from having their own budgets and resources in the following years, as in the West. The understanding that local governments are seen as a unit in which local services are generally under the control of the center will make the issue of autonomy of local governments a problematic one for local Turkish governments in the following years.

3.2. Republican Period

During the Republican period, the local government system, which was taken from the Ottoman Empire, continued to a large extent. For a long time, local governments were seen as a local extension of the central government in the Republican era. Especially centralization became more important after the republic, and local governments remained as units where the policies of the center were implemented. Elections for the local governments were just carried out for the formation of municipal boards, while centrally appointed governors served as the mayors. With the municipal law numbered 1580 enacted in 1930, it was accepted to establish municipalities in places with a population of more than 2000. Although this law underwent minor changes, it remained in force for 74 years and became one of the longest remaining laws of the republican period. This situation supports the reluctance of the central government to change the political positions of local governments.

The law numbered 1580 has not only made the municipalities responsible and authorized for the needs of the people living in the city but also shared this responsibility and authority with the provincial organizations of the central government. Due to this nature, the local government units were prevented from being the only authority in the city, and this situation caused conflicts of authority and responsibility among different political actors and institutions (Özgür, 2001:223). The law also changed the elections of the mayors. It was decided that the mayors would be elected by the elected council. In other words, mayors are not directly elected. It should also be noted that positions of centrally appointed governors had not changed for İstanbul and Ankara, and they continued to act as mayors for those provinces. In addition, the governors and district governors, as local representatives of the central government, have undertaken the duties of supervising and assisting the services of the municipality. Discussions about making local governments more democratic and autonomous started with the establishment of the Democrat Party in 1946 when a multi-party system was started. However, there was no significant change after the Democratic Party came to power (Tekeli, 1983:9).

Significant changes in terms of local governments took place with the 1961 Constitution. One of the most important changes has been the direct election of mayors. In addition, according to the old constitution, the rule of approval of mayors by the governors and the president was also abolished (Tekeli & Ortaylı, 1978). The appointment and dismissal of municipal organs became subject to a judicial decision. Thus, one of the political pressure tools of the central government on the local government has been removed. These developments increased the political power of the mayors. They have transformed into a more independent political actor rather than an extension of the centre. Another important point was regarding the revenues of local governments. As a result of the rule laid down in the constitution, local governments were provided with resources (financial equalization) commensurate with their duties (Keleş, 1988). In this way, a certain amount of constitutional guarantee was provided in terms of municipal revenues. However, the implementation did not take place

regarding financial issues, and the expenses of the municipalities increased considerably, especially with the migrations to significant urban areas. This situation has increased the dependence of local governments on the center's transfers.

Another important point of the 1961 Constitution was for the shanty houses in the city. According to Article 49 of the Constitution, it is stated that "the state takes measures to meet the housing needs of poor and low-income families in accordance with health conditions." With this article, municipalities have had the opportunity to intervene, especially in large urban areas where squatting is high. Social housing projects for squatter's house dwellers in urban areas would be on the agenda in the next decades.

In 1978, the Ministry of Local Government was established in the Ecevit government. With the establishment of the Ministry, it was aimed to make local governments more autonomous, create their own resources, and reduce the control of the central government. It was envisaged to support local governments politically and economically. One of the most important reasons for the establishment of the Ministry was the fact that CHP municipalities, especially in big cities, have put forward a different understanding of municipalities since 1973 and conflicted with central governments. The ministry, which served for only 22 months, tried to reduce the supervision and control of the state over local governments, and attempts were made to increase the revenues of municipalities (Keleş, 2000). The ministry also supported municipalities to be organized with each other by forming municipal unions, and many municipal unions (Union of Marmara and Straits Municipalities, Union of Black Sea Municipalities, Union of Aegean Municipalities, Union of Central Anatolian Municipalities) were established in a short time (Kızılboğa Özaslan & Buyer, 2015).

While the Republican period preserved the local government structure, which was largely taken over from the Ottoman Empire, some steps were taken for more autonomous municipalities both politically and economically. Especially

after the 1961 Constitution, municipalities have become much more autonomous structures compared to previous periods. The mayors were elected directly by the people, and they also protected juristically with the introduction of a new constitution. This situation made mayors significant urban actors, and some mayors played key roles in shaping Turkish local government and urban politics by mobilizing strategically those newly acquired powers in the 1970s. However, it could also be observed that the understanding of local governments as providing urban services and being an extension of the central government continues. In addition, municipalities have become almost completely dependent on the central government economically, especially with the ongoing migrations since 1950. Therefore, in the next section effects of the urbanization period and changing social and political movements both in the West and Turkey will be examined in order to provide spatio-temporal context in the 1970s.

3.3. Social and Political Change

Turkey has undergone many social and political changes, especially after the 1950s. In this period, which started with Democrat Party coming to power in 1950, urbanization increased rapidly. Şengül (2009) evaluates the period between 1950-1980 as the ‘urbanization of labour power.’ However, while the labour force is urbanizing day by day, both the central government and the local governments have failed to produce policies against the social and economic problems caused by this rapid urbanization, and then they have become insensitive.

With the influence of the leftist movements in the West, the shantytowns, which form a significant part of the cities, started to politicize toward leftist politics. These segments, which did not find any response in central and local politics, would be gained visibility in 1973 thanks to the mayors in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmit. In the next period, it would become one of the important issues in politics. In the next two sections, rapid urbanization shaping Turkish urban areas and the leftist movements that started in the West will be briefly covered in order to

present the political and social context of Turkish cities before the 1973 local elections.

3.3.1. Rapid Urbanization

While urbanization was low in Turkey until the 1950s, after the 1950s, it entered a rapid urbanization period. Urbanization in Turkey has started to increase with the introduction of Marshall plans aiming to mechanize Turkish agriculture for increasing efficiency and decreasing agricultural labour work. Even though the main goal was straightening the rural economy by exporting larger quantities of agricultural products, Marshall Plan's impact on Turkish society was rapid and uncontrolled urbanization due to surplus labour created by mechanization in agricultural activity (Şengül, 2009). Consequently, the population living in Turkish urban areas doubled from 1950 to 1970, and migrated rural people living in shanty houses formed nearly a quarter of the total urban population. These demographical changes in cities have also shaped the needs and demands of the urban population along with the growing working class.

Even though there was also a significant increase in the population of Turkey until the 1970s, the population of urban areas has increased even more with that rapid urbanization, as it was seen in Table 2. The increase in the population of Ankara has accelerated with the declaration of Ankara as the capital. However, the population, which increased relatively slower rate until 1950, increased significantly after 1950. Although the population of Turkey doubled from 1950 to 1975, the population of Ankara increased almost six times in the same period. Likewise, the rate of urbanization in Turkey has doubled in this time period. The most important difference that distinguishes the urbanization movements in the 1950-1975 period from the previous periods was that the cities grew with migration from rural areas to cities rather than natural population growth. As a matter of fact, while there was no significant difference between the total and urban population growth in the pre-1950 period, it is observed that the urban

population growth far outstripped the total population growth after 1950(Işık, 2005).

Table 2. Development of Turkey and Ankara City Population

Years	Total Population of Turkey (thousand)	Settlements with urban population of over 10000 in Turkey	Population of Ankara	Turkey's urban population ratio (%)
1927	13,648	2,223	74,553	16,280
1935	16,158	2,721	122,720	16,840
1940	17,821	3,216	157,242	16,850
1945	18,790	3,466	226,712	18,440
1950	20,947	3,924	288,536	18,730
1955	24,065	5,425	451,241	22,540
1960	27,755	7,200	650,067	25,960
1965	31,391	9,343	909,660	29,760
1970	35,605	12,724	1,236,152	35,740
1975	40,347	16,707	1,701,004	41,410

Source: TÜİK, 2011

While migration to urban areas was being continued, there was not any significant change in state policies in order to intervene in rapid urbanization in urban and rural areas. As a result of this reluctance, there was a significant increase in the population living in squatter's houses (see Table 3.). The rise is so high that squatter's houses were one-fifth of the houses in the urban area, and almost one-fourth of those living in the city sheltered in squatter's houses in 1980. According to Şengül (2009), a duality between squatter's houses and built-environment designed mainly for the middle classes began to settle at the center of urban contradictions. Especially in big cities, this situation has turned into tension between the middle class and those living in squatter's houses. It is possible to identify three periods during the period between 1950-1970, according to Şengül (2009). While it was observed that the existing structures

and the squatter's houses were in an external and tense relationship in the 1950s, the 1960s marked a period in which the internalization and articulation efforts of the slums intensified. The 1970s was the period when these efforts led to contradictions and divisions within the existing structure and the state.

Table 3. Increase in Squatter's Houses and Its Population

Years	Total Urban Population (thousand)	Population Living in Squatter's Houses	%	Total Number of Urban Houses	Total Number of Squatter's Houses	%
1955	5,324	250	4,69	1,050	50	4,76
1960	7,307	1,200	16,62	1,440	240	16,67
1965	9,395	2,150	22,88	1,880	430	22,87
1970	12,734	3,000	23,55	2,800	600	21,43
1980	20,330	4,750	23,36	4,500	950	21,11

Source: taken from Şengül (2009)

While politicians approached the situation more opportunist in order to gain popular votes by providing zoning amnesty and urban infrastructure to the districts where squatter's houses dominated, the mayors of the Republican People's Party (CHP), which was in a state of change in terms of being closer to socialist policies, approached to urban issues differently. They defined the problem as a social justice issue and tried to develop urban policies for newly arrived working classes in terms of distributing urban wealth more equally (Güler, 2004). In the next section, leftist movements in Western counties will be examined briefly to provide socialistic aspects of policies implemented in the 1970s.

3.3.2. The Rise of Leftist Movement in Urban Politics

After World War II, Western countries experienced reconstruction and rapid economic growth. However, this growth started to cause concerns and conflicts between different parts of society due to inequality in the allocation and

distribution of resources and wealth in society. Increasing Marxist movements, which were spreading in different parts of the world, and deepening social inequalities in society had contributed to student and workers' movements (Akalın, 1995) affecting various countries and cities. The struggle of the urban people for their basic needs escalated in the 1970s, and significant gains were made. These gains have also increased by the struggles being generally led by the unions and based on the cooperation with the people of the city and the local governments.

Many leftist political and social incidents had occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. Reactions against USSR's long-lasting oppression and bureaucratic communism were met with reactions from both the eastern bloc and the intellectual leftists in the West. Reactions were also shown within the Eastern Blocks as seen in "Prague Spring" which was the trial of a more moderate system of socialism in Czechoslovakia and oppressed by the USSR. The Prague experience created a strong emotional bond between socialists in the West and socialists in the eastern bloc. Later, the events of the workers and students in Paris were evaluated as reflections of the socialist developments in Prague (Bora, 1988). Moreover, while Vietnam War and Socialist Revolution in Cuba increased the anti-imperialist motivations, including Palestine's Resistance, Mao's Cultural Revolution in China provided a different perspective of the socialist experience. There were also different movements in the US, such as the Civil Rights Movement and the Free Speech Movement, aiming to strengthen the rights of black people and delimit the freedom of speech of students.

At the end of the student protests supported by the workers, the government and the capital, which were afraid of the masses, had to respond to the demands of the working class. Demands such as wage increases, housing, and living in a good environment were the demands that the working class would continue to fight in the 1970s. Even though many people came under the influence of Marxism in the 1960s, capitalist countries did not face serious threats. Despite this, it should also be noted that demands, problems, and conditions of the

working class have gained political and social visibility, including some achievements. This period is also important since many discussions around democratization, inequality in income distribution, and access to services have started, especially in urban areas. One of the main reasons why leftist movements have gained popularity is the expression of those demands and problems that had come from workers' unions and students within the framework of socialist thought. In other words, the wishes of those groups and the wishes of the society coincided, which gave that movement support from different groups.

The rise of the leftist movements in European politics and cities had also affected Turkish politics. New leftist parties, youth movements, and policy changes, along with left-of-the-center discussions in CHP had been influential in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1960s, the Turkish Left made an intense effort to understand Marxism (Çulhanoğlu, 1997). The freedom of thought that came with the 1961 Constitution gave young people the opportunity to deal more with Turkey's problems. During these years, the country's economic and social problems drew the youth into politics. The youth who did not approve of Turkey's American foreign policy, the 1964 Cyprus crisis, and the Johnson letter caused an anti-American attitude in society. The fact that the youth began to recognize the exploitation logic of imperialism resulted in their consciously taking an anti-imperialist attitude in 1967-68. After the 1960s, with the influence of the world conjuncture, the demands of the left-wing youth increased, and the right-wing opposition pole emerged with the support of the people having positions in the state policy and some state institutions. Mutual polarization further radicalized the left, causing social problems to increase (Güler, 2004). It is a natural result that the bloody conflicts caused by this polarization took place in cities with a rapidly increasing population after the 1950s.

As a result of the urbanization and capitalization process that started in the 1950s and accelerated since the 1960s, the development of the political consciousness of the people from the early 1970s brought about changes in state-society

relations. As a result of the increase in the rate of urbanization, the phenomenon and problem of squatter's house is no longer a situation to be overlooked. It was assumed that with the dissolution of the rural area, the masses who settled in the city would adopt urban values and become urbanized in time (Tekeli, 1988). This situation resulted in the birth of small Anatolian cities within the big cities. The state's inability or reluctance to intervene in urban problems adequately forced the new urban poor to formulate a solution to the housing problems and to the unemployment problem with the job opportunities they created (such as minibuses and peddling).

Areas of squatter's houses do not form a homogeneous structure but rather a structure based on kinship and fellowship. Although the first-generation squatters lived in different cities and towns and came from different cultures, they were in solidarity based on their similarities and the understanding that "we are all foreigners." However, the second-generation squatter youth were born into problems and were involved in the struggles and difficulties their families also faced (Güler, 2004). This situation created significant differences between the first generation and the second generation. The exclusion of the second-generation slum youth from urban social and economic life has caused them to question the dominant structures. Radical left organizations and social democratic parties questioning the rights of the oppressed classes in their rhetoric have attracted slum youth to their ranks. While low-income groups and squatter's houses in urban areas tend to vote for more conservative parties in the 1950s and 1960s, it has started to change in favor of leftist ones with the second generation (Güler, 2004, Şengül, 2009).

Conservative parties' inability to address problems in urban areas for the population migrated from rural areas and more radical solutions suggested by leftist parties have affected the voters' behaviours which resulted in the best performance of CHP in the 1973 local government elections. Party's preference for nominating more active and radical candidates in accordance with the changing political approaches within the CHP (left-of-the-center movement) in

major cities was also effective in pulling votes. CHP candidates, especially in İstanbul, Ankara, and İzmit, had been quite influential in local Turkish governments. This period would be a time when urban problems, demands, and services could no longer be ignored, urban politics became important, political tutelage was discussed, and local governments became centers of political struggle.

Moreover, local governments had conflicts with numerous political and economic actors, including their own parties. Mayors in big cities had tried to end the hegemony of central government and even their party leaders in urban politics since they perceived themselves as local autonomous political leaders representing their urban people. Policies and principles formulated in this period are called society-oriented municipalism. Their policies, decisions, and actions have reshaped the local alliances and positions of local governments while introducing the importance of urban areas in national politics. In the next chapter, society-oriented municipalism and its principles will be introduced. Moreover, the relationship of the mayor of Ankara with the central government, urban groups, and their own party will also be discussed.

CHAPTER 4

NEW UNDERSTANDING IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: SOCIETY-ORIENTED MUNICIPALISM

Rapid urbanization beginning early 1950s resulted in crowded cities in which municipalities were unable to provide urban services adequately, especially to those living in squatter's houses. The urban leftist movement also began to be active in big cities, with the influence of the second-generation squatter youth after the 1970s. The increase in urbanization problems and the expectations of the society for a solution have rendered the municipalities that were in a shortage of resources to be truly effective. In addition, the heavy pressure of the center on the municipalities was another factor that complicated the solution in the 1970s. The fact that the central and local governments were from the same political party until 1973 was an obstacle to activating the urban dynamics. Because the tutelage over the municipalities and the dependence on the centre affected and shaped the mayors belonging to the ruling party in terms of the fear of not being re-elected in the next elections. In other words, the mayors mainly acted as local agents of the central government they belonged. However, the central government-local government conflict pushed local governments to new searches. The duality between the significant urban areas and central governments had a major effect on the formulation of society-oriented municipal understanding. This conflict forced the municipalities to use resources effectively as well as a searching way to acquire or create new ones. Moreover, they had also noticed the importance of popular support, which pushed the mayors to communicate with the people in order to gain popular support against central government.

Society-oriented municipalism could be defined as the combination of different strategies the mayors applied to overcome material and political obstacles both

for providing urban services to people and becoming more autonomous political units. The mayors are a crucial part of this municipal movement since this approach was formulated gradually by the mayors of Ankara, İstanbul, and İzmit between 1973 to 1977 based on policy practices, decisions, responses, and conflicts they have faced with different political and economic groups (Güler, 2004). However, it should also be noted that many scholars and experts were also involved in this process by serving different positions in the municipalities, which adds to this movement's technocratic aspects (Güler, 2004).

Some of those experts and scholars presented some principles as a guideline for this new municipalism movement (Tekeli, 2009a; Tekeli, 1992). Therefore, before examining the Ankara and Dalokay case, it would be beneficial to provide the principles of society-oriented municipalism to better understand the decisions and actions of the mayor.

4.1. Principles of Society-Oriented Municipalism

The principles of society-oriented municipalism are the set of actions, decisions, and rules applied and created by the mayors and scholars. Even though the principles to be examined are supposed to be indispensable for the society-oriented municipalism (Kazancı, 1983: 41), there were also criticisms of the mayors, who formulated those principles, in terms of transforming principles into real policy-making practices (Bayraktar & Penbecioğlu, 2009). However, examining those principles is still crucial since they reflect the understanding of local government at that time (Göymen, 1990: 398). The five basic principles of society-oriented municipalism are as follows (Tekeli, 1977: 33): democratic and participatory municipality, productive municipality, (consumption) regulative municipality, resource creator municipality, and unionist municipality.

As it could be understood by the names of those principles, they also represent the demands for more democratic means of government, equal distribution of resources, and intervention of the state (central or local) to protect the welfare of

the people. Those demands share similarities with the demands of leftist movements in the 1960s in the World and also in Turkey. Therefore, the successes and popularity of CHP mayors applying those principles do not only originate from their capabilities. Time as the beginning 1970s and place, as urban areas experienced rapid urbanization, those principles applied were also crucial for the success of this new understanding as well as the political context in which central and local governments conflicted many times.

The power struggle between the central and local governments affected the formation of this new municipality movement. Local governments' struggle to overcome financial and political limitations, along with political tutelage and democracy discussions, were key aspects of this movement. The first and main necessity for municipalities to formulate society-oriented municipality principles was the conflict between the central and local governments belonging to opposition parties in significant urban areas. This situation pushed local governments, being unable to deliver basic municipality services and pay their employees, to generate different income sources and decrease costs while formulating low-cost municipal policies aiming to impact people's daily problems. Dalokay's pioneering short- and long-term projects were affiliated with those principles, which were formulated to develop solutions to the financial aspects of municipal services and power, including democracy and participation one, since this principle was also used to strengthen municipalities' economic aspects by giving accessing taxation mechanisms. In other words, the aim of the principles was to create financially free municipalities in order to formulate and sustain municipal services in addition to disciplining the production and consumption in urban areas for people. It is also important to state that those principles were not formed or determined before or after the 1973 elections since there was no source, campaign, or declaration mentioning the society-oriented municipalism or its principles. Those principles were formed during the 'experimental' policy implementation and formulations by the mayors of İstanbul, Ankara, İzmit and so on. Therefore, those principles should be

understood as consequences of a series of economic and political policy preferences the society-oriented municipalities implemented.

4.1.1. Democratic and Participatory Municipalism

Democracy was used as a tool for political struggle against the central government's political tutelage over the local governments. According to Tekeli (1992), municipalities should be structured as rule-makers in urban areas regarding economic, cultural, and social domains. He also stated that municipalities should also be able to act as local governments rather than local administrations. Even though there was not much in terms of democratic achievement in that period, it was quite important to start the discussions about strict political tutelage rather than accepting local governments as an extension of the central government. Even though it was desired to invite people to decision-making processes, it was quite unlikely to apply due to structural constraints and lack of any legal basis for such an implication (Keyder, 1979). Therefore, the democratic principle was important in terms of kindling the discussions of political tutelage issues even though it was hard to see any concrete achievements as other principles.

Another part of the principle, participation, was also used in different meanings in that period. Even though participation was about involving people into the decision-making process, it was not the case in the society-oriented municipality. Participation was about hearing the voices of the underrepresented and low-income groups in order to decrease social inequality (Bayramoğlu, 2015). In other words, participation was understood as creating mechanisms for seeing and hearing low-income groups' demands and problems in a political area dominated by local interest groups. Even though participation does not mean involving decision-making processes, it provided a chance to be apparent in the process carried out by political technocrats and elites.

4.1.2. Productive Municipalism

Productive municipalism has emerged as a necessity to overcome the limited resources the central government provides (Göymen, 1990). The main goals were creating urban rent for the people, owning their own resources and materials to provide cheaper and better urban services, and supporting the municipal budget. In this context, the main areas of productive municipalism were housing, mass transportation, food, and recreational activities. The society-oriented municipalities took advantage of the 15th article of Municipal Law No. 1580, which enables municipalities to create an orderly and clean environment (Güler, 2004). This article, including 76 paragraphs, gives municipalities many tasks and responsibilities, from cultural duties to establishing and operating flour and construction equipment (Geray, 1983).

Even though the most important reason why the principle of the productive municipality has become a necessity is the limited resources they had and their heavy dependence on the central government, this principle was also used to regulate the interests of local economic groups. Municipalities acted as entrepreneurs to meet the needs and expectations of the people, including increasing general welfare. According to Tekeli (2009a), the main thoughts and application areas for this principle were producing public goods and services (water, electricity, sewer, etc.) through state institutions, intervening establishment of monopolies in urban areas (such as establishing bread factories), and distributing the urban rent arising from the development of the city among the urban people (public transportation, mass housing). In other words, municipalities get involved in the production, distribution, and even marketing of urban rents (Geray, 1983) for using produced urban rent to increase the wealth of people. This principle, therefore, have a close relationship with another two principles of society-oriented: (consumption) regulative municipality and resource creator municipality.

4.1.3. (Consumption) Regulative Municipalism

Economic and health supervision of commodities were already under the jurisdiction of the municipalities; however, the effectiveness of the supervision was problematic for different reasons such as insufficient human resources, voting concerns, lack of appropriate laws, or magnitude of jurisdiction area (Kazancı, 1977). Lack of municipal intervention for the commodities, especially those heavily used and consumed by the majority, had pushed socialistic municipalities to establish social consumption structure providing cheaper and healthy foods for people.

Economic supervision duties of municipalities were controls of price, sale, label, street trading, weight, and measures. Health supervision involves safety controls of foods and beverages, drinking and utility water, working, and accommodation places. Municipalities had difficulties implementing supervision due to the pressures from chambers of craft and related trades workers and face-to-face relations. According to Kazancı, 70% of small and medium-scale municipalities could not conduct supervision even formally (Kazancı, 1977). Insufficient human and financial resources for bigger areas were also another problem for larger municipalities. Therefore, socialistic municipalities have started their own selling points as economic initiatives to sell foodstuffs directly to people. While selling points could provide cheaper and healthy products to consumers, they had also pressured the market prices without needing price regulation. In other words, the municipality could influence the market prices through their own selling points without needing to supervise or negotiate with private firms. This approach gave municipalities more power in terms of providing cheaper and healthier food to people to keep consumption in favor of consumers. Moreover, an opportunity to influence the market prices via keeping lower prices had given municipalities political and economic power over the economic groups benefitting from urban rent.

According to Tekeli (1977), this principle serves the creation of socialized consumption providing an environment where different social and economic groups could enjoy being part of the same urban population. While Tekeli emphasizes the social and spatial side of the principle, municipal policymakers put their emphasis on economic and political perspectives. Erim (1990) states that the principle's main aim is to discipline urban consumption by municipalities while providing economic benefits to both urban and rural populations. If we think about the circumstances that pushed socialistic municipality mayors to form and implement this principle, their struggle with the central government and local economic groups to regulate bread and food prices had come to the forefront as the main reason for establishing selling points and bread factories. Therefore, consumption regulator municipalism could be seen as another way to strengthen municipal power against other power holders through reducing legal and political costs of regulation and gaining people's support.

4.1.4. Resource Creative Municipalism

Municipalities different from the ruling party were struggling to deliver urban services and even pay their own employees due to financial pressures from the central government and lack of appropriate laws providing municipalities larger financial resources, which were postponed many times in the national assembly. This principle, similar to other principles, was formed to strengthen the municipal economic situation in order to carry out its own policies independently. An abundance of economic resources was emphasized by many scholars for autonomous local governments.

Tekeli (1983) proposes three economic policies for municipalities to become more autonomous from the central government economically; redirecting the urban rent generated from urbanization to the public, permitting municipalities to determine the prices of urban services, and giving local governments permission to tax. While those proposals could not be attained due to structural limitations, society-oriented municipalities implemented them only partially, such as denying

payments to several state apparatus, increasing the rent on municipal properties, or providing their own urban services for a lower price.

4.1.5. Unionist Municipalism

The idea behind unionist municipalism was to organize geographically close municipalities to provide better urban services with less cost. Municipalities working under the same organization could mobilize their resources and knowledge to help each other's needs and necessities without waiting for the central governments' transfer payments. In other words, the surplus of one municipality's workforce, equipment, or resource could be used for other municipalities' necessities for a given time. This approach increases the effectiveness of limited resources, which were quite vital for that period, and provides the opportunity for savings to be transferred to other urban services.

In this period, many unions were created in different parts of Turkey. They focussed on diverse issues regarding their own regions and problems or even national politics. For instance, while the Marmara and Straits Union of Municipalities was focusing on environmental problems and protection around the Marmara Sea, Revolutionist Municipalities Union had formed in order to promote the autonomy of local governments against the central government. (Güler, 2004).

As was stated before, society-oriented municipality principles were not imported or taken for granted from past experiences of the country or foreign countries. Those principles were formed as a response to the unique political and social context developed in major urban areas before and after the 1970s. Even though the political and social movements affecting and increasing the rise of leftist and socialistic policy practices around the World and Europe had an effect on Turkish politics, its uniqueness comes from the leadership of strong mayors determined to implement their own policies regardless of the pressures coming from the central government, historically powerful urban groups, and even their

own party. Periods of Vedat Dalokay and Ali Dinçer as two mayors of Ankara served between 1973-1980 will be examined. For this thesis, Dalokay, as one of the most important actors and architects for the formulation of society-oriented municipality, and his period will be prioritized over Dinçer in terms of examination and discussion of Dalokay's relations with central government, urban groups, and the party (CHP).

4.2. Dalokay's Period in Ankara Between 1973-1977

Towards the middle of the 1970s, when the general political and economic crisis started to turn into a system collapse, some social democratic mayors tried to put an end to the understanding of municipalism under the control of party leaders (Güler, 2004). Experts who gathered understanding of society-oriented municipality in a book stated that the municipal understanding of that day was carried out within the framework of capitalist relations, but as the developments in the West showed, municipalities were now subject to class-based criticism (Ankara Belediyesi, 1977). The transformation of cities into a productive force with new residential areas, the development of the political consciousness of the people, and their demands for political participation have favored left-wing parties (Özküre, 1977). Moreover, changes in squatter's houses' voting behavior to more socialistic ones due to the inability or reluctance of right-wing parties to solve problems they have experienced (Kazancı, 1983) had also quite critical for the election of CHP mayors in significant cities. CHP understood the demands of the urban masses to participate in the administration and realized a local government model that meets the demands of those masses. Especially metropolitan mayor candidates have emerged with discourses that respond to the demands of the masses, such as urban justice and equality. After the 1970s, the party's strategy for local governments focused more on the problems and demands of squatter's houses and the urban poor (Şengül, 2009).

The 1973 local government elections were held on 14 October 1973 in this environment, 55 days after the parliamentary general election. The parties

competed for a total of 1623 municipalities. Local government elections remained in second place on the agenda due to an atmosphere of chaos because 55 days have passed since the general election, and the government has not yet been formed, even the president of the Turkish General National Assembly has not been elected. CHP had been more successful than the national elections since the part won many populated and significant cities such as İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Adana, Gaziantep, and Eskisehir in the 1973 local government elections. From now on, Dalokay's period in Ankara Municipality will be examined for the limitation of this thesis.

Born in Elazığ in 1927, Vedat Dalokay graduated from the Istanbul Technical University Faculty of Architecture in 1949. He worked as an architect at the PTT and the Ministry of Public Works from 1950-1951. He also attended graduate studies at the Sorbonne Urbanism Institute in Paris from 1951-1952. After his graduation, he founded Dalokay Architecture Workshop in Ankara in 1954, and served as the Branch President of the Ankara Chamber of Architects and the General Secretary of the Chamber of Architects between 1964-1968. He has also earned many awards and honorable mentions in architectural project competitions, both national and international ones. Dalokay had drawn attention with his colorful personality as well as his architect, politician, writer, and artist identities. It can be said that Dalokay's colorful, combative, and creative personality had an important role in his being one of the leading representatives of society-oriented municipalism and the first practitioner in Ankara at that time.

When Dalokay (Dalokay, 1977) was elected, he defined Ankara as “a poor man whose stomach is aching (*vegetable market*), having malfunctioning and missing intestines (*sewer system*), suffering from cholera (*drinking water*), and homeless (*squatting*).” This expression is a good summary of Dalokay's policy program for his office service; since his projects mainly focused on housing for people living in squatter's houses, providing cheap and quality food, mass transportation, and sufficient infrastructure for both the lower and middle classes. However, his priority transformed firstly to find adequate funding for

those projects. The finance of the local governments has always been a problem in Turkey since local governments mainly depend on the central government's financial assistance. Moreover, they were much more dependent on central transfers in the 1970s since the financial resources of local governments were more limited. At the same time, the expenses for the booming population had been increased beyond what any local government could bear in such a short time. Therefore, the central government's financial transfers became extremely vital for local governments' daily functioning, and even obtaining additional resources from the center had turned into a huge success for mayors, which was presented as a political victory for mayors. However, the first duality in Turkish politics was the main challenge for Dalokay and other CHP mayors in the 1970s. After the formation of the new government by right-wing parties in 1975, parties controlling important local and central governments were from different and even adversary ideologies. This situation created a unique political context for Turkish urban politics, and even affected upcoming years of Turkish politics; since local governments, which were unable to benefit from the central government's financial and political power, turned into urban people in order to protect and gain popularity while finding new ways to generate income and provide better service despite confronting the central government, their own party, and local economic actors (Güler, 2004).

4.2.1. Relations with the Central Government

The first major challenge for the mayors was their relations with the central government. Parties in the central government and local governments were held by the same or similar parties and ideologies until 1974 in Turkey. This continuity had created/enhanced the perception that municipalities were sole representatives or local organs of the central governments. This situation had broken when the formation of the National Front replaced the CHP-MSP coalition in 1975 as a right-wing coalition. The local governments consistently having a deficit in the budget and being heavily dependent on transfers from the

center faced strict financial supervision and limitations from the central government (Tekeli & Ortaylı, 1978).

The most critical problem pressuring the local governments was the low budget. Local governments' budgets mostly relied on transfers from the central government, which limited the flow of financial resources even further after the formation of the National Front government. During this period, Ankara Municipality could not pay the salary of its employees, which disturbed providing municipality services because of the transfer rejection from the central government. While Ankara Municipality's own income was 350 million liras in 1975, the prepared budget of the municipality required 1.200 million liras (Dalokay, 1977). This significant gap is important for understanding municipalities' financial dependence on central government transfers since urban services and expenses of Ankara Municipality need nearly four times of the budget. Local governments were governed by laws issued in 1932 Municipal Law and 1948 Law on Municipality Revenues which were not providing enough income for the municipalities to deliver urban services. Rapidly crowded cities in which a significant proportion of the population lives in squatter's houses without proper or any infrastructure (Aydın et al. 2005, Günay 2006, Şengül 2009). During this period, Ankara Municipality could not pay the wages of its workers for nearly two months, and workers went on strike, which Dalokay supported and started his own hunger strike for three days in order to protest the central government refusing financial assistance. Even though Dalokay asked for economic support many times, he could not get the support.

Another reaction of Dalokay was complaining and announcing the situation to the Ankara people. He blamed the central government for favouring their own municipalities over opposition ones and sanctioning people for not voting for the ruling party (Güler, 2004). He asked the government for support repeatedly and the public many times and used the mother-father metaphor, which became famous in the national media. In his book, Dalokay (1977) writes:

“Recently, as I was leaving the municipality, I met a group of primary school students at the door. They sent the teachers, and they were going to ask the mayor what the municipality does. I took one of the little boys with me. I said, ‘look, little girl!’ Your mother is at home, gets up early in the morning, prepares breakfast, dresses you, sends you to school, sweeps, he provides everything for the house. He looks at you. This is how the municipality is; It makes your way, sweeps it, makes your park. It produces water, bread, and energy for you. Distributes it. In other words, what your mother does at home, the municipality does it in the city. But there is a state and father that makes the mother cry, does not give her pocket money, and does not lend her the slightest helping hand, just like a cruel Anatolian man. He doesn’t look for his home. With both hands on her side, this mother is saddened by the distress of not being able to serve her offspring. That’s why I call out to the state father. Let go of that cruel father attitude. Come to your mother’s aid. Let him open his purse. For a moment, the laws that your mother wanted to be enacted first. Let him save us from these troubles, and we will be stronger at your service.”

He resembled the municipality to a mother caring and satisfying the needs of her children, while the central government was a bad father for not providing enough money for that care. This metaphor summarizes the local governments in big cities trying to provide urban services to many people living under bad conditions, especially those dwelling in shanty houses. On the other hand, positioning himself as a mother of the city, Dalokay had been criticized by his opponent (Ali Dinçer) in the upcoming elections because of resembling the relationship of patronage, which will be mentioned in another chapter.

Dalokay’s strategy in his first years was to focus on the periphery rather than the central districts by providing and delivering uncostly urban services such as extending roads and bus lines and providing electricity and water. Improving squatter’s houses’ conditions had become a municipal priority, as promised before the elections. Moreover, an opportunity to obtain newcomer voters with a cheap and modest budget also had an effect on this policy in order to concentrate votes and support. Another important aspect of the issue is the politicization of urban services.

The conflict between the central government and local governments being discussed in national media and politics has caused urban services and demands to be politicized. The provision of urban services such as water, garbage

collection, transportation, and so on has turned into a political struggle for the urban population and mayors (Tekeli, 1992). The mayors had positioned themselves as representatives of those people who could not get proper urban services. Vedat Dalokay exposed the financial pressure from the central government repeatedly and even supported strikes of municipal workers while refusing to pay social security contribution of workers to *SGK*, which is the social security agency of the central government, in order to distribute money to more workers (Güler, 2004). Dalokay's announcement to not provide services to the Spanish Embassy due to fascistic acts of the Franco dictatorship in the name of the Ankara people showed his representative role not just as a mere provider of urban services but as the leader of the urban population even in the international matters which brought him into national media again as extraordinary mayor.

4.2.2. Relations with the Party's Local Branch, Municipal Assembly, and *Petit Bourgeois*

As was stated in the second chapter, the mayors were state officials appointed by the central government, and only municipal assemblies were elected by the people until the 1961 constitutional change. The introduction of the new constitution has enabled mayors to be elected by the people directly, but the separation between mayors and municipality assemblies has stayed. In other words, mayors and municipal assemblies were elected separately. While mayors are elected with popular voting, assemblies are formed proportionally in accordance with the votes parties acquired. Assemblies were critical for local interest groups since the municipal assemblies were the most important and highest urban political representation channel for influencing decisions regarding the distribution of urban resources until the 1961 constitution enabled elected mayors. Moreover, assembly members have more freedom to protect and enhance their class interests and their party's than the mayor, who is held accountable easier in the eyes of the people (Batuman, 2010). Therefore, socialistic municipality mayors had conflicts both with their own political parties

and municipality assemblies from time to time in order to protect their own political power and carry out policies they promised to voters.

According to the research of Tekeli (1977), craft and related trade workers have an important influence on municipality assemblies. For instance, 36% of CHP assembly members and 60% of other parties' members were craftsmen, tradesmen, and commissioners in Ankara Municipality Assembly in the 1973 local government election. While mayors in big cities such as Ankara, İstanbul, and İzmit represented or acted accordingly to urban socialism, members of the working class and consumers were not represented sufficiently in the municipal assemblies (Güler, 2004). This situation resulted in the assembly's reluctance and objections to implement policies damaging local urban economic groups' interests which resulted in conflicts between mayors and assemblies. Vedat Dalokay, elected mayor of Ankara Municipality in 1973, explicitly stated that the interests of craftsmen and tradesmen conflict with the interests of the people of Ankara (Dalokay, 1977). While the underrepresentation of the working class in the party and municipal assembly raises difficulties in formulating society-oriented municipality policies, mayors tried to increase their power and legitimacy by implementing those exact policies to gain public support. Therefore, policies formulated in accordance with society-oriented municipalism principles become the hotspots where mayors increase their political power and confront other local political and economic actors in urban and even national areas.

One of the most iconic incidents was the bakeries' strike in Ankara. Bread-producing bakeries started to strike with the rejection of the demand for an increase in bread prices. However, Vedat Dalokay refused the demand by announcing and demonstrating the profitability of bakeries with the current price, which seems to be quite sufficient (Dalokay, 1977). When the strike began, the municipality seized the bakeries to continue the production of bread, and some parts of the society voluntarily joined the production process. During this period, different municipalities from various areas were also supported by sending bread

to provide a sufficient bread supply for the Ankara people ((Bayraktar and Penpecioglu, 2009). During and after the bread incident, Dalokay stated repeatedly and occasionally that bread production must be socialized, like water and electricity, since bread is also one of the basics of life (Dalokay, 1977). In this period, many municipalities had started municipal projects to produce bread which were realized and grew over time under the name of Public-Bread. While Public-Bread projects were serving the welfare of the urban population in terms of decreasing the costs of food, it was also generating additional income for the municipality. However, the main reason was to prevent further exploitation of people in need by bakeries, especially in an issue that was quite vital for lower-income people to continue their lives. This bread issue is also a good example of observing the conflict of many urban actors in terms of power relations. While powerful economic interest groups for the urban area, bakers, as providers of one of the most basic staple foods, pushed for the price increase because they were not satisfied with the price proposed by the municipality. The mayor had shown strong opposition in order to protect the purchasing power of lower-income people who demonstrated their support for Dalokay by participating in bread production (Tekeli, 1991).

Class structures within the municipal assemblies could also be seen in party politics. Pioneer mayors of society-oriented municipalism in CHP faced conflicts with their own party. Mayors of İstanbul, Ankara, and İzmit, who were architects of this new municipal understanding and quite popular among the society, could not win the primary elections in their party and could not be candidates in the 1977 elections. Even though CHP prepared an election campaign with the society-oriented municipality principles in the 1977 elections, the party also changed the main mayors and implemented those principles successfully with those coming from their own organization. Batuman (2010) stated the situation as discomfort from the central administration of CHP due to the significant increase in the popularity of mayors among the people. In addition to the central board of CHP, Party's provincial organization also criticized mayors' careless attitudes toward the demands of their own provincial organization, which

increased the criticisms of the center members of CHP for nominating candidates not having close relations with the party. Moreover, party members, being craft and related trades workers, had also used their influence in the primary elections to prevent former mayors from staying in office because of the policies foreseen by the mayors damaging their class economic gain and class interests. Party's local organization ran a campaign against Dalokay under the leadership of Ali Dinçer, who was a member of the party since his youth and not as radical as Dalokay. The nomination of different candidates also shows the parties' increased importance of local politics and the interest of the party's central board in urban areas. However, the main reason socialistic municipality mayors are not elected is their conflicts with the local petit-bourgeois and their popularity among people. Mayors challenged radically interests of them who were always strong political actors in local politics in Turkey and the Ottoman era.

4.2.3. Strategic Decisions and Policies of Dalokay

Dalokay has made many decisions and policies that affect his own time and today in terms of changing local government practices. Rather than presenting all of Dalokay's policies, this section aims to present his policies that are important both for his time and for later historical processes. For this purpose, policies that strengthen/change the economic and political situation of the municipality and the policies that he has developed for the urban poor will also be included.

The first project will be *Akkondu* housing project developed by Dalokay and mostly finished by Karayalçın, another mayor of Ankara around, in 1994. The name of the project has later changed to *Batikent* due to the similarity of the name to the propaganda used by CHP. The projects aimed to expand the city in a controlled manner towards the western side of the city and to create a qualified environment for the low-income people living in the squatter's houses (Bayraktar & Penpecioğlu, 2008). According to the project, a total of 80 thousand residences would be built, and about 60,000 of the houses would be reserved for low-income families, middle-class people, and people living in

squatter's houses. Funding such an immense housing project was quite challenging for the municipality already suffering from a low budget. Moreover, the Ministry of Finance of the period before the general elections to be held in 1977 transferred funds to the municipalities affiliated with its own political party for their projects but did not transfer any funds to the Ankara Municipality for the Batikent Project (T. Sönmez, 1977: 71). Therefore, Ankara Municipality got a loan close to the municipality's own budget from the European Resettlement Fund for the Batikent Project in an environment in which Turkey had difficulties in getting loans from international sources. Even though the Batikent project has lost its true nature in the following processes due to misapplications regarding planning and design (Bayraktar & Penpecioglu, 2008: 78-80), the project was important to show a political desire to provide a better environment for urban poor and to realise their demands regarding housing and better living condition in the urban area.

Another important project was the Public-Bread (*Halk-Ekmek*) which was established to provide cheaper bread to society. As mentioned before, Public-Bread was established to take away the monopoly of the bakers, who make a significant profit from the bread prices sold in the city. Thus, the municipalities would both provide cheap bread to the people and play a role as a producer in determining the prices in the market. Even today, Public-Bread has been a basic service offered by many municipalities, producing a total of 198 million bread in Ankara in 2021 (Halk-Ekmek, 2022). The fact that Dalokay's Public-Bread project has turned into one of the most profitable companies of the municipality by providing cheap bread to the public is very important in terms of urban entrepreneurship, together with the principle of producer municipality, which is one of the society-oriented municipality principles. One of the projects that tried to put into practice related to food but could not be realized was the milk distribution project. It would be possible to increase rural production in the region and to deliver daily milk to houses with small children at home with the project. Dalokay considered this project important for the development of children raised in low-income families (Dalokay, 1977). This project can be

considered as a type of social aid to be provided in the next municipal period (social municipalism). However, the fact that milk distribution would be distributed to every citizen in need, regardless of income, differentiates the project from social aids since it becomes a municipal service offered to every citizen within the borders of the municipality rather than food aid. The project could not be realized due to the central government.

In the field of public transportation, Dalokay preferred a path to use the municipal budget in the most efficient way and also tried to increase the share of public entrepreneurship in order to solve the problems created by the dominance of small entrepreneurs in urban passenger transportation. In this context, he has chosen to use roundabouts to solve traffic jams, and he has not invested in expensive road construction projects. Moreover, he tried to increase the activities and efficiency of the Ankara Electricity, Gas, and Bus Operation Establishment (EGO) by purchasing a large number of new buses (Tekeli, 2009b: 126). However, Dalokay thought that the best urban transportation was rail transportation since it was stated in the study reports of the experts of the presidency, which was formed by employing several scholars to the municipality to advise the mayor in urban policy-making processes, that rail transportation would increase the control and effectiveness of the mass transportation system both for the municipality and the people. Moreover, traffic jams caused by private vehicles would be decreased, and pedestrian priority in the urban area of Ankara would be provided. It was pointed out in the report that Ankara would be a city where people can travel between their homes and work through railway transportation systems to be built in the city center, so that an efficient mass transportation system would limit the road and parking capacity for cars and prioritize pedestrians. In addition, it has been stated that the railway system would provide cheap and efficient transportation that can be used by all social classes (Tekeli, 2009b). Dalokay, who went to Moscow for the preparation of the metro project, could not realize this project. Problems in funding the project, insufficient workforce, lack of knowledge and experts about the railway systems, and the reluctance of the central government did not make the project possible.

However, these studies on the rail transport system would be important for the next mayors; bringing the metro to Ankara will turn into a promise and a request to be used in every election period.

Although there was not much action on democracy and participation, which are among the principles of society-oriented municipality in Dalokay's period, there were actually two important projects on the subject. The first of these was 'urban institutes' (*kent enstitüleri*). Urban institutes were an effort to carry the mission of raising awareness and educating the people of village institutes, which existed at the beginning of the republic, in the urban area. With the rapid urbanization, it was aimed to raise the awareness of the millions who migrated to the city, both on urban life and on urban policies and participation. Thus, those who came to the city would be able to integrate into city life more easily as urban citizens and participate in urban politics democratically. The project could not be realized, and it was not possible within the structure and legal framework of the period. Another project, which references the principle of the unionist municipality, was the establishment of the "Revolutionary Municipalities Union" which was formed by municipalities in the Ankara region. The aim of this union was to carry out studies and exert political pressure to make municipalities more autonomous against central governments. The most important difference from the other unions established in the period was that this union was established only for a political purpose; it had nothing to do with the production of any urban service. In this context, it can be interpreted that Dalokay was trying to change the existing structures and dominant hegemony and to implement his own strategy. Even though democratic and participatory principles were not realised in urban scalar, the effort should also be noticed.

Dalokay has also had decisions and actions to change other symbolic, hegemonic or existing structures and to produce new structures. When he took office in 1973, he made the city's emblem "Hittite Sun" and was erected as a statue in 1978 at one of the important intersections in the city center. The emblem was inspired by the Hittite civilization established in the Ankara region. The emblem

received harsh criticism from the central government of the time. There have been criticisms that the emblem belongs to civilization before the Turkish-Islamic civilizations and that it has nothing to do with the history of the current nation (Cengizkan, 2021). The emblem was tried to be blocked by the governor of Ankara, but with the approval of the Council of State (*Danıştay*), the emblem became the symbol of Ankara until 1995. Although there is no explanation in the literature about why Dalokay chose such an emblem, it can be thought that Dalokay evokes both a change and autonomy by referring to Ankara's own historicity and territory with this emblem. It can also be thought of as an effort to get rid of the hegemony of the republic with the emblem of such an ancient civilization and to establish that Ankara has its own uniqueness and freedom rather than being the capital of the state. The emblem became the subject of discussion in the following years and was changed as a first act by another mayor (Melih Gökçek) in 1995. Therefore, there will be a reserved paragraph for the discussion of emblems in the next case study.

Dalokay also has actions regarding how the mayor is positioned. Some of these were the refusal to pay the debts to the state institutions in order to pay municipal employees' wages, joining the strike with municipal workers, and sleeping in the city hall to protest the central government's minimal transfers. In addition, he often tried to announce to the public that the government's pressure, obstructions, and insufficient funds were given to the municipality, and he followed a very different path than previous mayors. In order to protest the execution of a group of young people by the Franco regime in Spain, he did not provide municipality services to Spanish Embassy, and a lawsuit was filed against him by the central government. In his defence of the case, he positioned himself as a representative of the people of Ankara and declared that he was protesting the execution, which he regarded as a political movement that was completely opposed to the political and social ideas of the people of Ankara (Dalokay, 1973). It is quite surprising for Turkey that a mayor is involved in the internal affairs of another country. Because it is a very powerful symbolic move that he put forward a mayor figure who can intervene and take action even on

international issues, his position portrays as a challenge to his position (mayorship) as the representative of the centre historically.

Dalokay has become a very important political figure in Ankara and local governments with his unique policy-making style and projects and policies that he has realized and failed to realize. Dalokay, who was at the forefront of the development of society-oriented municipalism, was also inspirational for the mayors of the next period. Some of the projects he carried out, such as Public-Bread, were preserved and developed by mayors belonging to different ideologies and parties that came to power in the following periods. Beyond the projects and policies, he has drawn the image of a different mayor, even a local leader, by going beyond the duties and responsibilities of being a mayor from time to time. The fact that he became such an important figure also played an important role in losing the intra-party elections for the next period.

4.3. Fall of Radicalism in Socialistic Municipality and Dinçer's Period of 1977-1980

It was expected that CHP's candidate would win the next local government elections in 1977 because of the former mayors' successful performance, especially in major urban areas, which resulted in the precise victory of CHP in many local governments. As the people appreciated the successful performance of those mayors, candidacy competition within the party had turned into quite a critical political choice due to the high probability of being the next mayor. In other words, CHP's candidates, especially in İstanbul or Ankara, would probably be elected without needing fierce competition with other parties. This situation led the party administration to select the candidate they favored most. Even though CHP managed to protect and increase their votes in the 1977 elections thanks to policies implemented by society centred municipality mayors (except İzmit where CHP lost), new mayors could not formulate and implement as radical policies as their predecessors (Batuman, 2010), which resulted in damage to party's prestige in upcoming elections. In the candidacy process, Dalokay had

to compete with Ali Dinçer being a provincial head of CHP in Ankara and a long party member. He also had the support of both the party leader, Bülent Ecevit, and other important district organizations such as Altındağ, Çankaya, central district, and Yenimahalle.

According to Bayraktar and Penpecioglu (2009), Dinçer's administrative mentality was close to a more collectivist and democratic one rather than a strong charismatic leadership style, as seen in Dalokay's period. Dinçer did not criticize the policies Dalokay carried or the principles of society-oriented municipalism; on the contrary, he explicitly remarked those principles. In his campaign for preliminary candidacy brochure by the name of "Why I am a candidate for the municipality", bearing Dinçer's signature, he summarized his intention in ten articles such as more democratic government, equitable distribution of services, more ordered and various municipal services, fight against expensiveness, productive and resource and resource creator municipality (Bayraktar and Penpecioglu, 2009). As it could be seen, Dinçer's promises do not conflict with the principles of society-oriented municipalism but enhance them even further. However, Dinçer heavily criticized Dalokay's way of policy-making. In his campaign brochure, Dinçer states (Bayraktar and Penpecioglu, 2009):

"While we are asking for authorization from the people of Ankara...we are asking it with the conciseness of how we could overcome those problems as an 'organization.' And we believe this could be achieved with the broad democratic left-wing cadres sharing the same mentality and faith we have. We want it as an organization believing that we have organized and conscious cadres rather than carrying policies based on people."

In another passage of the brochure, while district organizations (Altındağ, central district, Çankaya, Yenimahalle) are portraying the 'real' candidate of CHP, they are describing a part worker possessing some qualities such as having a tendency to govern in the name of the party instead of himself, being able to apply conscious and organized cadres rather than his personal showing, humble enough not to claim patronage or fatherhood of the people, being peaceful with

his party and organization, knowing the limitations of his responsibilities and authority, having the dynamism to seek solutions for problems of the city with the people and organization. In other words, district organizations of CHP implied a new candidate who has strong relationships with the party and is willing to work with them through his mayorship. Dinçer's and party's emphasis on democracy and participation is another criticism of Dalokay's disconnection from his party and organization. The fatherhood metaphor in the brochure was explicit criticism of Dalokay's way of governing as strong charismatic leadership, while party organization was emphasized repeatedly. As a result of the discomfort of the central administration of CHP due to the popularity of Dalokay and support given to Dinçer by the local branches of the party, Dalokay lost and could not be nominated for another term in office. It also is noted that party members being crafts and related trade workers, also had significant roles in the preliminary election. Dalokay's conflicts with those economic groups in his service had also influenced the victory of Dinçer as a more reliable and less radical candidate.

After the victory of Dinçer in the local elections of 1977, he started to bring his own team of experts to the municipality. Dinçer, unlike Dalokay, had appointed experts to several management positions in the municipality instead of keeping experts in advisory positions. In other words, experts were given responsibility and authority in the municipality to perform. This difference from the previous period gave the image of the municipality being run by experienced and organized cadres rather than the mayor's personal charisma, as was promised in preliminary elections. Bayraktar and Penpecioglu (2009) state Dinçer's administration as "...collective style of government which is composed of equals rather than the political boss and his men. It is based on the principle of first among equals". On the other hand, it must be noted that society-oriented municipality principles are protected and pursued in this period. Dinçer's administration and CHP adopted those principles as they had written those principles in the party's election bulletin and brochures. In addition to trying to

implement his own projects, Dinçer also embraced and continued the projects Dalokay started or put forward as ideas during his period (Ayanoglu, 2020).

Dalokay's *Batıkent (Akkondu)* social housing project was carried out, the foundation of the underground railway system was laid, some municipal foodstuff selling points were opened, and the municipal company for the Public-Bread (*Halk-Ekmek*) was established, and operationalized. Therefore, it could be stated that there is continuity in society-oriented municipality projects. In the Dinçer period, as in the Dalokay period, the ideas of returning urban rents to society and using the urban space for the public benefit were at the forefront, in accordance with the socialist municipality understanding (Ayanoglu, 2020). As it was mentioned before, the two mayors had differentiated each other in terms of their administration styles.

In Dinçer's period, long-term and holistic planning understanding was embraced in order to formulate solutions to urban problems. According to Göymen (1983), the new administration gave importance to the 'how to do?' question rather than 'what to do?'. While Dalokay proposes new and radical solutions not being feasible with given resources but pioneering to urban problems, Dinçer and his team were able to realize more projects than Dalokay due to the given importance of planning with available resources (Ayanoglu, 2020). Another important distinction between the two administrations is the democratic and participatory principle of the socialistic municipality.

As it was stated in Dinçer's brochures used in preliminary and local elections, he gave more importance to the participation of people or organizations in the municipal policy-making process. In his brochure of "Why I am a candidate," he states more democratic administration was one of his first aim (Bayraktar and Penpecioglu, 2009). Dinçer states in his election brochure:

"We cannot be content with electing our representatives every four years. We all must participate more consistently and competently. We have to see what's

going on up close. We have to participate in the decisions and supervise the managers.” (Bayraktar and Penpecioglu, 2009)

He also claimed that municipalities are the laboratories to spread democracy and enable the people to participate in decision-making processes (Bayraktar and Penpecioglu, 2009). Dinçer had only a limited opportunity to implement participatory projects such as initiating *I. Başkent Dayanışma Forumu* (Capital Solidarity Forum), which was aimed to gather many non-governmental organizations in order to discuss urban problems and solutions. Even though the forum would not be as effective as it was foreseen, since only limited representatives were able to deliver their thoughts, the event provided practice for democratic and participatory policies (Bayraktar and Penpecioglu, 2009). One of the most important reasons why the participatory principle of society-oriented municipality could not be realized as much as other principles were the insufficient legal basis for such a participatory mechanism (Bayraktar and Penpecioglu, 2009). The most radical discourse of Dinçer comes forward in this issue. Dinçer writes in his election brochure:

“There is no need to wait for the law for this. The only law is the CHP program and worldview. The law at most formalizes these boards, but by giving importance to these studies, we can actually get to know them.”

It is quite hard to observe such a radicalism or strong instance in his policies and discourses in terms of ignoring the rules and laws other than establishing democratic and participatory municipalism. Even though Dinçer is portrayed as a more moderate mayorship in comparison to Dalokay, his thoughts on the participatory principle and limited projects produced show that Dinçer places special emphasis on this issue. Even though his passion and efforts, Dinçer also stated afterward of his mayorship that participation and democracy of the people could only be possible unofficially (Bayraktar and Penpecioglu, 2009; Güler, 2004). As a result, more democratic and participatory administration understanding along with the aims such as working with various cooperation, creating channels or boards enabling more participation, or transparentizing municipal assembly meetings could be operationalized quite partially. According

to Bayrak and Penbecioğlu (2009), Tahir Dinçer, working closely with Ali Dinçer and the municipality, states, “we did not do it well” for the implementation of more democratic and participatory municipalism. While Dinçer was criticizing Dalokay’s one-man rule over the municipality, the decisions had been taken with limited people in his period. In other words, Dinçer’s thoughts on including different parts of society in the decision-making process could not be realized. Decisions were taken by the group of experts instead of a mayor and his advisors, which created a technocratic way of rule. Therefore, it would be difficult to say that technocratic understanding had changed in Dinçer’s period in this aspect.

4.4. Analysis of Socialist Municipalism in Ankara

Society-oriented municipalism movement practiced between 1973-1980 has impacted Turkish national and local politics greatly. While politically neglected mass migration to large urban areas continued for years, the first political duality between the local and central governments provoked discussions on local government autonomy. The mayors of society-oriented municipalism had aimed to increase the welfare of excluded and neglected people who migrated from the rural areas by providing urban services to squatter’s houses and regulating the market in customers’ favour. Moreover, this period is also important for better understanding the urban rent and different urban actors. Dalokay and his expert team had shown how local economic groups were benefitting from the urban rent. He also had many political conflicts with those groups, indicating the power of those groups in municipal assemblies and party organizations. Therefore, this period of society-oriented municipalism was quite influential in Turkish politics for the discussions on the autonomy of local governments from the central one, changing social and economic relations in urban areas around urban rent getting more significant due to rapid urbanization, and different urban groups influencing local governments.

One of the most striking examples of society-oriented municipality experiences in Turkey was the Dalokay period in Ankara. He had a significant impact on the future of local Turkish governments with his radical and strong character. The duality that emerged between local and central governments caused the center to exert political and economic pressures against local governments. Dalokay strongly opposed this situation and advocated reducing the political and economic dependence of local governments on the center in order to overcome such pressures and produce policies independently, which gave birth to society-oriented municipality principles. During this period, he tried to strengthen the Ankara municipality economically and tried to gain political power by getting the support of the people of Ankara. Another important point of the Dalokay's period was that he revealed the economic and political power of the local groups in the urban area. He observed that especially tradesmen and craftsmen both benefited from the economic rents in the urban area, and he said that this group influenced the municipal decisions in the city council in favor of their own interests. In order to clearly show this situation to the public, he published the incomes of certain artisan groups (bakers, drivers, tradesmen) through the press (Dalokay, 1977).

Moreover, he took decisions in favor of society (his opposition to the increase in prices of bread and buses, raising the rents of municipal immovables or serving through the municipality instead of renting, etc.). He aimed to transfer the rent that emerged in the urban area to society again. This situation inflamed conflicts between Dalokay and some members of the municipal assembly. Another criticism of Dalokay came from his own party organization. His party criticized Dalokay as someone who is far from the party, takes decisions alone, and does not care about the wishes of the party. While those criticisms should be emphasized, it should also not be forgotten that there were influential groups of tradesmen and artisans both within the party and in the municipal assembly. As a matter of fact, those groups supported Dinçer against Dalokay in the preliminary elections for the local government elections.

When we look at the first period of society-oriented municipalism, it is observed that there were many more political conflicts between the mayor and other political groups. Dalokay did not hesitate to come into conflict with the central government, local city council, local economic groups, and his own political party while following his 'radical' policies. He produced different ways of generating resources for the realization of urban services; even he went to Moscow for the Ankara underground project and had a plan prepared. He even participated in international issues as the representative of the people of Ankara. In this regard, he did not provide urban services to the Spanish Embassy for a week, and he also gave the names of important international personalities to the streets. With these aspects, it can be said that he placed himself in a similar way to the political position of today's metropolitan mayors active in many political areas, from international to local issues. One of the biggest reasons why Dalokay did not hesitate to come into conflict with so many political and economic actors was the support of the people of Ankara. Although he was not nominated as a candidate, the fact that the CHP increased its vote in the next elections could be interpreted as an example of public support.

Although it was observed that this radicalism was lost during Dinçer's period, more concrete services were actually produced during his period. The Dinçer period already embraced the projects that Dalokay started and presented, and he also formulated new policies. Instead of large, long-term, and challenging projects, which is one of Dinçer's criticisms of Dalokay, Dinçer has chosen to do smaller projects that can be realized quickly. Planning increased during his period, and policies began to be formed by a group of experts, not around the power of the mayor. During his period, Dinçer did not experience political conflicts as much as Dalokay, and like previous mayors, he was generally concerned with urban problems. Change in the central government to the coalition, in which CHP was a part of it, had a crucial impact on his period since there was no oppression in Dinçer's period, unlike Dalokay's one. On the contrary, the central government was supportive. The short-lived Ministry of Local Governments was formed in Dinçer's period in order to support

municipalities' autonomy. Dinçer, who had already worked for many years in the party, did not enter into any conflict with his party during his service. Although Dinçer did not discuss local governments' political and social positions as much as Dalokay, his period was important to examine the period after Dalokay for path-dependencies.

While naming Dalokay's period 'radical,' the stress is made on his path-shaping policies. Dalokay, as a strategic urban actor, showed strong resistance both to the formal and substantive dimensions of the state. The central government's ignorance and reluctance to solve urban problems, which were being accumulated for nearly two decades, gave Dalokay the opportunity to trigger a crisis in many state dimensions. With his discourse and political stance, Dalokay has accelerated important discussions in Turkish politics and Turkish governments. The aim of finding solutions to many problems that have accumulated in the urban area for years, and especially to the problems of squatter's houses, was crucial to show the importance of those people for having the power to affect politics. He also played a major role in the introduction of local governments and urban problems into national politics due to the politicization of urban politics and services. Political parties who seemed to be indifferent to urban politics started to prepare promises and visions special to urban areas, which they perceived to be a key to winning national elections.

The Dinçer period, on the other hand, has been a good example of reinforcing the path newly created in Dalokay's period. Although Dalokay has developed important discourses and projects, most of the projects have not been realized or completed in his period. Dinçer was very productive both in terms of planning and completing Dalokay's projects, along with putting forward other projects. Therefore, Dinçer was also an important actor in embracing Dalokay's projects and society-oriented municipalism to strengthen the structure Dalokay envisioned. In other words, change in discourse and structure began in Dalokay protected and articulated to structure in the period of Dinçer.

Another important analysis could be made in terms of their positions in urban governance. Even though Dalokay was portrayed and acted accordingly to being an urban manager, some of his projects were closer to being urban entrepreneurial. The implementation of urban entrepreneurship within the framework of the structural and legal conditions of the period was rather difficult compared to the post-1980 period. Even though urban entrepreneurship is a concept that started in the West in the 1970s and is mostly not implemented in European cities (Harvey, 1989), political and economic constraints, including pressures from the central government, affected many municipalities that practiced society-oriented municipalism in Turkey, forced Dalokay to act like an entrepreneur at some point. Of course, this entrepreneurship was not to attract investments to the urban area as a part of the capitalist accumulation process by providing necessary infrastructures for creating the most suitable environment for investments and competing with other cities, which would be practiced in the following periods. On the contrary, I can define it as entrepreneurship raised to protect the consumers and people living in the urban area from the market at a certain level. In other words, projects and policies that seem to be made with the spirit of urban entrepreneurialism are actually more suitable for the logic of urban managerialism. From this perspective, Dalokay stands out as a successful implementer of urban managerialism by combining some aspects of entrepreneurial logic.

Repetition of actions and set of implications are important in Dinçer. This enabled Dinçer to become a strategic actor. In Dinçer's period, there was an effort to advance Dalokay's vision rather than to create a different hegemonic state project. Dinçer's practices reinforced the durability of new structures created in Dalokay's period. This situation saved society-oriented municipalism from being an actor-based movement. It has strengthened society-oriented municipalism in ensuring that it affected structures and some aspects of it became part of the structures. As a matter of fact, there has been a situation where many different municipalities tried to implement some policies of society-

oriented municipalism (such as Public-Bread, and social housing projects) in the following periods.

In this period, Dalokay benefitted from the opportunities in the crisis of state dimensions. When Dalokay became a mayor, it was observed that there were crises in the society and the state administration. The fact that the population for which local governments were responsible, especially in big cities, has reached large amounts and demanded the delivery of important urban services has turned local governments into the focus of political and social problems. Dalokay, who benefitted from the crisis by gathering the support of the Ankara people, pushed the limits of the structure and took advantage of the opportunities that the crisis in the state dimensions provided him. His actions deepened the crisis in the formal dimensions of the state by using the crisis in the substantive dimension and changing the structure in line with his own strategy.

In this period, Dalokay had experienced conflicts with many dimensions of the state such as the mode of representation dimension, state project and hegemonic vision. Those conflicts were not only with the central government, but also with many actors in urban and municipal politics, including its own party. The support he received from the public played an important role in his pursuit of conflicts with so many political and economic actors. He continued the policies with the claim of representing the interests of the people of Ankara, especially for the lower classes, with the support he received from the public, even if those policies were against the interests of economic groups in the urban area. He even argued that he did not provide municipal services to the Spanish Embassy since actions of the government of Spain was against the values of the people of Ankara and Dalokay has to show reaction as a representative of the people of Ankara (Dalokay, 1977). In addition, the metaphorization of himself as Ankara's mother also supports the idea that Dalokay had seen himself as provider, protector and true representative of people of Ankara. While Dalokay's policies aimed to protect the general interests of the lower classes, municipal employees and the people of Ankara from the harmful effects of the market, he also

frequently expressed the pressures of the central government for not being able to fully implement these policies. As another important point, he defined the access of municipal services by those living in squatter's houses as rights-based problem. He saw the fact that these people living in the urban area did not benefit from the services of the municipality as a right-based or citizenship problem. Therefore, he provided the municipal services without waiting for legal conditions of the squatter's houses. Approaching this issue as rights-based is similar to the left-wing demands that were effective in Europe of the period. These demands were generally for the expansion of rights and freedoms of the working class. Therefore, effects of those movements could also be observed in Dalokay's policies and also society-oriented municipalism.

It could also be asserted that Dalokay followed a class-based populist policies in this process. The metro project has been developed for the transportation of the working classes to the urban centres, the Akkondu housing project has been developed for the people living in the squatter's houses, and the public bread (*Halk-Ekmek*) project has been provided for the cheaper access of the low-income groups to a widely consumed food. In addition, he clashed with the economic interest groups in the urban area (such as bakers, peddlers) for the protecting the welfare of the people in the city. In addition, he refused pay the payment for the central government institutions so that the salaries of the municipal employees could be paid, and even joined the strike to support them. In short, his policies were firstly aimed to protect the interests of the lower and working classes. Through those policies Dalokay had tried to realise the hegemonic vision of the society-oriented municipalism as transforming of urban rent produced for the welfare of the people. This discourse did not remain only in the symbolic or discursive dimension, but also realised in the material dimension. This has increased Dalokay's popularity, especially in squatter's areas and areas where the lower classes dwelled. It can be said that Dalokay used such popularity as an important power source for structural changes. Dalokay not only came into conflict with active economic groups in urban politics, but also clashed with the central government and his own party, targeting centralization,

which is another important structure in Turkish politics. In order to reduce the dependence of local governments on the centre, municipalities have established unions among themselves. The Revolutionist Municipalities Union, which was established under the leadership of Dalokay, was established for the political purpose of ensuring the economic and political independence of the municipalities and spreading the idea of autonomous local governments. Dalokay's conflict with his own party as well as with the central government is an important point in terms of decentralization demand. Because, Dalokay has been an important political actor in terms of acting independently of the pressures of not only the central government but also their own parties and all kinds of political and economic groups while creating policies for the people in the city where they are elected him. This opposition, which can be considered as radical, is very important in terms of questioning the centralism structure that had settled in Turkish politics until then. It also sets a strong example in terms of Dalokay and society-oriented municipalism aiming at policies targeting the structure. Because the conflict with the central government can be explained by a municipality in opposition demanding more resources. In addition, conflicts with interest groups in the city can be examined in terms of Dalokay's class-centered populist policies. However, the conflict with his own party is a strong finding in terms of the demand and desire for the structural change.

Society-oriented municipalism was an approach that was highly dependent on Dalokay's decisions and actions. The conditions of the period (urban problems), the indifferent attitude of the central government, the importance that was not given to cities and mayors historically, the conflicts on unequal distribution that emerged in the World, as well as the issues such as social justice provided a situation for strategic actors such as Dalokay to implement his strategic selectivities. In fact, it can be said that Dalokay's period was very important in the positioning of mayors as strategic actors in Turkish politics. While the effects and some aspects of society-oriented municipalism are still influential in local governments, the rapid structural changes in Turkish politics as the 1980 military coup, which suspended political activities for years, and the World ceased the

implications of society-oriented municipalism approach to have a strong impact on Turkish local government structures.

CHAPTER 5

PARADIGM CHANGE IN TURKEY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

The 1980s were years of significant changes and transformations in world political, economic, and social relations. The social dynamism of the 1960s-70s was divided into fragmented structures after the 1980s. The world economic structure has begun to change, and the importance of capital has increased. The management structures of nation-states have now been opened to institutionalization that serves the development of capital, so the world in which capital plays a decisive role has begun to be formed. All these changes have been part of a new economic paradigm that took its roots from neo-liberalism. Concrete implementation, on the other hand, has been implemented by capitalist states under the name of the New Right as a new political approach. Even though defining the period of AKP as new-right ideology, it is also one of the closest ones in terms of economic liberalization and political attitude since even AKP itself could not provide definite or concrete manifestation about their ideology and also showed contradiction within their government as in the new right.

In this chapter, the details of the new right hegemony project affecting the whole world and the effects of the neo-liberal accumulation strategy will be examined. The chapter will continue to discuss the Turkish experience and the new concept of local governments as social municipalism. Lastly, Gökçek's period between 2001-2014 in Ankara will be examined as a case.

5.1. The Rise of New Right and Neoliberalism in the World

The reconciliation of labor, capital, and the state over the welfare state policies after the Second World War went into crisis in the 1970s and left its place to the “new right” policies in the 1980s. The new right understanding is built on the

discourses of neo-liberalism and neo-conservative ideology. While neo-conservatism provided political aspects of the new right approach, neo-liberalism is used for economic reconstruction. Emerging two different approaches inevitably contains its own contradictions. However, it would be better to present key aspects of neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism.

The common point of the different forms of state that emerged after the Second World War is the recognition of the necessity of using state intervention in conjunction with market processes for full employment, economic growth, and the welfare of citizens. Keynesian fiscal and monetary policies used for this purpose were seen as the assurance of class reconciliation or peace between labour and capital. In this period, states intervened actively in industrial policies, health, education, etc. They have created various welfare systems, especially in urban areas (Harvey, 2015: 18-19).

After the Second World War, there was a period in which the economic and political gains of the working classes increased against the capital with the Keynesian welfare state practices in the developed countries and the import substitution development strategies in the underdeveloped countries. However, the financial crisis of the demand-side welfare state implemented in developed countries led to the blockage of import substitution strategies in underdeveloped countries by the 1970s. This situation has accelerated the search for new capital accumulation projects that would solve the problems of capital, including new state projects and hegemonies. The new capital accumulation project that the developed capitalist states needed to get out of the crisis they were in was realized with the acceptance of the new right understanding, especially in the Western countries. The new right is a new state and hegemony project that combines pro-supply neo-liberal economic policies and political conservatism, implemented firstly by Margaret Thatcher in England in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in the USA in 1980 (Topal, 2002: 63).

The use of the concept of the new right instead of neo-liberal to reflect the character of this period arises from the difference between the concepts of accumulation strategy and hegemony project. The neo-liberal economic policies implemented since the 1980s are the name of the new accumulation strategy. The definition of the new right concept used for this period as a hegemonic project stem from its characteristics beyond being a mere economic policy change in the world. Jessop (1983) explained the difference between the two concepts as follows:

“Accumulation strategies are directly related to economic expansion on a national or international scale; hegemonic projects, on the other hand, may be primarily (even if economically conditioned and concerned with economic issues) various non-economic objectives. That is, hegemonic projects may include military success, social reform, political stability, or a moral renewal. However, while the accumulation strategy is primarily directed towards relations of production and thus the balance of class forces, hegemonic projects are directed towards broader issues that are typically grounded not only in economic relations but also in the realm of civil society and the state. Accordingly, hegemonic projects must take into account the balance between all the social forces involved, no matter how these forces are organized.”

A free economy and strong state form the main structure of the new right. Therefore, the new right understanding has two main branches: the liberal tendency, which advocates a more open, free, and competitive economic order, and the conservative trend, which aims to establish social and political authority throughout society (Gamble, 1994: 35-36). However, bringing together those two different approaches forms an eclectic structure with many contradictions. The theoretical basis on which the policies implemented by the new right governments are based in the new right discourse consisting of neoconservatism and neoliberalism. According to Baltacı (2004) some scholars consider neoconservatism and neoliberalism completely separate from each other and state that there may be only some interactions between them. These people, who consider the new right-wing governments in developed capitalist countries as conservative governments that have finally realized that the free-market economy is the most correct economic system, are new liberals and call

themselves contemporary liberals, contemporary classical liberals, or classical liberals.

Belsey (1986) uses the concepts of neoconservatism and neoliberalism for two ideal types, each containing a set of principles as follows:

Neo-Liberalism

1. Minimal Government
2. Laissez-Faire
3. Free Market Society
4. Freedom of Choice
5. Individual-Oriented

Neo-Conservatism

1. Strong Government
2. Social Authority
3. Disciplined Society
4. Hierarchy and Obedience
5. Nation-Oriented

Belsey (1986) says that new right-wing practices such as Thatcherism include both of approaches together. Jessop (1983) says, “consolidated Thatcherism combined a distinctive ‘two nations’ authoritarian populist hegemonic project, a centralizing ‘strong state’ project, and a neo-liberal accumulation strategy.” While conservative discourses were used in the political sphere as authority and discipline, liberal discourses were mobilized in the economic sphere. Even though they seem to be distinct and cannot be combined, both approaches intersect in importance on law and order. Even though the neo-liberal approach wants a strong legal system to protect the market and does not oppose authoritarian measures to ensure this, the order must be imposed from above, which requires a strong state being able to impose and regulate laws. Neoconservatives, on the other hand, do not believe in the naturalness or

inevitability of the market, but they see the strict discipline of the market order as a politically useful tool for establishing authority (Baltacı, 2004). Although there is a difference in emphasis or historical basis between them, they come very close to each other in terms of results and often converge on the same points. Therefore, it becomes very difficult to distinguish between neoconservatism and neoliberalism since the two approaches are combined within the new right aiming to restore state authority for providing and preserving free economy and order.

The most important difference that distinguishes neo-liberalism from classical liberalism lies in their approach to the state since a strong state having political power for intervention and regulation on behalf of the market is needed. Because restructure of the Keynesian welfare economy into a neo-liberal one could not be attained without the strong and determined presence of the state. Harvey (2005) also explained how a neo-liberal state that puts the market at its center should behave with these words:

“Neoliberalism is first and foremost a theory of political-economic practices. This theory argues that the best way to improve human well-being is to unleash individual entrepreneurial skills and freedoms within an institutional framework based on strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create an institutional framework suitable for these practices and then maintain that framework. For example, it must protect the quality and reputation of money. It must secure private property rights and regulate the military, defence, security and legal structures and functions necessary to ensure, by force if necessary, the proper functioning of markets. Moreover, if markets do not exist (in the areas of land, water, education, health, social security or environmental pollution), they must be created, if necessary, by the state. But the state should not undertake anything beyond these duties. Government intervention in markets (once created) should be kept to the bare minimum.”

Therefore, the new right understanding of a strong state does not conflict with neo-liberalism. According to Friedman (1962), the main functions of the state are to “protect our freedom from both foreign enemies and citizens; to ensure the continuity of justice and order, enforce special agreements and strengthen competitive markets.” The nature of state’s intervention in the economic field is

quite different from the welfare state's understanding of the intervention. The state of the new right should be against all kinds of restrictions that will reduce the gains of the capital and should be on the side of any intervention that facilitates the functioning of the markets (Topal, 2002: 70). According to the new right understanding, the state should be strong to dissolve the welfare state understanding and construct the structure for attaining free market economy. In addition, the new right believes that the state should be strong in order to control the market order, make the economy more productive and provide social and political authority. In other words, strong and determined actions of the strong state are needed to establish the free economy advocated by the new right through reducing public expenditure programs and taxes, privatizing public goods and services, and abolishing regulatory institutions (Gamble, 1994: 40) as well as providing new political and hegemonic vision as a neo-conservatism in order to facilitate economic change.

Even though the conservative understanding has criticized liberal individualist doctrines, which advocate the removal of all obstacles to individual freedom, on the grounds that liberal values will erode the basic institutions that support the social order. The common point that made it possible for these two different understandings to be combined is the mutual respect that both traditions have for the concept of property. Conservative approach has always given great importance to property, which they see as one of the foundations of authority and order (Gamble, 1994: 61-62). Moreover, the welfare state understanding aiming to reduce inequalities in capitalist countries, as well as the rise of the social democrats and socialist developments demanding more social rights, have accelerated the process of meeting with liberals on common ground. Liberal understanding opposed the expansion of social rights since it would increase the role of the central government in society and limit individual freedoms. Similarly, conservatives opposed expanded social rights since they claimed that it would limit the traditionally hierarchical and authoritarian relations in the society (King, 1987: 8).

The neo-conservative understanding gave legitimacy to the new economic, social and political system that the new right wanted to establish with its discourses. Neo-conservatism gave the opportunity to new governments for system change through suggesting different institutions as a solution to social problems caused by the policies implemented. Traditional social organizations such as family, neighbourly relations, religious organizations, and foundations were brought to the fore to alleviate inequalities in society rather than the social state. So that the state could retreat from the social sphere by giving more space to those traditional institutions and structures. As a result, while the goals of withdrawing the state from social expenses and the priority of the free market were preserved with the implemented neo-liberal policies, the discourses of the neoconservative approach, which cares about tradition, religion, family, and national identity and advocates the idea of a strong state for the preservation of these institutions, formed the basis of the new right ideology. (Topal, 2002: 67). Beginning from the late 1970s, one of the main themes of the period was to be prepared for the reactions to the policies implemented by the central bureaucracy or organized sectors for the new right understanding, which represents a radical break in public policies. According to the new right understanding, the state must be powerful enough to take measures to reduce its expenditures and subsidies and also must be determined enough to resist the challenges from those who will be negatively affected by the changes (Gamble, 1994: 40). The strong state also becomes important an important actor in globalization process which neo-liberalism boosts for new capital accumulation strategy

In this process, globalization was defined as the integration and flow of different capitals and investments without facing any restrictions and constraints imposed by the welfare state. Many international institutions such as World Bank and IMF have declared neo-liberal economic programs, including globalization, as a strategy to overcome the economic crisis of the welfare state (Naim, 2000: 506). In this respect, it has been seen that many countries are engaged in economic and political reform efforts in order to take their place in the globalization process and benefit from international funding opportunities.

Local governments, as essential tools for providing welfare services, were needed to be reconstructed in accordance with the new right programs. In line with this purpose, they limited the powers and resources of local governments and made them withdraw from mass consumption areas. In areas where local governments did not withdraw, they were forced to produce urban services through the private sector. Urban areas for the new right understanding were not complementary units of the national economy but as competitors struggling to attract global capital to their area at the expense of other cities. Accordingly, the main duties of urban managers transformed into making their city attractive to international capital by using different strategies and cooperating with the local capital. As a result, local governments that came to power in line with these goals in the 1980s used their intervention powers not to ensure the reproduction of labour, but to take care of the needs of capital (Şengül, 2009: 174-176).

The two main goals of the new right's public administration approach were the narrowing of the state, especially starting from the areas where public expenses were high, and the restructuring of the public activities in the narrowed areas with the understanding of management or operating them directly with private sector contributions. According to these goals, privatization and public-private partnerships came forefront for local governments. For the new right understanding, the role of local governments as a provider of urban services should be changed into a facilitator role to the economic process of the city by sharing their responsibilities with private sectors to provide urban services as much as possible for attaining productivity and competitiveness. The understanding of serving the local community should be transformed into the understanding of service to the customer, which is compatible with a neoliberal emphasis on free-acting individuals.

Even though the new right, which has emerged with the claim of curing the failing aspects of the social welfare state with a governance approach based on efficiency, productivity, public and private sector partnership, minimizing the action-oriented state within the framework of market principles at the global

level approach has been far from meeting expectations, especially in social policy and increasing social welfare. Many reasons, such as the increasing welfare gap between social classes, income inequalities, increasing poverty and interest rates, erosion in job security, dissolution of the organization, and increase in informal employment levels, have increased the discontent in social segments. As a result of radical policies implemented, especially in the UK, governments carried out new right policies have disapproved by society and changed in following years. However, it did not cause a turning back to the welfare state but decreased the pace of neoliberal policies (Güler, 2004).

5.2. Turkish Experience after 1980

After 1980, Turkey was also affected by these economic, political, and social changes in the world. With the crisis of the import substitution accumulation strategy, Turkey experienced a hegemony crisis that shook the internal structure of the state, the power bloc, and the legitimacy foundations of the regime. The September 12 Coup was a turning point owned by the ruling classes, who demanded the restructuring of the social balance of power, the economy, and the state in their favour in order to overcome the hegemony crisis (Özkazanç, 1996). The authoritarian military regime established in Turkey with the 1980 Coup has ended the parliamentary system, which provided the appropriate environment for the structural changes compatible with the neo-liberal economic program (Ahmad, 2006: 206). In this context, Turkey has been one of the fastest adopting countries in the impact of the political and economic developments of the new right. The military coup of 1980 and prohibitions on many parties, especially on left-wing ones, created a suitable political and social environment for implementing new right policies. Turkey entered a new era with the January 24 decisions aiming to transform Turkish economy into a free market economy in 1980. The architect of this era was Turgut Özal and ANAP (Motherland Party) as representative and implementer of new right in Turkey. ANAP like other new right parties in the world, combined liberal, nationalist, and conservative understandings (Vergin, 1989).

Since the mid-1980s, the tools used by ANAP to protect its political power, representing the move away from the neo-liberal economic policies initially implemented and increasing the share of the state in the economy, have been state-owned enterprises (SOE) and extra-budgetary funds. These funds were used to control or neutralize the organized workforce and white-collar workers in the society, to support private initiatives in key areas, and to make financial transfers to voters in order to provide the necessary vote support for maintaining its power. The management of this and all similar funds, which are financially strengthened, has been given to the prime minister and the state minister responsible for the economy. This situation allowed the funds created to be directed to housing, electricity generation, road construction, or infrastructure investments, as well as to certain strategic areas in order to provide the necessary political support before the elections (Waterbury, 1992: 134). In this way, it was tried to gain the political support of the segments of society that could be adversely affected by the neo-liberal economy program implemented during the ANAP period (Waterbury, 1992: 128). Other political strategies were also implemented in those years. Issues such as gender, sect and race, which were important parts of class politics in the past, were included in the framework of identity politics by the new right understanding. In this way, it was desired to direct the working people to non-class ideologies and to erode their class affiliation in society (Özkazanç, 1996: Topal, 2002: 68-69).

Even though reductions in public expenditures are required as in neoliberal economic programs, ANAP also introduced social policies in order to alleviate the discomfort and increasing inequalities in the society as well as fight against poverty. However, the social policy practices of this period were limited to the transfer made to groups that could not participate in the market economy (Boratav, 2005).

Turkish leftist movement has also changed in this period. Although the CHP revealed its political identity with some movements, such as the Left of the Center Movement in the 1960s and the Democratic Left Line in the 1970s, it is

seen that after the 1980s, it embraced liberal values as a dominant paradigm of the period. While CHP, under Ecevit's presidency, was a member of Socialist International, he did not make any contact with the leftist organizations in his new party. It was considered as a surrender to new right politics and the neo-liberal process (Güler, 2004). Belge (1990) criticises this situation as "the problem of social democracy is not that of managing capitalism better than capitalists; however, the left's duty should be to find goals other than managing capitalism well". This situation was also observed in the approaches of left-wing parties to local government; left-wing mayors had also tried to implement neo-liberal policies in order to attract foreign investments and find funding and credit opportunities.

In Turkey, after the crisis, while transitioning from import-substituting industrialization to industrialization, which reduces domestic demand and encourages open exports, a large amount of capital that does not return to production has turned to urban rent and consumption areas after financial markets. In this direction, while the state withdrew from industrial investments in accordance with neo-liberal economic policies, it turned to large infrastructure and mass housing investments and increased the shares of local governments from the budget. There has been a transition from an urbanization model in which the reproduction of labour in urban areas was a priority to an urbanization period that serves capital accumulation strategies (Doğan, 2005: 145-146). In this new period, the ANAP aimed to turn the poor masses living in the city away from class consciousness by implementing different strategies through local governments such as allotment of the title deed to squatter's houses, zoning permits, zoning amnesties, tax refunds to wage earners, Social Assistance and Solidarity Funds (Boratav, 2005: 153).

5.2.1. Similar Situation with New Actors

The intense restructuring process in politics and economics beginning from 1980s caused disturbances in the society especially with the erosions in social

services. Neo-liberal policies, which have been implemented since the 1980s, have also aggravated the living conditions for large segments of society living in cities. The narrowing of public service areas and the move away from the social state understanding caused an increase in unemployment, unbalanced income distribution, and socio-spatial polarization in cities. Neo-liberal economic policies, presented as an export-based development model, had negative effects on industrial investments and the agricultural sector in the country (Kaygalak, 2001). The country's economy has gained a characteristic that is dominated by rent and speculative practices with the new period (Sönmez, 1996: 104). New capitalist accumulation developed around the most profitable urban areas, which caused new migration movements to those areas to get better economic opportunities. Moreover, political reasons have also intensified the migration to the cities. Thousands of people living in the eastern and south eastern regions of the country had to migrate first to the nearby provinces and then to the big cities of Western and Central Anatolia in order to protect their life and property safety due to conflicts between military and terrorist groups in the region. This situation significantly deepened the existing urban problems of big cities (İçduygu & Sirkeci, 1999: 253). Çakır (1994: 156) explained the reasons for migration from the east of the country to big cities as follows: In the urban labor market, applications such as dismissal, tendering, home employment, contracted labor, and seasonal labor were allowed. In this way, while the real wages of the people working in the cities decreased, the people who migrated to the cities to work were directed to disorganization (Peker, 1999: 301).

In the 1990s, a growth strategy based on foreign resource inflow was adopted. Although there was an increase in workers' wages due to increased union pressures in this period, high inflation and increasing foreign debts brought more serious problems to the country (Kaygalak, 2001: 138). As a result, rising wages, rising agricultural prices, and increasing defence expenses caused the macroeconomic balances in the country to deteriorate. After 1980, the centre-right and centre-left parties in Turkey, which agreed on neo-liberal economic policies, could not produce any positive policies toward the working classes and

agricultural producers in the face of the economic crisis. All these, in addition to unemployment in the country, increased the number of people working in informal jobs and in precarious conditions and caused the deepening of urban poverty (Doğan, 2005). The economic crisis, which negatively affected all sectors in 1994, brought with it the 5th of April Decisions. Decisions aimed at abandoning the social state practices with economic policies aimed at reducing domestic demand again ended the increases in wages in the early 1990s and negatively affected the living conditions of the wage earners (Kaygalak, 2001: 138). While the nation-state continued to be the dominant unit for many people to provide the services they need, the capacity of nation states to protect the losing classes from the negative effects of the neo-liberal economic restructuring process has become more limited with each passing day. Moreover, the neo-liberal pressures created a deep crisis in the left-wing parties. The manoeuvring abilities of the left-wing parties, which have traditionally been identified with redistributive policies that favour the disadvantaged segments of society, have been limited to neo-liberal goals. Therefore, the economic policies of the left-wing parties have become indistinguishable from the policies of the centre-right parties in many areas. This situation has caused inconsistencies between the expectations of workers, peasants, poor groups, and low-level bureaucrats, who form the traditional bases of leftist parties and policies. As a result, the increasing inadequacies of the nation states and the left-wing parties' inability to meet the needs of the disadvantaged in the society created a political vacuum, and this gap led to the proliferation of ultra-nationalist and religious fundamentalist political movements in Turkey (Öniş, 1997: 745-747). RP (the Welfare Party) as a new conservative party has gained popularity in such a political and social environment, especially in the 1990s.

The inability of traditional right- and left-wing parties to solve economic and social problems, including mass migration from rural and agricultural areas to the peripheries of large metropolitan centers popularized RP, especially among newcomers to cities. In this period, both right and left parties had the opportunity to manage local governments, but both parties could not provide different

policies from each other and had difficulties in finding solutions to urban problems. The fact that the policies developed by the CHP in the 1970s to increase the welfare of working classes and the urban poor were not seen in the left parties after 1980 played an important role in the search for other alternatives by the urban people. Güllalp (2003) says:

“The rise of RP in the 1990s was at the expense of the social democratic parties. RP’s voter base grew most rapidly in the poor peripheries of cities, that is, in areas that were strongholds of the social democrats in the 1970s. The Welfare Party went to the poor neighbourhoods of the cities with the discourse of socio-economic justice and equality. RP, trying to fill the vacuum created by the crisis of statism and the modernizing ideologies such as nationalism and socialism that rose above it, represented a post-nationalist and post-socialist understanding of ‘justice’. The Islamic understanding of justice did not remain only at the level of ideological discourse. At a more concrete level, local religious organizations and foundations took over some of the functions of the welfare state, which collapsed in the 1980s, and helped the poor neighbourhoods of the cities. The work of these organizations contributed to the massification of the Islamist political movement. These efforts played an important role in RP’s success, especially in the local elections.”

Moreover, the rising role of the state actors and agencies as the key distributor of economic rents increased the need for direct contact with politicians in order to gain more access to state resources. In this period, a relaxed attitude was displayed against economic crimes such as bribery, corruption, embezzlement, and fictitious exports. Again, widespread tax evasion and the growth of the informal economy were also known features of this period. However, the politicization of rent distribution has led to a loss of confidence in state administrators and a decline in the moral authority of the state. The above-mentioned reasons led to the rise of the RP and the “Just Order” program in Turkish politics. (Öniş, 1997). As a result of worsening living conditions and traditional political parties’ inability to produce policies, RP has managed to win the local elections in significant cities like İstanbul and Ankara.

RP could formulate a different approach to local governments as social municipalism with their mayors, especially in İstanbul and Ankara. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and İbrahim Melih Gökçek, the striking mayors of the period,

would later leave the RP and play an important role in the establishment of the AKP (Justice and Development Party). Erdogan will remain in power with the AKP for many years, and Gökçek would continue to be the Mayor of Ankara, which he took over in 1994, until 2017. Even though social municipality was first seen in the implementations of RP starting in 1994, its true implementation started in 2002 when the AKP came to power. Until the AKP came to power in 2002, the politics of the 1990s passed with different parties and coalition governments. Governments that failed to solve the problems created by implementing the neo-liberal economic program were further challenged by the 2001 crisis. The reaction of the people in the 2002 elections was quite harsh in terms of leaving the four big parties in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey out of the parliament. AKP, founded by politicians who left the RP in this period, came to power alone in the 2002 elections.

Turkish politics and conditions in the 1990s show similarities to the 1960s. Both periods coincided after periods of serious political and economic changes and were periods of rapid urbanization. The rapid urbanization process started with the migration created by the economic program that started to be implemented with the DP that came to power in 1950. During the 1960s, the problems of the poor in the city reached a serious level as a result of the indifference or incompetence of leftist thought and parties that were influential in the world in solving urban problems. In the 1970s, the CHP was able to come to power in the following years with the society-oriented municipalism started in the big cities by the actors from the CHP. Likewise, the problems that emerged with the changes in the 1980s began to be felt in the 1990s, immigration to the city increased, albeit for different reasons, and the political parties in this period had difficulty in producing solutions to the problems. Using discourses similar to those used by CHP municipalities, such as combining its discourses on social injustice and inequality created by the social and economic crisis with its emphasis on social policies, in the 1970s, RP won mayoralities in the second half of the 1990s and implemented social municipalism. Even though they have different ideologies and approaches, it can be said that they have important

similarities in terms of the emergence of two different understandings of the municipality. However, the two municipalism approaches are also quite different in terms of their relations with the state, society, and urban groups. Social municipalism, which was fully implemented during the AKP period, played an important role in the approval of the electorate while the AKP continued to implement neo-liberal policies. The next chapter will examine social municipality and the period of Gökçek, an important practitioner of this movement.

CHAPTER 6

SOCIAL MUNICIPALITY AS NEW CONCEPT

In the 1994 local elections, the mayors of the welfare party, which won two important cities such as Istanbul and Ankara, put forward a different understanding of the post-1980 period with the municipal policies they started to implement. This municipality's understanding being similar to society-oriented municipalism has formed with the practices and policies implemented by RP's mayors. According to Bayramoğlu (2014), the term social municipality belongs to Turkish literature. Keskin (2013) draws the distinction between society centred municipalism and social municipalism as: "Society-oriented municipalism expresses the use of authority and resources for the benefit of the public, while social municipalism means creating people dependent on the municipality by helping the poor in urbanization based on rent and consumption." This distinction was made based on the social activities and practices of the municipalities in these periods. In this period, the characteristic features of society-oriented municipalism, such as producer or consumption regulator, transformed into social assistance and social services.

One of the first and most visible social municipality practices of the period between 1994-2004 was the Ramadan tents created in the squares in the district centers. The distribution of hot meals in the Ramadan tents was followed by the distribution of food, coal, medicine, cheap books, and school supplies. First of all, these activities, which were seen as election propaganda and deception by other parties, continued with institutionalization within the municipality and entered the agenda of social policy studies (Erder and İncioğlu, 2008, p. 14).

Since the mid-1990s, there has been a great increase in the duties and functions of metropolitan municipalities. According to Ersöz (2011), the reason for this

increase was not any changes in law or the increase in the revenues of municipalities. This increase was derived from the political personalities and policy preferences of the Ankara Metropolitan and Istanbul Metropolitan Mayors in the 1994 local elections. These two municipalities have produced important services in the fields of social policy, such as social assistance, social services, education, and health, which have not been seen before. They have become institutions that provide various services for the elderly, the disabled, women, children, the poor, and those who need urgent help (Ersöz, 2011). As was stated in the previous chapter, the number of urban poor has increased due to the migration wave caused by neoliberal economic programs and military conflicts in the Eastern parts of Turkey. Moreover, the conditions of the urban poor have also worsened in this period due to the reduction of social services and policies. In this period, mayors of the social municipality understanding also pushed the limits of their powers in order to put their strategic policies forward for increasing urban poor like the ones in society centred municipalism. However, their policy preferences were more prone to be populist and clientelist, including Islamic motives, than the society-oriented municipalism. The understanding of social municipality, which started to be implemented in this period, was fully institutionalized and put into practice after 2004.

The 2000s was a period in which a series of reforms and new laws were implemented for local governments in Turkey, and local governments underwent significant transformations. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), which came to the government in 2002, mentioned the need for significant reform and innovation in local administrations in the government program (Keleş, 2009, p.502). This period is a period in which the negative consequences of the economic crisis in the 1990s, such as unemployment and poverty, were felt, and the most important and distinctive features of the socioeconomic structure that the government took over after the crisis were poverty and deep unemployment. One of the most important problems that the AKP government should solve in the social field is the negativities created by the effects of the crisis in urban areas. AKP continued the practices of the RP government in the past, and the

traditional solidarity networks that started at that time began to be institutionalized. In this period, municipalities continued their social aid activities such as Ramadan tents, circumcision weddings, food and coal aid, scholarships, medicine and financial aid to students, home care services, and school supplies. During this period, important changes were made in the Municipality Law, and in the Metropolitan Municipality Law. When the implemented local government reform is analysed in terms of “social municipality”, it is seen that local governments have acquired significant new duties in the field of social policy, new organizational structures and new concepts in the social municipality have begun to be discussed.

6.1. Restructuring Local Governments Around the Social Aids

The “Metropolitan Municipality Law No. 5216” and the “Municipal Law No. 5393”, which entered into force in 2004 and in 2005, envisaged some changes in order to preserve the old duties and organs and adapt them to the requirements of modern administration. With this law, several provisions have been established that will bring institutionalization to the social municipality in a legal sense. Thus, with this law, the metropolitan municipality was defined as a public legal entity with financial and administrative autonomy (Aydın, 2008: 122; Çukurçayır, 2013: 220). While the duties of the municipalities in the field of social assistance and social services are kept optional in the Municipality Law No. 580, it is stated that the appropriation allocated for the poor and the needy are required in both Metropolitan Municipality Law No. 5216 and the Municipal Law No. 5393. The provisions regarding the social duties imposed on metropolitan municipalities and district municipalities in the Law No. 5216 are given in Table 4.

Table 4. Provisions Containing Social Duties to Metropolitan Municipalities and District Municipalities in Law No. 5216

Build, cause to build, operate or cause to operate social facilities serving the entire metropolitan area, regional parks, zoos, animal shelters, libraries, museums, sporting, leisure and recreational facilities and similar facilities; where necessary, provide amateur sports clubs with equipment and secure the requisite support; organize sports competitions between amateur teams and, by a resolution of the metropolitan council, reward athletes who showed outstanding performance or received first three places in competitions inside or outside the country. (Article 7/m)
Where necessary, build premises and facilities for health-care, educational and cultural services, carry out all forms of maintenance of and repairs to premises and facilities owned by public entities for such purposes and secure the necessary equipment for them. (Article 7/n)
Spend the budget appropriation set aside for the poor and destitute, establish the centre for persons with disabilities to support activities for the persons with disabilities. (Article 18/m)
Social welfare and aid payments to people on low income, the poor and destitute, the desolate, and the persons with disabilities. (Article 24/j)
Manage and develop health care centres, hospitals, mobile health care units and social and cultural services of all kinds for adults, elderly people, persons with disabilities, women, young people and children, and to this end, establish, operate or cause to operate social facilities, open vocational training and skills courses; cooperate with universities, colleges, vocational schools, public entities and civil society organizations in the provision of such services. (Article 7/v)

Source: TGNA, 2004

As was seen in the Table 4. many social policy instruments were given to metropolitan municipalities to aid the urban poor culturally and economically. On the other hand, it is also possible to say that an understanding inherited from the Ottoman Empire continued in the field of social assistance during the AKP period. Volunteerism and charities have been invited to social policy mechanisms (Metin, 2011). During the AKP period, social assistance was prioritized as if it was the essential element of being a social state and was incorporated into the understanding of volunteerism compatible with the neo-liberal accumulation regime (Metin, 2011, pp.180-181).

AKP's social policy approach can be seen in its party program, government programs, and the documents named "Conservative Democracy." According to its program, AKP is in favour of a functioning market economy with all its institutions and rules. One of the most important goals in the program of the 59th government was expressed as "creating a democratic market society." For this reason, AKP's economic policies are market-oriented. This approach naturally draws the boundaries of social policy. In the program, AKP's social policy is explained based on an understanding of aid, not an understanding of rights as it says:

"Special programs will be created for the poor, the elderly, children and the unemployed, and citizens in distress will not feel abandoned and lonely. It is obvious that an understanding of a social state that takes care of the unemployed, the poor, the needy, the sick and the handicapped, and that will enable them to live in a manner worthy of human dignity, is inevitable. Our party will increase efficiency, speed and resource capacity in social state services by ensuring that the central government cooperates with local governments, non-governmental organizations and the private sector." (Bingöl, 2015)

This kind of understanding causes 'intertwined state and charity relations', which can be defined as the transfer of social aids on a voluntary basis and the shaping of the state's participation in social aids (Buğra, 2008: 130-131). The private sector, voluntary organizations, religious foundations and charities, and civil society become key elements of social policy. The 2000s were the years when the distribution of social aid reached enormous numbers in accordance with the party program. However, social aid distributed through local governments and NGOs were disorganized and randomly without any accountability. The disorganization of aid in this period, its distribution by people who are not experts in the subject and not in accordance with social policy principles have been the subject of criticism by many researchers (Kesgin, 2008 Güler, 2004, Çelik, 2010, Buğra & Keyder, 2007).

Local governments are in the role of organizing social aid distribution at the local level. The support given to AKP as a carrier party of a market-oriented

economy by low-income and urban poor indicates the success of this new social aid distribution system in terms of mobilizing votes (Çelik, 2010). The combination of market economy and social policies does not cause a contradiction, since destruction and poverty created by the capitalist economy are alleviated by the help of socially benevolent policies. On the contrary, they complement each other. However, conservative philanthropy-oriented policies based on voluntarism and charity rather than the social state are irregular, and a significant part of them are informal and under the influence and direction of the party mechanism (Çelik, 2010, p.69). According to Çelik (2010, p.69), AKP social policies have clientelist and paternalistic features.

The urbanization wave after the 1990s reinforced the clientelist relationships since patronage-based relations became the strategy to find unclaimed land for squatter's houses, join informal and formal market labour, and be protected by local governments (Işık & Pınarcıoğlu, 2013). Therefore, the relationship between the concerns of the mayor for re-election and the social demands of the urban poor is at the centre of social municipality practices. Moreover, the authority to spend social expenditures for the urban poor is given to metropolitan municipality mayors. The article 18/m gives metropolitan mayors power to “spend the budget appropriation set aside for the poor and destitute, establish the centre for persons with disabilities to support activities for the persons with disabilities.” Giving the discretion to metropolitan mayors for distributing social aids reinforces the formation of clientelist relationships. This situation gives mayors a strategic actor role in practicing power. Since social municipalism is formed by the practices of mayors similar to society-centred municipalism, there are not any objective standards in municipal services, which causes each municipality determines its own social municipality standards by comparison (Ateş, 2009: 94).

The fact that social municipality practices are not tied to clear rules and lack of effective accountability mechanisms causes the services to be implemented with an understanding that is far from the principles of transparency, necessity and

impartiality (Pektaş, 2010: 18) which are seen as components of neoliberal approach. The most important reason is derived from the lack of definition of the urban poor who social municipalities provide social aids and also the lack of legal basis for providing guidance to municipalities. Therefore, municipalities could distribute the social aids to any people without any constraints such as quantity, time, or content. The absence or lack of experts on social services in municipalities also makes it difficult to standardize and objectively provide services (Ateşoğlu, 2009).

Municipalities should not be considered as the main institution for social aid in this period. For social policy and aid, the ministries, state institutions, local agents of the central government, non-governmental organizations, and municipalities can take part. According to Erdem and Ceren (Erdem & Ceren, 2019), only 3.6% of the resources transferred to social aids institutions were distributed by municipalities in 2015. This rate drops to 2% if the social aids of the Ministry of Health are included (Türkoğlu, 2013). Therefore, the social aids distributed by social municipalities comprise only a few percentages compared to other state and state-affiliated institutions. The central state and institutions still continue to play a major role in social assistance and aid. However, it is also criticised that the lack of institutions for coordinating those institutions also caused problems such as inefficiency, uneven distribution, and uncountability. In this situation, the social aids given by local governments cause distributions in a clientelist way rather than increase the welfare of people or fight against poverty. For instance, municipalities increase their social aids before both general and local elections (Akan, 2015). Moreover, Doğan's (Doğan, 2016) research on social assistance and voters' behaviours found that social aids are very effective in the preferences of voters. It was seen that 68% of people participating in the research stated that the social aids they would receive from the municipality would affect their political choices. Therefore, social municipalism plays an important role in gathering votes, especially in urban areas, in which neoliberal accumulation strategies are aimed most.

In short, social municipalism is an understanding that focuses on social aids in order to alleviate inequality and poverty in urban areas caused by the neo-liberal economic structure. While the urban areas were changing in the context of the new capital accumulation strategies, social municipalism aimed to increase the welfare of the groups who were most affected by this process. The state and local governments supported the neoliberal change in favour of the capital in the urban areas instead of the reproduction of labour, but they also introduced social municipality practices in order to eliminate the vote concerns. While local governments are equipped with necessary legal tools in terms of social aids, the absence of the terms and conditions for the use of these powers has allowed municipalities to distribute social aids arbitrarily. This structure has affected the power relations between the urban poor who are facing poverty, and the mayors, who have important authority to use their powers in distributing social aids, and has prepared a suitable environment for the formation of clientelist relations.

6.2. Social Municipality Experience between 2004-2014 in Ankara under İ. Melih Gökçek Mayorship

Melih Gökçek started his political life in ANAP, and in 1984, he won the mayorship of Keçiören, a district of Ankara. He did not win the 1989 elections and joined the RP (Welfare party) in 1991. Gökçek, who entered the Turkish Grand National Assembly as Ankara deputy in the 1991 general elections, resigned from his deputyship to compete in the local elections in 1994. In 1994, he won the Ankara Mayorship with the RP. After the RP was closed, he transferred to the FP (Virtue Party) and won the 1999 local elections. With this election, he became the first mayor in Ankara's history to win two consecutive terms. With the closure of the FP, he joined the DP (Democrat Party) in 2002 and then the AKP in 2003. Gökçek, who also won the local elections in 2004, 2009, and 2014, served as the mayor of Ankara for 23 years until he resigned in 2017.

Gökçek spent his political life in right-wing parties. With the 1994 local elections, it became one of the most important actors of the social municipality approach. The social municipality, the first practices of which were seen with the social aids implemented by the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara as a member of the RP (Welfare Party), acquired a new legal framework for social aids in 2004 with the coming to power of the AKP. During his mayorship, Gökçek both used social assistance and investment strategies to make Ankara a centre of attraction for capital investments. Even though he preserved and developed institutions such as Public-Bread, which remained from the society-oriented municipalism period, Gökçek also followed policies such as the privatization of many municipalities' real estate and companies.

During the Gökçek era, he carried out discourses and activities in the context of Harvey's urban entrepreneurship. On the other hand, with the understanding of social municipality, social aids have been another important activity. Thanks to Gökçek's strong ties with the central government, it can be said that the municipality did not experience financial problems during this period and that he did not encounter any significant problems other than the judiciary and non-governmental organizations while realizing his projects. In addition, it is possible to see Islamic motifs in municipal activities in this period. In these respects, the period of Melih Gökçek in Ankara will be examined in terms of urban entrepreneurship projects. Afterward, social assistance mechanisms, which are the most important part of the social municipality, will be examined. Finally, the projects and activities in Ankara will be looked at from the perspective of hegemony change.

6.2.1. Gökçek as an Urban Entrepreneur

Gökçek, who came to power with the 1994 election, primarily focused on the housing problem in the city and realized new projects together with the housing projects he took over from Karayalçın (previous mayor of Ankara). Changing the content by making revisions in the projects he took over caused many lawsuits.

In particular, the “Dikmen Valley Project” has transformed from a social housing project to a luxury housing production with the new administration (Balçı, 2006). Dikmen Valley Project has been a source of inspiration for the “Orange Flower Valley Project” and many similar projects that Gökçek will do in the future. Land allocation has been made in Batıkent, Beytepe and Çayyolu, and the Eryaman- Güzelkent, Bentderesi Valley Arrangement Project plans have continued. Urban transformation projects targeting districts where squatter’s houses are prominent have gained weight. Dikmen Valley I. and II. phases have been completed, III. IV. and V. stages were designed. In this process, the municipal administration of the period needed to renew and revise the plans, but almost all the planning initiatives were the subject of lawsuits by the Çankaya Municipality (Balçı, 2006). In addition, Gökçek tried to increase the attractiveness of the city with various investments in order to attract capital with the urban transformation. Gökçek stated his vision for Ankara as follows: “Ankara is no longer a city of civil servants. [It is] a city that grows and receives enormous immigration...We want to make Ankara a congress city, university city, and the second largest city in industry after Istanbul, a health centre and a tourism city” (Anon. (ABB), 2006).

In terms of this vision and purposes, large shopping malls (AVMs) such as Bilkent-Real, Aktepe-Migros, Armada and Panora were opened in Ankara (Hacısalıhoğlu, 2000), and it was aimed to organize Ankara as a consumption city. It also used the advantage of being the administrative city of Ankara as the capital. The “North Ankara Entrance Urban Transformation Project Law” dated 04.03.2004 and numbered 5104 was enacted, especially for the urban transformation project in Ankara. The purpose of this law is to “increase the level of urban life by improving the physical condition and environmental image, beautifying and providing a healthier settlement order within the framework of the urban transformation project in the areas covering the northern Ankara entrance and its surroundings.” The project aims to organize the ‘protocol road’ and its surroundings from Esenboğa airport to Chankaya Palace in which was the residence of the president of Turkey. The “aesthetic” discomfort caused by the

squatter's houses built on this road route, especially used by the international guests who come to the city, would be replaced with this project. According to a protocol signed with TOKİ (housing development administration in Turkey), the squatter's houses in the area would be demolished, and new houses would be built in their place. In his speech at the opening ceremony of Özal Boulevard (Esenboğa Protocol Road), which was renewed and expanded as part of the project, Gökçek said the following:

While many foreigners who came to our country were passing through here, our diplomats would make an effort to say, "How can we keep foreign guests busy so that they don't see this bad image?" From today, this image is changing. (..) One thousand 500 houses built together with TOKİ for North Ankara are about to be finished. (..) We will also go out to tender for 18 thousand houses. (..) Therefore, two years later, Northern Ankara will also give the capital a different look with this road." (Turan, 2006)

Prime Minister of the time, R. Tayyip Erdoğan, supported Mayor Gökçek and stated the following:

"While our guests were being brought and taken away, I believe that our ministers accompanying them often passed this route with their heads bowed. Because the entrance of the capital of a modern contemporary country could not be like this. I believe that from now on, we will show our chests, our foreheads high, both our airport and our way of protocol, we will show the understanding of 'the way is civilization', not with words but with practice. (..) Ankara has lost many years because there was not such an urban planning mission and such an understanding of urbanism in our predecessors." (Turan, 2006)

Gökçek has also planned many parks, sculptures, and entertainment areas that he thinks will stimulate the city's tourism. Restoration of Youth Park, large recreational parks such as Göksu, Wonderland, "Mavi Göl", "Moganpark" were built. In addition, in 2014, he spent 25 million TL on decorative 'city gates' for Ankara's five different entrances (TMMOB, 2017). Different statues and large toys (such as dinosaurs, robots) placed in different parts of the city and have nothing to do with the texture of the city drew a great reaction with the public resources spent. Yavaş, who became the mayor in 2019, stated that Gökçek spent 342 million liras only on sculptures during his term (Aydınlık, 2009). However,

the biggest of these projects was the ‘Ankapark’ project, which is introduced as Ankara’s ‘Disneyland’. The construction of the project started in 2013, and 801 million dollars was spent on the project, which was thought to attract domestic and international tourists to Ankara (ABB, 2022). However, the project came to a standstill with Gökçek’s resignation and was completely cancelled with the change of mayorship in 2019 to CHP’s candidate. With Ankapark, one of the gigantic and expensive projects carried out in the context of urban entrepreneurship, a huge waste of resources has been experienced.

One of the important changes that took place in the Gökçek period was in the transportation of Ankara. In the Gökçek era, unlike the previous periods, vehicle-based transportation was preferred rather than rail transportation. During the Gökçek era, it was thought that the crossroads would solve the traffic problem. A road layout dividing the city with multi-lane roads was adopted, and many overpasses were built for pedestrians to pass. The completion of the metro lines took a long time during the Gökçek period, and the Keçiören metro, which was supposed to be opened in 2005, could not be completed until 2011. Municipality was transferred the project to the Ministry of Transport in 2011. Along with Keçiören metro, Çayyolu and Sincan metros could not be completed by Ankara Metropolitan Municipality and all of them were transferred to the Ministry of Transport (TMMOB, 2017). In addition, the number and routes of private buses and minibusses increased in this period. In this perspective, railway and public transportation promoted in society-oriented municipalism were changed.

While protecting some aspects of society-oriented municipalism, new initiatives did not realised in Gökçek’s period. A participant’s, who was a social welfare officer working in Ankara Metropolitan Municipality, perspective on productive municipalism in Bingöl’s (Bingöl, 2015) research offers an explanation for this situation as the interviewee says:

“...Some say that the municipality should not provide this [social] aid, but should create employment through this aid. Already in the market, if someone

needs a job, they find the employer, they find each other, there is no gap, it would be in vain for us to enter there. Those who need workers find them from the market There is an employment agency [for this purpose]. Some people say don't give fish, teach me how to fish. Let's say you are helping 100 million dollars, start a 100-million-dollars business instead. They say open clothes shop. Well then you will bankrupt the confectioner! Get leather. You screwed up the skimmers! When you enter as a state [to the market], an idea emerges that will create a handicap in the market economy [for other actors in the market]. There is also a shoemaker in the market. When you enter the market with public resources, you confuse the market, you do a non-profitable business there. Either you will do such a job in production areas for all products, or you will not [at all]. If you open a market, you will screw up the market. Do something; When it is done by the state, it doesn't work anyway. We went that route. When you say let's do it, go look at the bakers. Public-Bread produce bread. In the market, If the bread was not produced by Public-Bread, it would be 3 TL in the market. But bakers are in trouble. Then the baker asks, you entered the bread, enter the refrigerator [business]. It was good to get into the bread. Hunger was relieved somewhat. But either you will enter every field, you will set the standard, or you will not enter at all..." (Bingöl, 2015; p. 234)

This point of view is very important in terms of explaining the social municipality approaches. The interviewee praises the Public-Bread, which was opened during the period of society-oriented municipalism, since it provides benefits society and alleviates hunger. But he also says that market intervention by the state would not work. He also states that bakers have difficulties due to bread production. In this case, it is important to show that the municipality does not want to confront other economic groups even at the expense of the people's welfare. Within the framework of neoliberal logic, it sees the intervention of municipalities in the market as harmful. It is also an important point that the interviewee complains about the cheap sale of bread due to Public-Bread. In the same research (Bingöl, 2015), it was also stated that when the researcher asked the participants what they understood from social municipalism, the answer was social aids in general. In this sense, 'social' in social municipalism almost completely covers social aids and services. Therefore, social aids as a characteristic of social municipalism will be examined in the next chapter.

6.2.2. Municipal Social Aids and Services

Social aids and services are important municipal activities of the Gökçek period. In fact, the interviewee in the research of Bingöl (2015) established the relationship between the social municipality and social aids for Ankara as follows: “This is exactly what we do; social aid is social municipality.” The basis of the social municipality is based on social aids. In the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality, poverty was defined within the framework of urban poverty, and poverty was approached as a problem brought by urban life and migration from urban to rural areas (Bingöl, 2015). From this point of view, poverty is not seen as a result of capital accumulation strategies. The problem is largely attributed to individuals. In other words, the affected segments, due to market-oriented structural changes in state and local governments, are expected to adapt to the changing economic conditions.

Social aids and services of the municipality can be examined in 2 main groups. The first group is the area where the municipality provides aid and service due to individuals’ economic and health conditions. The second area can be counted as the services provided by the municipality for children, youth, and women for culture, education, sports, and vocational acquisition. Municipal social services directed by the Municipality’s Cultural and Social Affairs Department offer different services such as kindergartens, vocational courses, and clubs for youth, women, and old people. These services are the services provided for the needs of citizens, such as making use of their spare time, self-development and socialization (ABB Activity Report, 2014). However, as previously stated by the municipality employee, the basis of the social municipality is not these services but social aids.

Social aids, which is generally carried out by the Social Services Planning and Coordination Branch Directorate, has been established to meet the basic needs of the poor in the city for a certain period of time, to ensure social peace, and to support the abolition of poverty-related crimes (Keleş, 2008). This job

description draws the perspective of social municipalism towards the urban poor. Municipality defines the urban poor as a risk that can disrupt social peace and create crime. In this sense, social aids enable both the passivation of groups badly affected by the neoliberal process and the ability to collect votes with a sense of gratitude generated from the same groups. In addition, the concern that the deepening of poverty would create crime in society and disrupt the social order is also compatible with the idea of neo-conservatism. In this sense, preserving the existing social order and relations in the society with social assistance also constitutes an aspect of the social municipality.

Ankara Metropolitan Municipality preferred in-kind aid rather than cash aid in social aid and put forward the legal framework for this situation. Therefore, the social aids of the municipality consist of food, cleaning, and coal products in general. While the municipality reached 37 thousand people from these aids in 2001, it was 180 thousand in 2002, 400 thousand in 2008, and 300 thousand in 2014 (Metin, 2011; ABB Municipality Activity Report, 2014). In the municipal activity reports examined between 2010 and 2014, a great emphasis was placed on social aids, and these social aids activities of the municipality were highlighted and detailed more than any other service (ABB Municipal Activity Report, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014). To give an example, only 27 of the 88 pages allocated to the activities section in the 2014 annual report are devoted to social aid and services. In the same report, only 1 page (page 102) was spared for a project with an enormous budget like ‘Ankapark’. In addition, only 3 pages are reserved for urban transformation, which is very important for local governments. In these 3 pages (144-146 pages), 6 large-scale urban transformation projects were explained, while the same report allocated 6 pages (81-86 pages) for the municipality’s social services for children. Similar observations were made for other annual reports. It is important to see the emphasis given to social aids as the most important feature of the social municipality in municipal annual activity reports presented to both municipal assemblies and the public. An important strategic objective in the annual reports was “to implement all kinds of social assistance and social projects in order to

prevent a social explosion in the city” (ABB Municipal Activity Report 2014). While revealing the aim of alleviating impoverishment, which is an important aspect of social municipalism, the reasons causing the risk of the social explosion were not mentioned. Therefore, the aim of the social aids was not to eliminate the causes of impoverishment but to keep poverty at a manageable level that would not lead to a social explosion.

Public-Bread company, which was established during the period of society-oriented municipalism, is also used in the food aid of the municipality. With Public-Bread, approximately 14 million bread donations were made to 46,432 people in 2010 and more than 18 million to 14,820 families in 2014 (ABB Municipal Activity Report 2010, 2014). During the Gökçek period, the number of Public-Bread selling points and the variety of products were also increased. The cheap bread supply, which became a standard service for many municipalities after the period of society-oriented municipalism, was also used in the period of Gökçek. It was considered important because the poor could afford bread at lower prices and because it was used within the framework of social aids. Moreover, it would harm the image of ‘social’ municipalism by disrupting the supply of one of the basic food items for the urban poor.

There are controversial aspects in the way how social aids are distributed. The lack of transparency of the process and the lack of detailed and objective criteria regarding who would benefit from social aids give the opportunity for the creation of clientelist relations. It has been observed that municipalities increase social aids considerably, especially during election times. In addition, Gökçek stated that he did not aim to transform municipal budgets for social aids in a more accountable and clearer way (Aydoğan, 2009, p. 98). Aydoğan’s research on social assistance in Ankara in 2009 provides important findings (Aydoğan, 2009). Even if Ankara Metropolitan Municipality has certain criteria for providing social aids, especially poor people have experienced insecurities in the distribution of social assistance. The researcher stated that almost all of the people he interviewed believed that social aids were distributed based on

clientelist relations (Aydođan, 2009, p. 52). Aydođan also stated that clientelist relationships could emerge in many aspects of receiving social aids. Clientelist relationships may emerge at different stages in this long process, from the collection of the necessary documents in order to receive social aids to the investigation team that comes to the houses of poor people to confirm the poverty they experienced. Because this process is structured in a way that more than one actor could use his discretion at many levels of the process, the objectivity and transparency become disappear. In addition, in Aydođan's research, it is seen that an official from Altındađ Municipality criticized Ankara Metropolitan Municipality's coal aid in particular (Aydođan, 2009). Despite being both members of the same party and social municipality practices, this difference is important in terms of understanding that social municipality is a practice based on actors' decisions and actions. Although the necessary structural and legal regulations for social municipalism were introduced in 2004, the decisions and actions of the actors are still very decisive because of the lack of objective and transparent structures which give opportunities to actors to use the clientelist nature of social for implementing their strategic selectivities.

In 2007, Altındađ (Altındađ, 2007) conducted research on employees working in state and state-supported organizations that provide social assistance in Ankara. In the survey, employees stated that 82% of applicants for social aids applied because of financial difficulties. In addition, employees think that only 3.3% of the information given by the applicants is sufficiently accurate. On the other hand, 67.8% of the employees think that understanding whether the applicants really need social aids depends on the skills of the people who evaluate them (Altındađ, 2007). While there is a shortage of people who are experts in that field in municipalities, even those who are educated in this field have difficulty assessing the needs of the applicants. For this reason, it is structurally quite possible for the strategic actors of the municipality, which has political concerns, to approach social aids with clientelist relations.

A speech by the Minister of Justice could be given as an example to understand the government's perspective on clientelist policies. During the 2009 elections, Minister of Justice Mehmet Ali Şahin made a statement in an election speech in Antalya before the local elections that "local governments that are fighting and conflicting with the [central] government cannot pass their projects through Ankara." The clientelist understanding is not only through the transfer of resources. As seen in this example, clientalism also takes place with a threatening political attitude (Metin, 2011: 198). Here, it is not important what the projects of the municipalities are or what kind of services they will provide to the citizens. Instead, it is at the forefront that municipalities or local governments support the central government. Similarly, people who benefit from the municipality's social assistance also have a fear of not being able to receive service in case the mayor changes. Those in need of aid can vote for their continuation as mayors (Çelik, 2010: 77-78). This may turn out to be a typical feature of clientelist politics.

6.2.3. Usage of Conservative Motives as a New Hegemonic Vision

Neo-conservatism, which gained strength with the new right, also shows itself in the practices of Gökçek while he was the mayor. 'The Hittite Sun,' which was determined as the emblem of the city with Dalokay in 1973, changed in 1995 when Gökçek became the mayor of Ankara. The new emblem places the Kocatepe Mosque, which was built in 1987, and Atakule, a shopping center opened in 1989, at its centre. In addition, the moon and stars, which are Islamic symbols, are also placed. The new emblem signals the new era in terms of symbols used. First of all, the mosque and shopping symbols used can be interpreted as the unity of neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism. The use of these two symbols, which are quite new, instead of buildings that have historical meaning in the emblem that could be used to represent Ankara, can also be evaluated as a break with the republican past. Beyond these, the use of Islamic symbols which are not related to Ankara already makes enough reference to conservatism. This emblem, like the previous one, has been the subject of

political debates and has been cancelled many times by court decisions (Cengizkan, 2021). The last emblem representing the Ankara cat which was prepared to represent the branding of Ankara, is used for Ankara. This was done with the aim of marketing Ankara in the international arena for the purpose of urban entrepreneurship.



Figure 1. Changing Amblesms of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality between 1973-

Source: <https://ayrancim.org.tr/?p=8722>

Islamic references are also evident in social aid and services. There are examples such as free transportation practices of the municipality, especially during religious holidays, mass circumcision (*toplu sünnet*) events, iftar tents set up during Ramadan, evening entertainments in Ramadan with Ottoman references, and an increase in food aids this month. In addition, it has been observed that the religious discourses of the officials are frequently used while distributing social aids (Aydoğan, 2009). During the Gökçek period, it is also striking that he made many streets naming. Ankara Municipality has named and changed 552 street names between 1994 and 2005 (Bostanoğlu, 2008). It is prominent in naming that the names that evoke the modern bourgeois identity are replaced by the names that evoke Islam and the Ottoman Empire (Bostanoğlu, 2008). In the philanthropy discourse, which is frequently used in social aid, references are also given to the Ottoman period.

With these aspects, many references were made to the Ottoman Empire and Islam during the Gökçek period, and these references also showed themselves in social aid and events, street, bridge, and road naming. Along with Islamic references, neo-conservatism was also widely used by the central government during the AKP period. In this sense, the local government in Ankara played a role in reinforcing this hegemonic view in harmony with the centre.

6.3. Analysis of Gökçek Period and Social Municipality

Social municipalism is an approach shaped by the policies implemented by the Ankara and Istanbul mayors, who were elected from the RP in 1994. Social municipality is actually a local government experience that emerges with the articulation of many economic, political and social policies. Economically, it has been taken to the centre of neo-liberalism and has been identified with urban entrepreneurship practices in the urban area. Politically, Gökçek created an Islamic discourse in a neo-conservative line. Ankara municipality has tried to further impoverishment of urban groups affected by the new economic and political change and also produced created a certain level of consent by distributing social aids. The AKP, which came to power in 2004, supported the social municipality of local governments and provided the necessary legal ground for social municipalism to be implemented.

There are some factors that cause the emergence of the social municipality. These are the urban poor, who shifted to the right ideology with the acceleration of urbanization after the second half of the 1980s, the transformation of urban areas from labour reproduction to capital reproduction with the decline of the welfare state, the integration of leftist parties into neoliberal policies and their inability to produce alternatives. Social municipalism is not actually a radical municipalism movement. They are local structures that are fully compatible with the neoliberal economic program which the central government implemented. The biggest innovation this municipal approach introduced was the social aids it provided for the urban poor. In other words, the ‘social’ in the social

municipality is actually referencing the social aids mechanisms. The importance of usage of social aids could be understood as efforts to mobilize votes of the urban poor impoverished due to the implications of the new right-wing policies implemented by ANAP in Turkey or Thatcher in England after 1980, aiming to abolish the welfare state quickly and providing a rapid transition to open market economy understanding. This understanding led to the fall of the new right-wing parties from power in the 1990s. However, the difficulty in creating a different alternative forced subsequent governments to engage in politics within the framework of neoliberal policies. In this period, social aids provided by AKP's local governments played an important role in explaining the support of the urban poor, who suffered the most from neoliberal policies, to the party that implemented neoliberal policies the most compared to previous periods.

Considering the content of social aids in Gökçek's period, it is very difficult to find an application that will create any change in the position of the urban poor. The food, coal, and clothing aids prevent the urban poor from getting poorer or keep them at a certain level. However, it does not create a change that will save them from poverty. This situation ensures that poverty continues, and the urban poor become dependent on municipal aids. There are also problems in the delivery of social aids. The distribution of social aids is subject to certain conditions. However, these conditions created for the applicants to be selected rather than eliminated. In other words, it is not specified which conditions are not suitable for receiving social aids. In addition, there is a structure in which more than one actor can use his discretion to ensure these conditions. People who are authorized to provide social aids or who have an effect on this process can affect the granting or non-granting of social aids by using their discretion. In addition, the inadequacy of expert personnel in this area also makes it unclear under which conditions the discretion is given by the people who use their discretion. The increase in social aids during election periods or religious days is another criticism. Considering the studies (Doğan, 2016) showing that social aids have an effect on voter behaviours, it has been seen that these aids provide a very suitable environment for the creation of clientelist relations.

Therefore, it could be asserted that populism was used as a political strategy in Gökçek period. Both symbolic and material distribution of resources could be observed in his periods for the exchange of votes and popularity. While social aids and assistances were distributed, conservative motifs were also accompanied on many occasions. Populism could be used not just for coming into power, but also maintaining it (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). The populism used in Gökçek period was mostly based on anti-elite populism. Even though he could also be defined as an elite since he has occupied the mayorship for years, anti-elite discourses were unchanged. While he was announcing himself as one of the people, he often criticised previous governments as being an elite and disconnected from the public. It gave the impression that it approached the public and the problems of the people by providing municipal aid to low-income families and systematizing it. However, the most important point is that populism was integrated into structure as clientelist relations and also sustained in symbolic and discursive dimensions. The arbitrariness in the social aid structure and reluctance to make this distribution system more objectified could be understood as an extension of populist political strategy's integration into structure as clientelism.

With the law 5216, social aid expenditures in municipal budgets were given to metropolitan mayors. The fact that these political actors, who have a political concern in each election period, try to collect votes with authority given to them could be understood by the amount of social aids that increased during the election period. In addition, non-universal structures that are far from providing objective criteria in the method of providing social aids facilitate municipalities to use social aids arbitrarily. It has also been seen that the central government supports the structures and practices that lead to clientelism rather than opposing them. Because the social assistance of the municipality tends to increase not only in local elections but also in general elections (Karadoğan, 2012). This situation also shows that the clientelist relations created at the local level are also used to strengthen the power of the central government.

The social municipality also contains contradictions within itself. The transition from urban management to urban entrepreneurship created by neoliberal policies is also one of the important characteristics of the Gökçek period. As Gökçek himself stated, he aims to put Ankara ahead of other cities in many sectors, making large investments for this goal, which is another feature of urban entrepreneurship. In particular, there are efforts to organize Ankara as a city that attracts consumers and tourists. Gökçek has allocated large portions of the budget for this. To give an example, more than \$800 million was spent on a failed project like Ankapark, and 25 million lira was spent on a decorative project like Ankara doors in 2014. It is doubtful how successful these projects in the context of urban entrepreneurship are and how much they provide benefits to society or the urban economy. In addition, urban transformation projects are carried out within the framework of clearing the city from squatter's houses rather than providing better conditions to the population living in these areas. With these aspects, a municipality that focuses on capital accumulation rather than on the urban poor also gives the highest share of the social aids given to the urban poor in its annual reports. In addition, the fact that these aids are made in the context of philanthropy with Islamic motifs causes the urban poor to see these aids as a blessing rather than a right.

Another important point of the social municipalism implemented in the Gökçek period is the relationship that the municipality established between the public and the capital. As mentioned before, there is a perception by the urban poor that they pose a threat to the social order. The fact that the urban poor would generate crime and increase the risk of social explosion is stated both in the municipality official who spoke to the researcher (Bingöl, 2015) and in the municipal activity reports (ABB Municipal Activity Report, 2014). Social assistance distributed to reduce this risk was determined as the least costly policy from an economic perspective. Instead of changing structures that create the risk of social explosion to eliminate this risk, a policy of managing social risk at a certain level is followed. This situation could be interpreted as an effort to preserve the clientelist relations established by the municipality with the society. In other

words, while the necessary structure for capital accumulation is preserved, social aids are used for the urban groups damaged by this structure to the production of consent for the continuation of the same structure.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined society-oriented municipalism and social municipalism through the mayors of the periods, Vedat Dalokay and İbrahim Melih Gökçek. While analysing these actors, important political, economic, and social processes being influential on the two municipal approaches from both the world and Turkey were given. In this way, the spatio-temporal framework that the actors were in when starting their duties as mayors was tried to be provided for a better understanding of their actions. Thanks to this spatio-temporality, the characteristics of the municipalism approaches, in which the actors played an important role in formulating, were tried to be determined, and the decisions and practices of the actors were evaluated within frameworks of their own periods. In this section, two different municipal experiences will be compared and discussed by using Jessop's strategic relational approach.

Jessop said that the state is a structure that is shaped by the relations of different groups. However, the structure also affects these actors, and the affected actors also reproduce the structure with newly established relations (Jessop, 2005). In this sense, it was stated that the old structures created a path-dependency for the actors operating within the structure, but the structures offered not only limitations but also opportunities that enabled the new actors to shape the future. Actors could select different strategies and affect the future forms of structures by their actions (Jessop, 1990). Therefore, actors play crucial roles in determining path selectivities. These path selectivities, on the other hand, can be created through strategic actors, who have the power to affect the structure by using their power with strategic actions. In other words, two different strategic actors in the same position and in the same spatio-temporal context can affect the structure in different ways for the future by following different strategies. For

this reason, the actors' own way of thinking and abilities are as important as the external conditions and structures. However, it should not be forgotten that not every action of a strategic actor is strategic. The decisions and actions of actors are strategic to the extent that they affect the structure.

Jessop's approach to the state, like previous Marxist thinkers, does not accept the state as capitalist a priori. He says that the state is capitalist to the extent that it serves capitalist processes and not capitalist to the extent that it does not (Jessop, 1990). Just as the whole society cannot be considered capitalist, those who come from different parts of society and occupy strategic positions within the state structures may not act with capitalist logic. At this point, strategic actors might take a position against the capitalist processes by creating their own strategies instead of serving the capitalist processes. Therefore, Jessop's approach to the state and actors provides an important theoretical framework for the comparison and transition of two different municipalism in which actors play an important role in the formation. In addition, although Harvey did not take a stance exactly like Jessop in his approach to the state, he also put emphasis on the actors.

Harvey's article on urban management and urban entrepreneurship shows the importance he gives to actors. Although Harvey considers the state as a facilitator to capitalist processes (Raju Das, 2017), urban management and urban entrepreneurship also allow actors to apply their approaches to the city by using different strategies. Although these strategies are meant to serve the capitalist accumulation processes, the actors can decide for themselves what kind of strategy they will follow. At this point, considering the theoretical frameworks of Jessop and Harvey together, it is difficult to say that every strategy implemented by the actors serves the capitalist processes. Because the actors have limitations in predicting the future results of the strategies they developed within the limitations of their own periods (Jessop 2001; Jessop, 2005). Therefore, even if the practices of the actors who will shape the future of the city within the structure are decided with the mentality of serving the capitalist accumulation processes, future consequences of their strategies may not serve these processes.

Moreover, while discussing the changing governance practices in urban areas before and after the neoliberal period, Harvey does not consider all the actors involved in this process in terms of serving or facilitating the capitalist process. Even in his article, Harvey gives examples from European local governments opposing the urban entrepreneurship view. Therefore, this thesis accepts Harvey's framework as the dominant political and economic paradigm in urban policies and grasps it as an important structural and hegemonic power that affects the actors. However, this thesis departs from Harvey's theoretical framework and adopts Jessop's state approach in terms of the fact that actors inevitably serve capitalist processes. The thesis considers that the actors can be in an effort to form counter-hegemony as much as they can serve the capitalist accumulation process as in Jessop's approach. In this framework, while evaluating the actors, the idea of actors who create their own strategies within the limits of structures in which they push boundaries and take advantage of opportunities by using different strategies has been accepted instead of the idea of actors acting accordingly to the dominant political and economic context of the period. External influences, as well as structures having a crucial impact on actors' decisions and actions, would be affecting factors. However, affected actors by those external influences still have the power to generate different responses in accordance with their own strategies. Thus, actors can be considered as active subjects who are a part of the process rather than as passive subjects affected from the outside. Therefore, the strategies actors have formulated could not be mere reflections of dominant structures and hegemonies of their periods. The implemented strategies must also be evaluated as relational, in which actors have the ability to act and think outside of the dominant structures and hegemonies. The examination of actors and municipality approaches will be conducted with this framework.

The examination of society-oriented municipalism and social municipalism mentioned in the thesis will be started by discussing the similarities of the two approaches. Starting from the historical perspective, the problems that arise due to rapid urbanization and formulating the solutions to these problems will

emerge as the first similarity. As it was mentioned before, Turkey has experienced rapid and uncontrolled urbanization in the 20 years before the emergence of society-oriented municipalism. The pattern of similar urbanization could be observed after the second half of the 1980s. The surplus of labour in agricultural production, which triggered the first urbanization, and the urbanization from rural to urban areas are similar to the second urbanization, which affects the social municipality period. The first urbanization was triggered with Marshall's aid and started with the increase in the technology used in agriculture, and the second urbanization was experienced when the open market economy decreased the profitability of the agricultural sector. In addition, investments in important urban areas during the second urbanization period and military conflicts in the eastern regions of Turkey were also effective in increasing urbanization. As a result, there was rapid population growth in cities before the two municipal periods. However, the important point is that central and local governments could not play a role in solving urban problems that arise as a result of rapid urbanization rather than rapid urbanization itself. In the period before society-oriented municipalism, local governments were seen as an extension of the centre and as political units where urban services were provided. As the parties in this period did not create an urban program even for local elections, it is difficult to say that local governments were given importance in that period. In addition, the central and local administrations were reluctant or could not develop strategies for the solution to the urban problems that grew with the increase in squatter houses. Therefore, Dalokay has become a popular figure among squatter's houses by focusing on the solution to the problems of the squatter's houses in Ankara or at least bringing the problems and wishes of the urban poor to the political environment. A similar process has also been experienced in social municipalism. After the second half of the 1980s, the population of the cities increased, and the squatter's houses expanded. In addition, social security has decreased, and the impoverishment of the lower classes has increased with the implemented neoliberal policies. The right-wing and left-wing parties that came to power in Ankara could not offer solutions to urban problems and could not follow different policies from each other. The fact

that the left-wing parties could not produce radical policies against neoliberalism in this period is also an important factor. As a result, Gökçek, as the candidate of a party that can be considered as conservative, provided the beginning of social municipalism with solutions that would quickly increase the welfare of the urban poor living in squatter's houses.

In this sense, it can be said that both municipal approaches use structural and social crises. The crisis tendencies that Jessop mentioned in the six dimensions of the state have a very important place in both municipalism approaches. The crisis of representation arising from the inability to adequately represent the wishes and problems of the urban poor in politics, the crisis of rationality experienced due to the failure of the state's interventions to provide a solution, and the crisis in the social basis of the state with increasing in unequal distribution, and the hegemonic crisis that emerged as a result of these have led people to political actors who can put forward a different administration from the existing structures. In this sense, it can be said that both approaches emerged during the periods of structural and social crises. Society-oriented municipalism emerged after 12 years of political and social turmoil, which was stated as a restructuring of the state as a result of the 1961 military coup. Similarly, Gökçek, who is an important actor in social municipality, was elected as the mayor of Ankara 14 years after the 1980 military coup. Until Gökçek's period, Turkey quickly moved to an open market economy, and there was a period of intense social and political problems. The periods before the emergence of the two municipalism approaches in Turkey were a period of crises that emerged in the social dimension together with the political and economic changes. The urban poor, who are among the groups most affected by these changes, have been observed to be the main focus of the two municipality approaches.

Another similarity between Dalokay and Gökçek, who represent two different municipalism, is that neither of them had a certain program when they came to power. In other words, society-oriented municipalism and social municipalism were not implemented using pre-established programs or guides. Both municipal

management experiences have emerged as a result of the decisions and practices of the mayors. In other words, Dalokay and Gökçek are the architects of society-oriented municipality and social municipality experiences for Ankara. At this point, both municipalism movements could be grasped as strategic selectivities developed by the practices of the actors and formed by the strategic decisions taken by the actors. With their decisions and practices, they pushed the limits of existing structures and seized opportunities. Many projects that Dalokay tried to implement faced obstacles from the central government, but he also found the chance to implement projects such as Halk-Ekmek or social housing by interpreting the laws in a broad sense. Many projects implemented during the Gökçek period were brought to the judiciary investigation, and even after 2004, the courts gave verdicts against Gökçek. In addition, after 2004, he benefitted from the legal gaps and deficiencies in the distribution of social aids and used social aids arbitrarily. The practices in the two municipality periods set an example for many other municipalities in Turkey, and in this sense, they had an impact on local government practices in Turkey. The principles of society-oriented municipalism, such as producer municipality and consumption regulating municipality, have shown themselves in the practices of local governments (such as bread production and organized sales) both in their periods and in the following periods. The social assistance of social municipality has become a standard practice for many municipalities.

Finally, it can be said that the legitimacy of society-oriented municipalism and social municipality is largely achieved by popular votes. During the Dalokay period, he experienced conflicts with the central government, urban groups, and his own party with the decisions he has taken in the context of society-oriented municipalism. However, he was able to continue his practices despite the risk of having conflicts with different groups due to the support he received from the people of Ankara. Although the CHP was not nominated Dalokay in the local elections in 1977, the party had significantly increased its votes which is an important indicator of the support given to his policies. No matter how much Gökçek's practices are criticized, he also has strong public support like Dalokay.

He served as the mayor of Ankara from 1994 to 2017 and, in this process, did not lose any elections. From this perspective, popular votes especially acquired from the areas of squatter's houses located and low-income dwellers lived were critical for both municipal approaches and mayors. Symbolic and material distribution by both of the mayors targeted low-income segments. Populism was used as a political strategy to implement their own strategic selectivities, even though there were differences how they mobilized, integrated structure, and aim of the populism. Therefore, including the means of collecting this support, society-oriented municipalism and social municipalism are separated from each other on many points.

The first point of distinction between the two understandings of municipalism stems from the political movements in which the actors forming them are affected. Just before the period of society-oriented municipalism, leftist movements were influential all over the world. The leftist movements that developed in Turkey also emphasized issues such as social justice, unequal distribution of resources, and social exclusion. The movement has also been effective among the second generation of squatter's houses in big cities. Moreover, the actors of society-oriented municipalism emerged from the CHP, which defined itself as the left-of-the-center in this period and became a member of the socialist international in 1976. In this context, it can be said that society-oriented municipalism has developed within the leftist understanding. On the other hand, social municipalism is closer to the conservative understanding. In the 1990s, the leftist parties could not offer different policies than the conservative parties because of their policies aimed to reduce the harms of neoliberal understanding instead of producing policies against neoliberalism. Since the left-wing party SHP (Social-Democratic Populist Party), which held the local government in Ankara between 1989-1994, could not produce policies different from the local governments of other right-wing or conservative parties, the population living in squatter's houses and urban poor turned to extreme right views (Güler, 2004). Social municipalism, which started with the Gökçek era, displayed a liberal attitude in the economy and a conservative attitude in social

and political areas, which was similar to the new right view. Social services and social aids provided by using Islamic and conservative motifs were also promoted in the period of Gökçek, who was first nominated by the RP as being a conservative party. Therefore, it can be said that the mayors of both municipal approaches have quite different political views affecting their municipal practices.

Another difference in the periods of the mayors is that the society-oriented municipalism was implemented during the welfare state, while the social municipality was implemented in the period when the welfare state was largely eroded through a quick neoliberal transformation of Turkey. Therefore, different structuring of the state has created important differences in terms of municipalism, especially for urban policies. During the welfare state period, cities came to the fore as areas where labour was reproduced, and necessary urban services were provided. On the other hand, with neoliberalism, urban areas are areas transformed into places in which capital is reproduced and structured to serve capital accumulation processes. This situation, benefiting from Harvey, highlighted urban management in the welfare state period and urban entrepreneurship in the neoliberal period. Therefore, the two municipal understandings were influenced by the dominant political and economic system of their times. With social municipalism, Dalokay aimed to distribute the urban rent and services equally to everyone living in the city for the reproduction of labour and welfare of people. On the other hand, during the Gökçek period, necessary infrastructure investments were carried out to attract capital to Ankara with the understanding of urban entrepreneurship, and it was aimed for Ankara to stand out from other cities as a consumption and tourism city. Urban services are organized around aids to the specific urban poor rather than distributing resources or those aids on an equal basis.

The most important feature of society-oriented municipalism is to return the urban rent, which emerged with the growth of the city, back to the people. Therefore, the use of urban rents by the municipality to increase the welfare of

the people of the city is the most important feature of this understanding. In social municipalism, on the other hand, the understanding of returning a part of the urban rent back to them, especially by helping the groups who are completely or partially excluded from this rent, is dominant. It was mentioned that both municipalism approaches use crises that arise in some dimensions of the state. However, they are quite different from each other in the way they use crises. With the understanding of society-oriented municipality, Dalokay tried to transform the crisis in the substantive dimensions of the state into a structural or formal crisis and aimed to affect the structure as much as possible with these crises. Dalokay aimed to transform local governments into more autonomous political units through some strategic activities such as announcing the pressures of the central government to the public, going on a hunger strike for workers who cannot get paid, not paying the debts of the municipality to the central government institutions, establishing the Revolutionary Municipalities Union which was established for local governments to be more independent from the centre. In addition, he showed the influence of historically important economic groups in city administration and urban politics, and he wanted to decrease the influence of these groups in urban politics with practices such as establishing bread factories and not increasing public transportation fees. He was so against the centralist structure that he even contradicted his own party. With the view that local governments are not an extension of the central state, under the influence of some urban groups, and central political parties, Dalokay has tried to significantly change a historically very important structure. While doing this, he tried to gain the support of the people both by transforming the urban rent back into the public and through his discourses and realised actions. Class-based populism came to the forefront as a political strategy to gain power against many political actors and structure. Populism as a political strategy was not used before the election of Dalokay. Even though there were promises to lower-income dwellers and people living in the squatter's houses for increasing their welfare and providing better municipal services, many of his projects had formulated during his term because of a necessity. In other words, class-based populism Dalokay implemented had become prominent political strategy for overcoming

problems, difficulties, and pressures from different political actors (from national or urban area) through the power he mobilized from the popular approval.

Social municipalism, on the other hand, used the crisis in the dimensions of the state quite differently. With neoliberalism, a capital-oriented accumulation strategy has been adopted, and rapid urbanization has caused the impoverishment of the urban poor even further. With social assistance, it has been tried to prevent the worsening of the situation of the urban poor to a certain extent. While maintaining the neoliberal understanding of social municipality and the characteristics of the urban area that has begun to be transformed for the reproduction of capital, social municipalism has differentiated from previous local governments by distributing social aids. Gökçek's most important policy choice was introducing direct social aids by the municipality. This policy was also supported by using Islamist and pre-republican discourses evolving around benevolence and charity. Thanks to social aids Gökçek was able to gather popular votes especially from the areas low-income people live. He used anti-elite populist discourses by accusing previous mayors or actors not to implement right policies for the welfare of the people. Thanks to social assistance, the 'risk of social explosion' was prevented, and consent of the urban poor was produced (ABB Municipal Activity Report, 2014). The mayors have been given wide powers, especially in the field of social assistance, with the legal changes made in line with the understanding of social municipality after 2004. The legal framework provided the local governments with a vague field to distribute social aids by not setting any universal principles and conditions for this distribution. Therefore, the distribution of social aids was politically oriented due to the lack of a legal framework. This situation provides an opportunity for clientelist relations to emerge. In other words, social aids as a mean for acquiring and sustaining popular votes have integrated into structure which enhanced the position of mayorship. It has turned into a production of consent with social aids over the urban poor who are in need. In Gökçek's term, there was a goal of reducing social risk and preventing the risk of social explosion, which is also seen in municipal activity reports. Social aids were also used for this goal. This

situation actually serves to maintain the crisis at a certain level rather than overcoming the crisis, which enabled Gökçek to become the mayor. Social aids given through local governments have an important role in the promotion of social municipality by the central government. The increase in social aids not only in local elections but also during general elections shows that the clientelist relations established by the municipalities with the urban poor are also established for the central government. In this context, Gökçek, who gained power by using the crisis that emerged in the substantive dimension, was a strategic actor in terms of preventing the crisis from affecting structural dimensions by keeping the crisis at a manageable level instead of eliminating it. In addition, overcoming this crisis also harms clientelist relations at some point. The votes received in return for the social aids given to the urban poor, who are in need, will damage clientelist relations with the disappearance of this neediness. Moreover, the idea of politically and economically autonomous local governments from the central government, which was promoted during the Dalokay's period, was reversed despite the wide powers given to the mayors during the social municipality period. Local governments have turned into the local extension of the centre. The resignation of many important cities, including Gökçek, by the 'request' of the president supports this situation. Therefore, it can be said that Dalakoy, who is the representative of the society-oriented municipalism approach, targeted the centralist structures being one of the characteristics of the local government structure in Turkey. On the other hand, social municipalism brought back the centralized structure that was shaken by Dalokay. The mayorship, which clashed with many groups by the support of the public, including its own party during the Dalokay's period, has transformed into being a local representative of the central government and compatible with the interests of the urban economic groups in Gökçek's period.

Two municipalism approaches could be better understood by using Jessop's conceptualization of the state (Table 5 and Table 6). In Table 5, the evaluations of the two mayors and the municipal approaches to the state crisis are examined in six dimensions proposed by Jessop. While the approaches are quite similar to

each other in the mode of representation dimension, they have contrasts with each other in most dimensions. While Dalokay and his approach have a reaction to a structural change in the mode of articulation dimension, Gökçek emphasizes that this crisis can be overcome with the right management. In the intervention dimension, while there is an intervention to the market in order to protect and increase the welfare of the people with Dalokay and society-oriented municipalism, an intervention against the problems created by the market or structure comes to the fore in Gökçek and social municipalism. This distinction is also reflected in the social base dimension. While the protection and care of the people is seen as a key to overcome the crisis in Dalokay, increasing in urban rent by enhancing urban economy and economic actors, which is also prominent in urban entrepreneurship, is seen as the way out of the crisis in Gökçek's approach. While policies are being pursued with the logic of urban entrepreneurialism, social assistance and aids to the people who are harmed or impoverished by these policies both serves to protect the existing structure and produce the legitimacy for the system. Both municipal approaches differ from each other in terms of the roles they assign to local governments. While there is a decentralized desire in Dalokay, this desire is the opposite in Gökçek. One of the criticisms that can be made here is that Dalokay spent a significant part of his mayorship as the mayor from the opposition party and wanted decentralization due to the pressures of the centre, while Gökçek's situation was the opposite. However, the fact that Dalokay insists on this demand even against to his own party can be interpreted as he really wants a structural change. On the other hand, although Gökçek had more authority than previous mayors and served in his office for many years, he did not enter into any conflict with the centre. He even left the mayorship when he was asked to resign in 2017. Gökçek, who accused the previous mayors for following the wrong policies and corruption before the 1994 local elections, remained limited in his criticism of the structural order as a desire for a more liberal and democratic order, especially for the conservative sections of the society, even after he won the mayorship. Therefore, while Dalokay wanted a structural change not only for Ankara but for the decentralization of all local governments, it is very difficult to see such a strong

desire during the Gökçek period, even when he was in opposition party before 2003. Finally, while urban rent, which is one of the most important points for society-oriented municipalism in the dimension of hegemonic vision, is used at the expense of disturbing some urban economic groups in order to increase the welfare of the citizens, in Gökçek's period, while the local economy is increased with urban entrepreneurship, there is gaining the consent of the affected segments of the society with social aids. Since there is nothing to change in the ongoing structures for him.

Table 5. Responses of Society-Oriented Municipalism and Social Municipalism for Crisis in Ankara Using the SRA Crisis Aspects

Crisis Aspects of State Dimension	Dalokay and Society-Oriented Municipalism	Gökçek and Social Municipalism
Three Formal Dimensions		
Modes of representation	Representing Low-Income and People Living in Squatter's Houses Who were Excluded from Urban Rent, Welfare, and Infrastructure	Representing Low-Income and People Living in Squatter's Houses Who were Affected by Neoliberal Market Economy
Modes of articulation	Local Governments that are Politically and Economically Independent from the Central Government	Strong Mayorship and Mayors Being Able to Implement 'Right' Policies
Modes of intervention	Intervention to Market by Providing Diverse and Cheaper Municipal Services (Housing, Transportation, Food)	Intervention to Disadvantaged and Low-Income People by Distributing Social Aids
Three Substantive Dimensions		
Social basis of state	Protecting People from Market Economy and Enhancing Welfare in Urban Area	Enhancing Urban Economy by Investing Infrastructure, Cooperating Local Economic Groups, Aiding Low-Income Groups
State project	Autonomous Local Governments Being Able to Implement Necessary Policies for Local People	Local Governments Supported by the Central Government's Transfers and Investments
Hegemonic vision	Turning Urban Rent Back to People, Protecting and Increasing Welfare of the People	Production of Consent Through Social Aids for Implementation of Neoliberal Market Economy, Looking After the Affected Parts of the Society

Source: Formed by the Author by Using Jessop's Six dimensions of the state and their crisis tendencies (Jessop, 2016)

In Table 6, a brief analysis of two municipal understandings in state dimensions is presented. As a mode of representation, it can be said that the two actors benefit from populism, even if their usage is different. However, while the populism used in Gökçek's period took a clientelist form in structure, such a situation did not occur in Dalokay's period. At this point, one of the criticisms that may come to the thesis is that the Dalokay period was rather short compared to Gökçek. However, the formulization of Dalokay's projects, even if there are populist, leaves very narrow space for its use for clientelist relationships. The projects are formulated as being open to the use of all segments living in the urban area. On the other hand, social assistance, which is the characteristic feature of the Gökçek period and social municipalism, creates opportunities for clientelist relations both structurally and practically. However, despite the criticisms brought to the structural problems that caused the social assistance system to be clientelist, Gökçek, who had been mayor for many years and had wide powers, did not make any changes in the system. Therefore, it is difficult to say that the projects put forward in the Dalokay period may lead to clientelist relations in the following periods, as they leave a very narrow space for the formation of clientelist structures from the very beginning. An example of this is the fact that Public-Bread (*Halk-Ekmek*), which can be seen as a populist project, is not suitable for creating clientelist relations despite being protected and developed by all mayors.

Table 6. Analysis of Society-Oriented Municipalism and Social Municipalism in Ankara Using the SRA

State Dimensions	Dalokay and Society-Oriented Municipalism	Gökçek and Social Municipalism
Three Formal Dimensions		
Modes of representation	Class-Based Populism	Clientelism supported with Anti-Elite Populism
Modes of articulation	Decentralization	Centralization
Modes of intervention	Direct and Indirect Intervention to Market-Economy	Intervention for Sustaining Welfare of the People in a Certain Level by Social Aids,
Three Substantive Dimensions		
Social basis of state	Urban Managerialism, Protecting Welfare of the People from the Market Economy, Providing Municipal Services to Everyone	Urban Entrepreneurialism, Appliance of Neoliberal Market Economy and Providing Social Aids for Supporting Losers of The Market
State project	Politically and Economically Autonomous Local Governments	Local Agents (Representative) of the Central Government
Hegemonic vision	Turning Urban Rent Back to People, Citizenship-Based	Distributing Social Aids to People for the Protection of Structure

Source: Formed by the Author by Using Jessop's Six dimensions of the state and their crisis tendencies (Jessop, 2016)

In the mode of articulation dimension, although Dalokay developed a decentralized discourse, it was frequently criticized by his own party and Dinçer, who later became the successor of Dalokay. Particularly, he has been criticized that he behaves more on its own in urban policies and uses important experts as consultants rather than empowering them. Although Dalokay has decentralized demands for local governments, it can be said that it has a centralist orientation in city management. But structurally his will and demands are decentralized. On the other hand, Gökçek followed centralist policies both in terms of the mayor's powers and the structural position of local governments. This difference comes to the fore in the state project dimension of the two actors and the municipal movement. In the social basis dimension, Dalokay put the protection of the welfare of the people of Ankara at the focal point in line with the principles of

urban managerialism. He argued that everyone living in the urban area should receive municipal services, especially by approaching the people living in squatter's houses in terms of providing those services on a right-based basis. On the other hand, while Gökçek increased the welfare of the city with urban entrepreneurialism, he chose to alleviate the devastating effects of this policy, especially for low-income groups, through social assistance. As a hegemonic vision, legitimacy in society-oriented municipalism is provided by using urban rent for the urban people, social municipalism has another point. Social municipalism does not propose another order structurally, it proposes social assistance to reduce the social risk that may arise by the 'losers' of this system. Thus, it prevents structural negativities which provides the point of the legitimacy. In other words, protecting the structure by assisting the people who are affected from it.

The two municipalism approach share main similarities which could be listed as follows:

- i. They are actor-based approaches to local governments. The mayors of Ankara had a crucial role in formulating those approaches through their strategic decisions and actions.
- ii. Crisis, both in formal and substantive dimensions of the state, are important for the formation of those approaches. Rapid urbanizations, the inability of governments and actors to formulate solutions to urban problems, and social instabilities caused by political and economic restructuring provided both mayors opportunities to implement their strategic selectivities.
- iii. The problems and demands of the urban poor, mostly living in squatter's houses, have become the focus of both municipal approaches in terms of forming the characteristics of the municipal approaches and collecting votes. Populist policies and discourses have been crucial to maintain the power.

While two municipal approaches share similarities originated from structural and social crises as well as influence of strategic actors, they are quite different in terms of the relationship of the actors with the structure. While Dalokay tried to change the structure and produce a different hegemony by using state-sized crises, Gökçek, who used similar crises, developed a protective understanding of the structure. Gökçek era strengthened the crisis by keeping the crisis under control, especially with social aids, rather than changing the dominant structure and hegemony. In this sense, as strategic actors, both mayors played an important role in shaping the future of the structures with their strategic decisions. There are great differences occurred, due to the actors that shape these understandings, in the approaches of the two municipalism, which have common problems and crises in terms of their similarities, Even when the influence of the structures on the actor was quite high during the Dalokay period, he tried to overcome the centralism, which is very important characteristic in the Turkish political structure. Even if the central and local governments were from different parties, it can be claimed that Dalokay would still try to change the centralism in Turkish politics since he experienced the problems even with his own party. On the other hand, it can be said that the control of the center over the local governments increased during the Gökçek period, especially with usage of clientelist relations. While Turkish experience for urban managerialism and entrepreneurialism maintain characteristics of the Harvey's framework, it also distinguished in some respects due to different conditions, structures, and relationships. The centralist structure, the positions of local governments in the structure, the groups and political parties that are effective in urban politics, the concerns of votes and the strategic actors' relations established with the society have been very effective for both municipalism approaches. This situation has led to a different development of urban managerialism and entrepreneurialism in Turkey.

Dalokay and Gökçek's approaches to local governments have been very influential in the experience of the transition from urban managerialism to urban entrepreneurialism in Turkey. The dominant political movements of the period,

the position of the local governments within the structure, crisis in the state dimensions, and the responses of the actors (Dalokay and Gökçek) have been influential for the emergence of society-oriented municipalism and social municipalism. These municipalism approaches constitute two important landmarks of local government transition in Turkey. In this thesis, it has been tried to examine the Turkish transition from urban managerialism to urban entrepreneurialism, which Harvey revealed by examining the transformation in American cities, using Jessop's state approach. Jessop's framework has helped to emphasize the relationship between strategic actors and structures. It has been seen that strategic actions could have a significant impact on structures and social relations, even within the limits and opportunities offered to them by the structures. In this context, it would be necessary to consider the actions of strategic actors who will act within those structures as well as the structures organized through public reforms. Moreover, emphasis given to strategic actors could increase our knowledge about the relationship between actors and structures while examining the state structures and transitions instead of ignoring the actors constantly acting and shaping the future of the structures which was articulated by the actors of the past.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

David Harvey 1989 yılında yayınladığı “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism” başlıklı makalesinde Amerikan kentlerdeki yönetim değişimine dikkat çekmiş ve kent çalışmalarında önemli bir tartışma başlatmıştır. Bu değişim dünyadaki kentlere yansımaları birbirinden farklı olmuş ve bu tezde de Türkiye’deki geçiş incelenmiştir. Türkiye’deki geçiş 1970’lerde toplumcu belediyecilik ve 2000’lerde ortaya çıkan sosyal belediyecilik üzerinden incelenmiştir. Bu belediyecilik akımları veya yaklaşımları dönemin hâkim sosyal, ekonomik ve politik sınırları içerisinde yaşanan kent sorunlarına göre şekil almıştır. Ayrıca iki belediyecilik yaklaşımında da dönemin belediye başkanları özgün bir yerel yönetim perspektifi ve pratiği oluşturmada oldukça önemlidir. 1970’lerde ve 2000’lerde bu belediyecilik akımları ana olarak Ankara ve İstanbul’da uygulanmış, ancak Ankara belediye başkanları bu belediyecilik yaklaşımlarında daha karakteristik politikalar ortaya koymuşlardır. Bundan dolayı bu tez odağına iki Ankara belediye başkanını ve onların geliştirdikleri belediyecilik akımları üzerinden Türkiye’deki yerel yönetim değişimini göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Bu tezde Harvey’in makalesindeki kent yönetimindeki değişimin Türkiye’deki deneyimi yer alırken, teorik çerçeve olarak Jessop’ın devlet yaklaşımı benimsenmiştir. Poulantzas’ın devlet teorisinden oldukça etkilenen Jessop, Poulantzas’ın sınıf iktidarı ile devlet iktidarı arasındaki son denklemden memnun değildi. Jessop, Poulantzas’ın devlete toplumsal bir ilişki olarak yaklaşımına katılmıştır. Ancak Jessop’a göre Poulantzas, devlet gücü için kilit bir ikilemin üstesinden gelememiştir. Devlet gücü, makro düzeyde egemen güç bloğuna yarar sağlar. Ancak mikro düzeyde, sınıf çıkarlarının yanı sıra çok

çeşitli çatışmalar ve taktikler de devlet politikalarını etkilemektedir. Sonuç olarak Jessop, devletin sosyal bir ilişki olduğu konusunda hemfikir olsa da devlet gücünün doğası hakkında genelleme yapamayacağımızı veya makro düzeyde bir iddiada bulunamayacağımızı iddia eder. Ekonomik veya sınıfsal kaygıların yanı sıra diğer birçok siyasi stratejinin devlet politikasını etkilediğini kabul ederek, devletin belirli siyasi stratejilere diğerlerine göre daha duyarlı olacağı konusunda daha esnek bir beyanda bulunur. Bu sonuç, nihai olarak, teorik veya politik düzeyde sınıfa veya sermayeye öncelik veren herhangi bir açıklamanın göz ardı edildiğini gösterir (Jessop, 1990). Ancak devlet hem stratejik hem de yapısal olarak seçici olmaya devam ediyor; bazı devlet biçimlerinin bazı stratejileri diğerlerine tercih ettiği anlamına gelen “yapısal olarak dolayımlanmış bir önyargıya” sahiptir (Hay, 1994). Jessop, Poulantzas’ın ortaya attığı devletin göreceli özerkliğini de eleştirir. Basitçe sosyal dünya olarak adlandırabileceğimiz hiçbir bileşenin, a priori veya önceden belirlenmiş bir anlamda tamamen veya hatta büyük ölçüde karar verici olarak kabul edilemeyeceğini iddia eder (Jessop, 1990). Jessop, Marksist teori içerisinde kapitalist devlet bağlamında yürütülen tartışmalarda “sermaye-sınıf” ikilemini aşmak için stratejik-ilişkisel yaklaşımı önermiş ve kapitalist devlet tartışmalarındaki ikilemin aşılması için “strateji” kavramının kullanılması gerektiğini belirtmiştir. Jessop’a göre, sermaye-mantığı çerçevesinde yürütülen devlet çalışmaları, devletin sermaye birikimi ve burjuva siyasi tahakkümü açısından işlevselliğini kabul ederek, devleti çoğu kez özünde kapitalist olarak görmektedir. Ayrıca bu anlayış içinde, sermayenin tek bir mantığının, kapitalist gelişmenin mevcut her aşamasında geçerli olduğu varsayılır ve tek bir zorunluluklar dizisi olduğu ima edilir. Jessop’a (2014) göre, “bu tür varsayımlar oldukça kısıtlayıcıdır ve farklı birikim stratejileri izleme olasılığını ve farklı sınıf güçlerine elverişli bir manevra alanının varlığını göz ardı eder.”

Stratejik-ilişkisel yaklaşım, siyasi ve ekonomik politika oluşturmanın varlığının temeli olarak aracı, yapısal ve düşünsel faktörler arasındaki karşılıklı bağımlılığı ve yinelenen ilişkileri kuran ilişkisel ve diyalektik bir yöntemdir. Yapı ve aktör arasındaki dinamik ilişkiye odaklanır. Hay’e (Hay 2002) göre, yapı ve aktör

arasındaki etkileşim “ayrı ayrı ele alınan yapısal ve fail faktörlerin toplamına indirgenemez.” Öte yandan yapı ile aktör arasında birbirini etkileyen ve birbirini etkileyen sürekli bir ilişki vardır. Bu nedenle bu iki kavramın birlikte incelenmesi gerekir. Ayrıca bu ilişkinin mekân-zaman bağlamı çerçevesinde incelenmesi de önemlidir. Hay, yapısal bağlamın doğasının tarihten geldiğini iddia eder. Bu yaklaşımda yol bağımlılığı (path-dependency), doğrusal ve bozulmamış bir tarihsel değişim sağlamaz. Dünün kararları ve eylemleri bugünün bağlamını şekillendirip, kısıtlayıp mümkün kılarsa da (Bathelt ve Gluckler, 2003), yol bağımlılığı geleceği şekillendirmek için yine de aktörlere bağlıdır; çünkü gelecek “oyuncuları sonsuz tekrara mahkûm etmez” (Jessop, 2005). Yol bağımlılığı, kendi bağlamlarında hareket eden aktörlerin daha iyi anlaşılmasını sağlamak ve ayrıca aktörlerin yol şekillendirme stratejileri için anlamlı bir içgörü sağlamak için önemlidir. Stratejik-ilişkisel yaklaşımı daha iyi anlamak için Jessop, devleti incelerken devletin altı boyutunu önerir ve “her boyutun kendi stratejik seçicilikleri vardır ve her biri analitik olarak farklı olsa da ampirik olarak hepsi örtüşür” (Jessop, 2016). Boyutlardan üçü devletin yapısal yönleriyle ilgiliyken, diğer üç boyut söylemsel ve eylemsel yönlerini oluşturur. Yapısal boyut, yapının veya devletin kapasitelerini ve kısıtlamalarını kavramak için önemlidir. Aktörlerin kabiliyet ve toplumla ilişkilerini şekillendirir. Diğer üç boyut, devletin sosyal tabanıyla ilgilidir. Söylemsel ve eyleme yönelik yönler, biçimsel özelliklere stratejik anlam verir. Özetle Jessop’ın yaklaşımı ile stratejik aktörlerin yapı ile kurdukları ilişkiler analitik düzlemde incelenebilmektedir. Ayrıca yapıların oluşmasına ve aktörlerin eylemlerine etkisi olan mekân-zaman bağlamı da oldukça önemlidir. Bu şekilde stratejik aktörlerin içinde buldukları koşullara göre gösterdikleri karar ve eylemleri kendi dönemsellikleri içerisinde değerlendirilebilmektedir. Çünkü aktörlerin kararları, uygulamaları ve düşünceleri ancak kendi zaman ve mekanlarında yorumlanabilir. Dolayısıyla aktörlerin siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal durumları, hem onların karar ve uygulamalarının sınırlarını çiziyor hem de kendi stratejik seçiciliklerini yaratmaları için onlara farklı fırsatlar sunuyor. Bu nedenle tezde dünyadan hem aktörleri hem de Türkiye’yi etkileyen önemli siyasi, ekonomik ve toplumsal hareketlere yer verilecektir.

Jessop'un yaklaşımının aksine Harvey, devlet içindeki diğer sosyal ve politik güçleri vurgulamaz. Ancak Harvey stratejik aktörlerin salt kapitalist sınıfın çıkarlarına hizmet etmek yerine kendi çıkarları için hareket etme ihtimalini de kabul etmektedir (Şengül, 2009). Şengül'e (2009) göre Harvey, kentsel mekanın hem üretiminde hem de yeniden üretiminde aktörlerin tarihsel öneminin farkındadır; ancak sınıf ilişkileri çerçevesinde farklı aktörleri ve stratejik eylemlerini de kapitalistler arasındaki rekabet veya kapitalist ile işçi sınıfları arasındaki çatışmalar olarak tanımlar (Şengül, 2009). Kısacası, iki önemli Marksist düşünür arasındaki temel ayrım, devletin ontolojik özünde yatmaktadır. Ancak iki yazar, kentsel siyaset ve yönetim incelemesinde çelişkili olmaktan ziyade, kentsel siyaseti incelerken birbirini tamamlayıcı olarak düşünülebilir.

Türkiye'de yerel yönetimler, Batı ülkelerinden farklı bir şekilde gelişmiştir. Osmanlı döneminde yerel yönetimler genel olarak merkezin idaresi altındaydı ve Avrupa'dakiler gibi özerk idari birimler değildi. Ancak bu yerel yönetimlerin tamamen merkezi yönetimin denetiminde ve merkezin uzantıları olduğu anlaşılmamalıdır. Osmanlı döneminde teşkilat yapısı şekillenen yerel yönetimler, zaman zaman merkezi yönetime karşı güç geliştirerek daha özerk yapılar oluşturabilmiştir. Ayrıca kentsel alanlardaki farklı gruplar kentin ekonomik ve sosyal yaşamında etkin rol oynamıştır. Bu anlamda Osmanlı Devleti'nde özgün bir yerel yönetim yapısından bahsetmek mümkündür. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulmasıyla birlikte Osmanlı Devleti'ndeki sistem daha da merkezileşmiş ve büyük ölçüde korunmuştur. Ancak bu merkeziyetçilik eğilimine karşı daha özerk bir yerel yönetim yapılanması talepleri, kentsel alanların giderek büyümesi ve öneminin artmasıyla başlamış, ancak devlet yapısı genel olarak merkeziyetçi yapısını korumuştur. Bu durumla birlikte kent yönetimine belediye başkanı olarak seçilen bazı stratejik aktörler hem yapıların değişmesinde hem de kent siyasetindeki ilişkilerin yeniden tanımlanmasında oldukça etkili olmuştur. Toplumcu belediyeçilik ve sosyal belediyeçilik, mevcut yapıların sınırlılıkları ve imkanları dahilinde stratejik aktörlerin kararları ve uygulamalarıyla organik olarak şekillenen iki belediyeçilik hareketi olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Mevcut yapıların kısıtlılıklarını ve imkanlarını zorlayarak veya kullanarak iki farklı belediyeçilik hareketi yaratan bu stratejik aktörler, sadece kendi yerel yönetimlerini değiştirmekle kalmamış, diğer belediyelerin işleyişine de örnek teşkil etmişlerdir. Bu anlamda kendi zamanının fırsatlarını, kısıtlamalarını ve krizlerini kullanan bu aktörlerin kararları ve uygulamaları önemlidir. Bu tezde iki farklı belediyeçilik hareketinin önemli mimarları olarak Ankara Belediye Başkanları Vedat Dalokay ve İbrahim Melih Gökçek incelenmektedir.

1950'lerden 1970'lere ve 1980'lerin ikinci yarısından itibaren yeniden başlayan hızlı kentleşme, Türk siyasetinde oldukça etkili olmuştur. Büyük şehirleri hedef alan bu kentleşme hareketleriyle, merkezi yönetimlerin konuya ilgisizliği veya çözüm bulamamasından dolayı her iki dönemde de kentsel sorunlar oldukça büyümüştür. Özellikle kentlere göç etmiş ve gecekondularda yaşayan insanlar her iki belediyeçilik hareketi için de çok önemlidir. Bu belediyeçilik hareketleri, kent yoksullarının sorunları ve talepleri çerçevesinde gelişmiştir. Ancak, bu kentsel soruna yaklaşımlarında birçok farklılık vardır. Hem Türkiye'de hem de Dünya'da kentsel yönetim vizyonları, kentsel alanların daha geniş siyasi ve ekonomik yapılarıdaki rolünü etkilemesi açısından da önemli faktörlerdir. Aktörlerin yaşadıkları dönemlerdeki farklılık, kent politikalarına da yansımıştır. Toplumcu belediyeçilik yaklaşımının aktörü Dalokay'ı refah devleti döneminin baskın kentsel rolü olan kent yöneticiliği (urban managerialism) bağlamında yorumlamak daha uygun olurken, Gökçek'i kentsel girişimcilik (urban entrepreneurialism) bağlamında yorumlamak gerekir. Aktörlerin kentsel yönetime yaklaşımları, dönemleri incelenirken Harvey'in bakış açısının Türkiye'deki geçişi daha fazla anlam kazanmaktadır.

Tezin üçüncü bölümünde toplumcu belediyeçiliğin ortaya çıktığı zaman olan 1970'lere kadarki Türk yerel yönetim tarihi, dünyada baskın siyasi hareketlere ve Türkiye'de yaşanan sosyal ve ekonomik değişikliklere yer verilmiştir. Türk yerel yönetim tarihi Osmanlı ve cumhuriyet dönemleri olarak incelenmiştir. Dönemler incelenirken Türk yerel yönetimleri için oldukça önemli bir yapı olan merkezîyetçilik öne çıkmıştır. Cumhuriyet döneminde Osmanlı Devleti'nden

alınan yerel yönetim sistemi büyük ölçüde devam etmiştir. Cumhuriyet döneminde uzun bir süre yerel yönetimler merkezi yönetimin yerel bir uzantısı olarak görülmüştür. Özellikle cumhuriyet sonrası merkeziyetçilik önem kazanmış, yerel yönetimler merkezi yönetimin politikalarının uygulandığı birimler olarak algılanmıştır. Cumhuriyet dönemi, büyük ölçüde Osmanlı Devleti'nden devralınan yerel yönetim yapısını korurken hem siyasi hem de ekonomik açıdan daha özerk belediyeler için bazı adımlar atılmıştır. Özellikle 1961 Anayasası'ndan sonra belediyeler önceki dönemlere göre çok daha özerk yapılar haline gelmiştir. Belediye başkanları doğrudan halk tarafından seçilir ve yeni bir anayasa ile hukuki olarak da korunur duruma gelmiştir. Bu durum, belediye başkanlarını önemli kentsel aktörler haline getirmiş ve bazı belediye başkanları, 1970'lerde yeni elde edilen bu güçleri stratejik olarak harekete geçirerek Türk yerel yönetiminin ve kentsel siyasetinin şekillenmesinde kilit roller oynamıştır.

Türkiye, özellikle 1950'lerden sonra birçok sosyal ve siyasi değişim geçirdi. 1950'de Demokrat Parti'nin iktidara gelmesiyle başlayan bu dönemde kentleşme hızla arttı. Şengül (2009) 1950-1980 arasını 'işgücünün kentleşmesi' olarak değerlendirmektedir. Ancak işgücü gün geçtikçe kentleşirken gerek merkezi yönetim gerekse yerel yönetimler bu hızlı kentleşmenin getirdiği sorunlara karşı toplumsal ve ekonomik politikalar üretememiştir ve sonrasında duyarsız hale gelmişlerdir. Batı'daki sol hareketlerin de etkisiyle kentlerin önemli bir bölümünü oluşturan gecekondu mahalleleri sol siyasete doğru politize olmaya başlamıştır. Merkezi ve yerel siyasette karşılık bulamayan bu kesimler, 1973'te Ankara, İstanbul ve İzmit belediye başkanları sayesinde görünürlük kazanacaktı. Sonraki dönemde siyasetin önemli konularından biri haline gelecekti. Türkiye'deki kentsel alanları şekillendiren hızlı kentleşme ve Batı'da başlayan sol hareketler, 1973 yerel seçimleri öncesi Türkiye'deki önemli kentlerin siyasi ve toplumsal bağlamını sunmak açısından oldukça önemlidir. Bu sayede toplumcu belediyecilik ve Dalokay dönemi daha anlaşılır olmaktadır.

Tezin dördüncü bölümü toplumcu belediyeçilik ve Vedat Dalokay dönemini incelemektedir. 1950'lerin başlarında başlayan hızlı kentleşme, özellikle gecekondualarda yaşayan belediyelerin kentsel hizmetleri yeterince sağlayamadığı kalabalık şehirlerle sonuçlandı. 1970'lerden sonra ikinci kuşak gecekondu gençliğinin de etkisiyle kentli sol hareket büyük kentlerde de etkin olmaya başladı. Kentleşme sorunlarının artması ve toplumun çözüm beklentisi, kaynak sıkıntısı çeken belediyelerin gerçekten etkin olmasını sağlamıştır. Ayrıca merkezin belediyeler üzerindeki ağır baskısı 1970'lerde çözümü zorlaştıran bir başka faktördü. 1973 yılına kadar merkezi ve yerel yönetimlerin aynı siyasi partiden olması, kentsel dinamiklerin harekete geçmesine engel olmuştur. Çünkü belediyeler üzerindeki vesayet ve merkeze bağımlılık, bir sonraki seçimde yeniden seçilmeme korkusu açısından iktidar partisine bağlı belediye başkanlarını etkilemiş ve şekillendirmiştir. Başka bir deyişle, belediye başkanları esas olarak ait oldukları merkezi hükümetin yerel temsilcileri olarak hareket ettiler. Ancak merkezi yönetim-yerel yönetim çatışması yerel yönetimleri yeni arayışlara itmiştir. Önemli kentsel alanlar ile merkezi yönetimler arasındaki ikiliğin, toplum odaklı belediyeçilik anlayışının şekillenmesinde büyük etkisi olmuştur. Bu çatışma, belediyeleri kaynakları etkin kullanmanın yanı sıra yenilerini edinmenin veya yaratmanın yollarını aramaya zorladı. Ayrıca, belediye başkanlarını merkezi hükümete karşı halkın desteğini kazanmak için halkla iletişim kurmaya iten halk desteğinin önemini de fark etmişlerdi.

Toplumcu belediyeçilik, belediye başkanlarının hem halka kentsel hizmetler sunmak hem de daha özerk siyasi birimler haline gelmek için maddi ve siyasi engelleri aşmak için uyguladıkları farklı stratejilerin birleşimi olarak tanımlanabilir. Bu yaklaşım, 1973 ile 1977 yılları arasında Ankara, İstanbul ve İzmit belediye başkanları tarafından farklı siyasi ve ekonomik gruplarla karşı karşıya kaldıkları politika uygulamaları, kararları, tepkileri ve çatışmalarına dayalı olarak kademeli olarak formüle edildiğinden, belediye başkanları bu belediye hareketinin çok önemli bir parçasıdır. (Güler, 2004). Toplumcu belediyeçiliğin beş temel ilkesi şunlardır (Tekeli, 1977: 33): demokratik ve

katılımcı belediyeçilik, üretici belediyeçilik, tüketimi düzenleyici belediyeçilik, kaynak yaratıcı belediyeçilik ve birlikçi-bütünlükçü belediyeçilik.

Merkezi ve yerel yönetimler arasındaki güç mücadelesi bu yeni belediyeçilik hareketinin oluşumunda etkili olmuştur. Yerel yönetimlerin mali ve siyasi sınırlamaları aşma mücadelesi, siyasi vesayet ve demokrasi tartışmaları bu hareketin kilit unsurlarıydı. Belediyelerin toplum odaklı belediyeçilik ilkeleri oluşturmasının ilk ve temel gerekliliği, önemli kentsel alanlarda muhalefet partilerine bağlı merkezi ve yerel yönetimler arasındaki çatışmaydı. Bu durum, temel belediye hizmetlerini yerine getiremeyen ve çalışanlarına maaş ödeyemeyen yerel yönetimleri, halkın gündelik sorunlarına etki etmeyi amaçlayan düşük maliyetli belediye politikaları oluştururken farklı gelir kaynakları yaratmaya ve maliyetleri düşürmeye itmiştir. Dalokay'ın öncü kısa ve uzun vadeli projeleri, demokrasi ve katılım da dahil olmak üzere belediye hizmetlerinin ve gücünün mali yönlerine çözümler geliştirmek için formüle edilen bu ilkelerle ilişkilendirildi, çünkü bu ilkeler belediyelerin ekonomik yönlerini güçlendirmek için de kullanıldı. Başka bir deyişle, ilkelerin amacı, kentsel alanlarda üretim ve tüketimi insanlar için disipline etmenin yanı sıra, belediye hizmetlerini formüle etmek ve sürdürmek için mali açıdan özgür belediyeler yaratmaktır. Toplum odaklı belediyeçilikten ya da ilkelerinden bahseden bir kaynak, kampanya ya da bildiri bulunmadığından, bu ilkelerin 1973 seçimlerinden önce ya da sonra oluşturulmadığını ya da belirlenmediğini belirtmek de önemlidir. Bu ilkeler, İstanbul, Ankara, İzmit ve benzeri belediye başkanları tarafından deneysel politika uygulaması ve formülasyonları sırasında oluşturulmuştur. Dolayısıyla bu ilkeler, toplum odaklı belediyelerin uyguladığı bir dizi ekonomik ve politik politika tercihinin sonuçları olarak anlaşılmalıdır.

Dalokay (Dalokay, 1977) seçildiğinde, Ankara'yı "midesi ağrıyan (sebze ve meyve halinin yetersizliği), bağırsakları bozuk ve eksik (kanalizasyon sorunu), koleralı (kalitesiz içme suyu) ve evsiz (gecekondulaşma) fakir bir adam" olarak tanımlamıştır. Bu ifade, Dalokay'ın görev süresince ürettiği politikaların iyi bir özetidir; çünkü projeleri ağırlıklı olarak gecekonduarda yaşayan insanlar için

konut, ucuz ve kaliteli gıda, toplu taşıma ve hem alt hem de orta sınıf için yeterli altyapı sağlamaya odaklandı. Ancak, önceliği öncelikle bu projeler için yeterli finansman bulmak için değişti. Yerel yönetimlerin finansmanı Türkiye’de her zaman bir sorun olmuştur, çünkü yerel yönetimler esas olarak merkezi yönetimin mali yardımına bağlıdır. Ayrıca, 1970’lerde yerel yönetimlerin mali kaynaklarının daha sınırlı olması nedeniyle merkezi transferlere çok daha bağımlıydılar. Aynı zamanda, patlayan nüfus için yapılan harcamalar, herhangi bir yerel yönetimin bu kadar kısa sürede kaldırabileceğinden daha fazla artmıştı. Bu nedenle, merkezi yönetimin mali transferleri yerel yönetimlerin günlük işleyişi için son derece hayati hale gelmiş, hatta merkezden ek kaynak sağlanması bile belediye başkanları için siyasi bir zafer olarak sunulan belediye başkanları için büyük bir başarıya dönüşmüştür. Ancak Türk siyasetindeki ilk ikilik, 1970’lerde Dalokay ve diğer CHP’li belediye başkanları için asıl meydan okumaydı. 1975’te yeni hükümetin sağ partiler tarafından kurulmasından sonra, önemli yerel ve merkezi hükümetleri kontrol eden partiler farklı ve hatta muhalif ideolojilerdendi. Bu durum Türkiye’deki kent siyaseti için özgün bir siyasi bağlam oluşturmuş, hatta Türk siyasetinin gelecek yıllarını da etkilemiştir. Merkezi yönetimin mali ve siyasi gücünden yararlanamayan Dalokay, kendi partisi de dahil olmak üzere merkezi siyaset aktörleriyle karşı karşıya gelmelerine rağmen, yeni gelir elde etme ve daha iyi hizmet sunma yolları bulmuştur. Halkın desteği gücünü korumak ve popülerlik kazanmak için oldukça önemli hale gelmiştir. Yerel ekonomik aktörler ile de çatışmaya girmekten çekinmeyen Dalokay, projelerini kentsel rantın halka dönüşümü söylemine oturarak birçok farklı siyasi ve ekonomik aktörle halkın desteği sayesinde mücadele etme imkânı bulmuştur.

Tezin beşinci bölümü ise 1980 sonrasında sosyal belediyeciliğin ortaya çıktığı 2000’lere kadar Dünya ve Türk siyasetine etki eden önemli siyasi ve ekonomik değişimleri ele almaktadır. 1980’ler dünya siyasi, ekonomik ve toplumsal ilişkilerinde önemli değişim ve dönüşümlerin yaşandığı yıllar olmuştur. 1960’lar-70’lerin toplumsal dinamizmi, 1980’lerden sonra parçalı yapılara bölündü. Dünya ekonomik yapısı değişmeye başlamış, sermayenin önemi

artmıştır. Ulus-devletlerin yönetim yapıları artık sermayenin gelişimine hizmet eden kurumsallaşmaya açılmış, böylece sermayenin belirleyici rol oynadığı dünya oluşmaya başlamıştır. Tüm bu değişimler, köklerini neo-liberalizmden alan yeni bir ekonomik paradigmanın parçası olmuştur. Somut uygulama ise kapitalist devletler tarafından ‘Yeni Sağ’ adı altında yeni bir siyasi yaklaşım olarak hayata geçirilmiştir. AKP dönemi yeni-sağ ideoloji olarak tanımlanabilse de ekonomik liberalleşme ve siyasi tavır açısından AKP’nin kendisi bile parti ideolojisi hakkında kesin ve somut bir tezahür sağlamamakta ve farklı hükümetleri içinde çelişkiler göstermektedir. Bu durum yeni sağın kendi içindeki çelişkilere de oldukça benzerdir.

1980 sonrası dünyadaki bu ekonomik, siyasi ve sosyal değişimlerden Türkiye de etkilenmiştir. İthal ikameci birikim stratejisi kriziyle birlikte Türkiye, devletin iç yapısını, iktidar bloğunu ve rejimin meşruiyet temellerini sarsan bir hegemonya krizi yaşadı. 12 Eylül Darbesi, hegemonya krizini aşmak için toplumsal güç dengesinin, ekonominin ve devletin kendi lehlerine yeniden yapılandırılmasını talep eden egemen sınıfların sahip olduğu bir dönüm noktası olmuştur (Özkazanç, 1996). 1980 Darbesi ile Türkiye’de kurulan otoriter askeri rejim, neo-liberal ekonomik programla uyumlu yapısal değişikliklere uygun ortamı sağlayan parlamenter sisteme son vermiştir (Ahmad, 2006: 206). Bu bağlamda Türkiye, Yeni Sağ’ın siyasi ve ekonomik gelişmelerin etkisini en hızlı benimseyen ülkelerden biri olmuştur. 1980 askeri darbesi ve başta sol olmak üzere birçok partiye getirilen yasaklar, yeni sağ politikaların uygulanması için uygun bir siyasi ve toplumsal ortam yarattı. Türkiye, 1980 yılında Türkiye ekonomisini serbest piyasa ekonomisine dönüştürmeyi amaçlayan 24 Ocak kararları ile yeni bir döneme girdi. Bu dönemin mimarı, yeni sağın Türkiye’deki temsilcisi ve uygulayıcısı olarak Turgut Özal ve ANAP’tı. ANAP, dünyadaki diğer yeni sağ partiler gibi liberal, milliyetçi ve muhafazakâr anlayışları birleştirdi (Vergin, 1989).

Türk sol hareketi de bu dönemde değişime uğradı. CHP’nin 1960’larda Ortanın Solu Hareketi ve 1970’lerde Demokratik Sol Çizgi gibi bazı hareketlerle siyasi

kimliğini ortaya koymasına karşın, 1980'lerden sonra dönemin egemen paradigması olarak liberal değerleri benimsediği görülmektedir. Ecevit'in başkanlığındaki CHP, Sosyalist Enternasyonal üyesiyken, yeni partisinde sol örgütlerle herhangi bir temas kurmadı. Yeni sağ siyasete ve neo-liberal sürece teslimiyet olarak değerlendirildi (Güler, 2004). Belge (1990) bu durumu "sosyal demokrasinin sorunu kapitalizmi kapitalistlerden daha iyi yönetmek değil; ancak solun görevi, kapitalizmi iyi yönetmekten başka hedefler bulmak olmalıdır". Bu durum sol partilerin yerel yönetimlere yaklaşımlarında da gözlemlenmiş; solcu belediye başkanları da yabancı yatırımları çekmek, fon ve kredi imkanları bulmak için neo-liberal politikalar uygulamaya çalışmıştı.

1990'lardaki Türkiye siyaseti ve koşulları 1960'larla benzerlikler gösterir. Her iki dönem de ciddi siyasi ve ekonomik değişim dönemlerinin ardından denk gelmiş ve hızlı kentleşme dönemleri olmuştur. 1950'de iktidara gelen DP ile birlikte uygulanmaya başlayan ekonomik programın yarattığı göçle birlikte hızlı kentleşme süreci başlamıştır. 1970'li yıllarda CHP'li aktörlerin büyük kentlerde başlattığı toplumsal belediyeçilik ile CHP sonraki yıllarda iktidara gelmeyi başarmıştır. Aynı şekilde 1980'li yıllarda yaşanan değişimlerle ortaya çıkan sorunlar 1990'lı yıllarda hissedilmeye başlanmış, farklı nedenlerle de olsa kente göç artmış ve bu dönemde siyasi partiler sorunlara çözüm üretmekte zorlanmışlardır. 1970'lerde sosyal ve ekonomik krizin yarattığı toplumsal adaletsizlik ve eşitsizlik söylemlerini sosyal politika vurgusuyla birleştirmek gibi CHP'li belediyelerin kullandığı söylemlere benzer söylemler kullanan Refah Partisi, 1990'ların ikinci yarısında belediye başkanları kazanarak kendi yaklaşımları olan sosyal belediyeçilik anlayışını hayata geçirdi. Farklı ideoloji ve yaklaşımlara sahip olsalar da iki farklı belediyeçilik anlayışının ortaya çıkması açısından önemli benzerlikler taşıdıkları söylenebilir. Ancak iki belediyeçilik yaklaşımı devlet, toplum ve kentli gruplarla ilişkileri açısından da oldukça farklıdır. AKP döneminde tam olarak uygulanan sosyal belediyeçilik, AKP neo-liberal politikaları uygulamaya devam ederken, seçmenlerin onayında önemli rol oynadı.

Altıncı bölümde ise sosyal belediyciliğin hem yasal hem de pratikte tam olarak uygulamaya geçildiği 2000-2014 arası dönem ve Ankara'nın en uzun süre görev almış belediye başkanı Melih Gökçek incelenmiştir. Sosyal belediyciliğin en önemli karakteristiği sosyal yardımlardır. Sosyal yardımlar Gökçek döneminde 5216 ve 5393 Sayılı Belediye Kanunu ile yasal bir zemine oturtulmuş, sosyal yardımların kullanımı ise belediye başkanlarına bırakılmıştır. Gökçek kentsel girişimcilik için birçok proje geliştirmiş, özellikle Ankara'nın turizm kenti olması için önemli yatırımlar yapmıştır. Diğer bir yandan ise sosyal yardım ve hizmetler ile özellikle kentli yoksula yönelik projeler geliştirmiştir. Gökçek dönemindeki sosyal yardımların içeriğine bakıldığında, kent yoksullarının durumunda herhangi bir değişiklik yaratacak bir uygulama bulmak çok zordur. Gıda, kömür ve giyecek yardımları kent yoksullarının daha da yoksullaşmasını engellemekte ya da belirli bir düzeyde tutmaktadır. Ancak onları yoksulluktan kurtaracak bir değişiklik yaratmamaktadır. Bu durum yoksulluğun devam etmesini ve kent yoksullarının belediye yardımlarına bağımlı hale gelmesini sağlamaktadır. Sosyal yardımların dağıtımı belli şartlara bağlıdır. Ancak bu şartlar adayların elenmesinden ziyade seçilmesi için yaratılmıştır. Ayrıca bu şartların sağlanması için birden fazla aktörün takdir yetkisini kullanabildiği bir yapı mevcuttur. Sosyal yardım yapmaya yetkili veya bu süreçte etkisi olan kişiler, takdir yetkisini kullanarak sosyal yardımların yapılıp yapılmamasına etki edebilirler. Ayrıca bu alandaki uzman personelin yetersizliği, takdir yetkisini kullanan kişilerin hangi koşullarda takdir yetkisi verdiğini de belirsiz hale getirmektedir. Sosyal yardımların seçim dönemlerinde veya dini günlerde artması da bir başka eleştiridir. Sosyal yardımların seçmen davranışları üzerinde etkili olduğunu gösteren çalışmalara (Doğan, 2016) bakıldığında, bu yardımların klientalist ilişkilerin oluşması için oldukça uygun bir ortam sağladığı görülmüştür.

Tezin yedinci bölümü ise iki belediyciliğin benzerlikleri, farklılıkları ve Türkiye'de kentsel yöneticilikten girişimciliğe geçişin analizi yapılmaktadır. İki belediycilik yaklaşımının üç önemli benzerliği vardır. Birincisi Ankara belediye başkanları, stratejik kararları ve eylemleriyle bu yaklaşımların formüle

edilmesinde çok önemli bir role sahiptir. İkinci olarak belediyeçilik yaklaşımları devlet boyutlarındaki krizleri kullanmışlardır. Hızlı kentleşme, hükümetlerin ve aktörlerin kentsel sorunlara çözüm üretememesi ve siyasi ve ekonomik yeniden yapılanmanın neden olduğu sosyal istikrarsızlıklar, her iki belediye başkanına da kendi stratejilerini uygulama imkânı vermiştir. Son olarak çoğunluğu gecekondularda yaşayan kent yoksullarının sorunları ve talepleri, belediyeçilik yaklaşımlarının özelliklerini oluşturma ve oy toplama açısından her yaklaşımının da odak noktası haline gelmiştir. Popülist politikalar ve söylemler iktidarı sürdürmek için çok önemli olmuştur.

Jessop'ın devlet boyutlarına olan stratejik ilişkiyi kullanarak bir analiz yapılmış, her iki belediyeçiliğinde yaklaşımı ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. Belediyeçilik yaklaşımlarının hem devlet boyutlarındaki krizlere yaklaşımları hem de bu boyutlarla ilişkileri birbirlerinden oldukça farklıdır. Dalokay ve toplumcu belediyeçiliğin devlet boyutlarında yaşanan krizleri yapısal sorunlar olarak değerlendirirken, sosyal belediyeçilik ve Gökçek sorunları uygulanan yanlış politikalarda bulunmaktadır. Krizden çıkış olarak Dalokay öncelikle kentsel rantın kentli halka ve yoksullara yapısal olarak dönüştürülmesi düşüncesi hakimken, Gökçek döneminde krizden çıkış yatırımları ve sermayeyi çekecek kent altyapısına yatırımlar olarak görülmüştür. Sosyal yardımlar ise politikalardan zarar gören ya da yoksullaşan kişilere yönelik hem mevcut yapının korunmasına hem de sistemin meşruiyetini üretmeye hizmet etmektedir. Her iki belediye yaklaşımı da yerel yönetimlere yükledikleri roller açısından birbirinden farklılık göstermektedir. Dalokay'da âdem-i merkeziyetçi bir istek varken Gökçek'te bu istek tam tersidir. Bir temsil biçimi olarak, kullanımları farklı olsa da iki aktörün de popülizmden faydalandığı söylenebilir. Ancak Gökçek döneminde kullanılan popülizm klientalist bir yapıya bürünürken, Dalokay döneminde böyle bir durum yaşanmamıştır. Dalokay'ın projelerinin formüle edilmesi, popülist olsa bile klientalist ilişkiler için kullanılmasına çok dar bir alan bırakmaktadır. Projeler, kentsel alanda yaşayan tüm kesimlerin kullanımına açık olacak şekilde formüle edilmiştir. Öte yandan, Gökçek döneminin ve sosyal belediyeçiliğin karakteristik özelliği olan sosyal yardımlar

hem yapısal hem de pratik olarak klientalist ilişkiler için fırsatlar yaratmaktadır. Klientalist ilişkiler yaratmaya uygun olmaması buna bir örnektir. Devletin sosyal boyutunda Dalokay, kent yöneticiliği ilkeleri doğrultusunda Ankara halkının refahının korunmasını odak noktasına koymuştur. Özellikle gecekondularda yaşayan insanlara bu hizmetlerin hak temelli olarak sunulması açısından yaklaşarak, kentte yaşayan herkesin belediye hizmeti alması gerektiğini savunmuştur. Öte yandan Gökçek, kentsel girişimcilikle kentin refahını artırırken, bu politikanın özellikle dar gelirli kesimler üzerindeki yıkıcı etkilerini sosyal yardımlarla hafifletmeyi seçmiştir. Hegemonik bir vizyon olarak toplumcu belediyecilikte meşruiyet, kentsel rantın kentli için kullanılmasıyla sağlanırken sosyal belediyecilik yapısal olarak bir düzen önermez. Yapının kaybedenlerinin ortaya çıkarabileceği sosyal riski azaltmak için sosyal yardım önerir. Böylece meşruiyet noktasını sağlayan yapısal olumsuzlukların önüne geçmektedir.

İki belediyecilik yaklaşımı, yapısal ve toplumsal krizler ile stratejik aktörlerin etkisinden kaynaklanan benzerlikleri paylaşırken, aktörlerin yapıyla ilişkisi açısından oldukça farklıdır. Dalokay devlet boyutunda krizler kullanarak yapıyı değiştirmeye ve farklı bir hegemonya üretmeye çalışırken, benzer krizleri kullanan Gökçek yapıyı koruyucu bir anlayış geliştirmiştir. Gökçek dönemi, hâkim yapıyı ve hegemonyayı değiştirmek yerine, özellikle sosyal yardımlarla krizi kontrol altında tutarak krizden devamlı yararlanmasını sağlamıştır. Bu anlamda stratejik aktörler olarak her iki belediye başkanı da stratejik kararlarıyla yapıların geleceğini şekillendirmede önemli rol oynamıştır. Dalokay döneminde Türk siyasi yapısında çok önemli bir özellik olan merkeziyetçilik aşılmaya çalışılmıştır. Öte yandan Gökçek döneminde özellikle klientalist ilişkilerinin kullanılmaya başlanmasıyla merkezin yerel yönetimler üzerindeki kontrolünün arttığı söylenebilir. Türkiye'deki kentsel yöneticilik ve girişimcilik deneyimi, Harvey'in çerçevesinin özelliklerini korurken, farklı koşullar, yapılar ve ilişkiler nedeniyle bazı açılardan da farklılık göstermektedir. Merkeziyetçi yapı, yerel yönetimlerin yapı içindeki konumları, kent siyasetinde etkili olan gruplar ve siyasi partiler, oy kaygıları ve stratejik aktörlerin toplumla kurdukları ilişkiler her

iki belediyeçilik anlayışında da oldukça etkili olmuştur. Bu durum Türkiye’de kentsel yöneticilik ve girişimciliğin farklı bir şekilde gelişmesine neden olmuştur.

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